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“Much writing on bioethics fails as philosophy because it takes for granted some of the 
institutions of practices of particular cultures or times.” 
 
O’Neill, O., Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, CUP, 2002, p. X. 
 
 
 
 
“The right to refuse medical treatment is at the core of individual autonomy. It enables an 
individual to retain physical integrity of his body, and to determine whether there are 
considerations more important than the preservation of his health or even life. The 
administration of blood transfusions against religious objection, a caesarean section 
operation imposed over the objections of the woman in labour, force-feeding of an adult 
anorexic patient and a non-consensual sterilisation operation on a mentally handicapped 
woman with the sole purpose of preventing any future pregnancies, […] go to the very essence 
of our choices as how to live.” 
 
Wicks, E., “The right to refuse medical treatment under the European convention of human 
rights”, Medical Law Review, 9, spring 2001, p.17. 
 
 
 
 
“Rules governing doctor-patient relations must rest on the premise that anyone’s wish to help 
a desperately pained, apparently helpless person is intertwined with a wish to hurt that 
person, to obliterate him from sight. It is not accidental  that the injunction to “take care of” 
someone has a two-edged meaning in popular speech.”
  
 
Burt, R., Taking care of strangers, the Free Press, 1979, Introduction, p. vi.
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Introduction 
 
In the course of this thesis, I will foreground cases in which the supposedly objective way of 
portraying autonomy has been in fact applied in rather different ways in relatively similar 
cases occurring in the Western world. More specifically, I will focus my attention on the US, 
the UK and Italy. 
 
The current approach used in bioethics, and more specifically medical ethics, gives a 
prominent role to the notion of autonomy when dealing with sensitive issues related to the 
patient’s future. This central notion of autonomy was necessary for the construction of the 
premises of the ethical revolution that shook the Western medical world after WWII.  
 
As a response to the atrocious medical experiments carried out by German and Japanese 
doctors, the Western world wanted to ensure greater protection for the patient such that he 
might be better able to defend himself from treatment forced upon him in the name of 
[pseudo] science. This was achieved via the implementation of the notion of informed 
consent, through which the decisional power of the patient increased drastically, the results 
being seen on many occasions in direct improvements to the possibility for affirmation of 
autonomy, freedom of choice. In recent years, however, the nature of such improvements has 
been called into question. 
 
A second foundational element of the role of autonomy in Western bioethics has been one 
particularly important shift in medical ethics over the past twenty years: the patient-doctor 
relationship has moved from a paternalistic model -whereby doctors were expected and 
entitled by law to enforce on patients their judgement on the presumption of “knowing best”- 
to a new system where a patient’s authority over her body is central. This qualitative change 
to the patient’s decisional power has in itself increased the (quantitative) weight of autonomy 
in specific bioethical controversies. Gradually, society has modified its perception of 
autonomy in medical contexts, moving from a concern with the best possible option for the 
patient -for whom any deviation from this path only served to further negate his autonomy 
due to a putative lack of competence- to an increasing respect for the patient’s autonomy on 
condition of sufficient proven competence. The growing acceptance of the patient’s will as a 
sufficient moral justification for ensuring, or withdrawing, treatment has created a number of 
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controversial cases in relation to the patient-doctor relationship. 
 
Thus, as a starting point I will consider the current Anglo-American legal system -whereby 
the notion of respect for patient’s autonomy has increasingly gained more relevance vis-à-vis 
the previous paternalistic approach that was dominant in the patient-doctor relationship. 
Paternalism had assumed that physicians were to be allowed to interfere with a person’s 
freedom of action, a person’s autonomy, on the grounds that it is for the good of the person, 
her liberty thus being legitimately restricted. 
 
The growing number of debated cases of refusal of medical treatment and its denial on the 
grounds of impermissibility in the name of the patient’s best interest has underlined the need 
for our attention to be refocused on the actual disappearance of paternalism from bioethical 
debates.  
 
The crucial switch in power relations is characterised by an acknowledgement that -under 
satisfactory conditions of competence- the patient is the best judge for providing -or rejecting- 
informed consent over a medical procedure concerning her. Prior to this conception of “patient 
knows best” there existed a dogmatic view of doctors as the best judges by definition. After 
all, what can the patient be expected to understand about the procedure that she may or may 
not decide to undergo? Eventually, it was realised that doctors are as imperfect as any other 
professionals, and though generally more informed than their patients, doctors can fail just as 
every other human being engaging in any practical activity can. The a priori justification of 
valuing the nobility of having chosen a profession where an irreversible mistake can be 
noticed was no longer satisfactory. The more this knowledge of fallibility spread in society, 
the less people were willing to trust doctors, resulting in a need, gradually expanded, for an 
increase in the patient’s decisional power, or, in more technical terms, in greater respect for 
her autonomy. 
 
This reform brought innovations in the capability of the patient directly to shape her [medical] 
destiny. This was seen as a positive change in biomedicine but also more broadly in society, 
because, despite often being underestimated, the interconnection between “medical politics” 
and “real politics” is direct enough to allow one to influence the other in significant ways. 
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It is on these grounds that this work should be considered: through the analysis of the 
unconvincing application of the notion of autonomy in some specific cases, it is my intention 
to broaden our perspective on how we should evaluate an inconsistent use of this central 
concept. 
 
In bioethics there exists a tendency to assess autonomy (or practical autonomy) as the 
function we can -or cannot- have within a given system. My idea is that we must abandon the 
mental state that puts a barrier between the sphere of bioethics -and biopolitics as a result- and 
the broader political scheme within which certain interpretations can be questioned. In 
understanding the inadequacy of such a premise in current debates, we must be ready to 
dissolve it progressively by the acceptance of its anachronism. This questioning our own 
stance on many delicate issues is a necessary means to avoid a situation in which the 
inconsistency present in the two spheres of justice (political and bioethical) produces such 
unhappiness -through the biased use of autonomy as a tool functional to power and not to 
individuals- that the very groundwork of the current Western society could be shaken by a 
violent outburst of anger towards authorities, the state and the status quo more generally. If we 
are to defuse this tension, we are thus required to provide a less drastic change (operated 
within the current system), yet we need also to realise the urgent need for innovative 
examination of the role granted to autonomy in Western society. 
 
In order to reveal the central goal of the present investigation, I will attempt to cover a range 
of different cases exhibiting a certain commonality yet also varying along other important 
axes. This will allow for the gradual broadening of the reader’s perspective, ultimately 
demonstrating the interconnection of all of the specific cases (related by the use of autonomy 
as their basic principle of justification) and their political contexts.  
 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I will explore standard accepted versions of the notion of 
autonomy in Western contexts, particularly those of Kant and Mill. I will then consider more 
recent representations and applications of such a notion, underlining the difficulty in reaching 
a precise agreement on the definition of autonomy even before applying it to a particular case. 
Indeed, this initial ambiguity is what leaves room for different interpretations of the notion 
depending on the circumstances. A fundamentally important aspect that should be understood 
from the beginning is that, when referring to the incoherence of the application of the notion 
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of autonomy in this work, I will not aim to point out a tension between the Kantian and 
Millian versions, as I do not contend that one is exclusive of the other. I am aware that these 
two conceptions could be used in parallel without undermining the consistent application of 
the wider notion. My critical analysis of how autonomy is subject to contingent interpretations 
will instead be centred upon a malfunctioning use of its definition according to Kant’s 
description. It is within that version of autonomy that I will foreground the incoherence to 
which I refer. 
 
To give my critique a more precise and detailed frame of reference, in the subsequent three 
chapters I will focus my attention on four specific contexts in which the concept of autonomy 
(and its related sub-definition of competence) has been applied in an inconsistent and 
therefore questionable manner. In concluding Chapter 3 I will provocatively sustain that in 
future cases resembling those considered, the medication of mentally ill death-row prisoners 
scheduled for execution should be avoided as it would be the only way to ensure a more 
coherent way of applying the principles that we -as a society- claim to defend. The reasoning 
behind such a provocation will bring into the equation the direct relevance of politics in 
defining our ways of dealing with this bioethical case.  
 
As a final step of this work, in the last chapter I will provide a more satisfactory insight of 
why is it necessary to analyse the mentioned cases through the use of biopolitics. This last 
part of the thesis will therefore continue with the incorporation of Robert Burt’s input into this 
work’s discussion of autonomy before considering also Onora O’Neill’s contribution and the 
value of their respective approaches to understanding autonomy.  
 
I will first of all analyse a practical aspect of the current way of dealing with autonomy, 
underlining -in line with Burt- that the autonomy of one individual might sometimes be 
necessary for another to affirm himself as a free agent. In other words, I will highlight that the 
interdependence that two individuals have in assessing their own autonomy, or competence, is 
rather too frequently given insufficient consideration. This problematic awareness will bring 
us back to the question of why there exists a tendency to stress independence as the key 
feature of autonomy, given that the actual autonomous status of an individual might be more 
dependent upon others than currently assumed. 
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The next and final step will be to affirm that -in light of the cases considered, as in others 
arising in the field of bioethics- we are now in a position to renegotiate our conception of and 
approaches to autonomy in both bioethical and bio-political contexts.  
 
Having realised the structural limits of the individual-centred version of autonomy that 
governs the bioethical and political world, as well as all the problems related to its misuse as a 
natural reaction preserving the very system that we live in, we have the moral duty -and we 
should have the political wisdom- to reshape the autonomy discourse towards a more 
communitarian conception that will help us deal with future cases.  In order to ensure the 
relevance of this thesis in progress towards this end, however, some important premises to my 
work must be made. 
 
First of all, I am aware of the fact that each of the cases considered could produce sufficient 
material for a thesis of its own. However, I urge the reader to understand that despite its 
intriguing appeal at theoretical level, the option of expanding the analysis further for each 
case would have led the thesis to sacrifice breadth in favour of depth given the practical 
constraints of this work; while focusing on a single case also represented a valid option, this 
would not have allowed for a wider evaluation of the role of autonomy. The payoff is the 
ability to consider what is common to these different (and yet sufficiently similar) situations.  
 
Indeed, this relates to the main objective of this work: to reconnect the discussion over 
autonomy taking place in the field of bioethics to its political context, interrogating the current 
conviction that bioethical cases should be evaluated as a separated field altogether. 
 
In this respect, I think it would important for the reader to understand how this thesis 
developed into its current form, as the research process itself has undoubtedly played a central 
part in the shaping of the work. 
 
Initially, my research was centred upon Anorexia Nervosa and the debate over the 
acceptability of refusal of naso-gastric treatment by patients suffering from this unique mental 
disorder. My perception of the problem was that if we accept that autonomy is the evaluating 
factor upon which we should base the moral and legal permissibility of an action, all we had 
to do was to establish if anorexics are autonomous. As will be explained in Chapter 2, this 
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debate is related specifically to the assessment of the presence of competence and/or capacity 
(the terms with which we connote autonomy in medical contexts), two related concepts whose 
definition is problematic in itself.  
 
However, what became gradually more obvious to me was that, if I wanted truly to 
understand what made cases of Anorexia Nervosa so controversial, focusing the argument 
only on the assessment of competence as the way of resolving its controversial status would 
have provided only a temporary answer. 
 
To grasp the depth of the issues at stake, I had to increase the challenge to case-specific 
analyses and move the investigation to more structural questions regarding autonomy and its 
role in Western bioethics. The decision to broaden the coverage of my research allowed me 
gradually to question my initial idea of the assessment of competence in Anorexia Nervosa as 
a sufficient guide to the permissibility of medical treatment (or its refusal). 
 
Firstly, I encountered a case involving schizophrenia and capital punishment (exposed in 
Chapter 3) that quite drastically contrasted with the common idea of forcing medical 
treatment on a person to keep them alive, as in this case the notion of autonomy was used to 
justify enforced medical treatment to kill -albeit indirectly- the person that should supposedly 
have benefited from the treatment. 
 
This strikingly different way of defining how we as a society should decide to respect 
autonomy provoked further questions in me. I came increasingly to doubt the absolute to 
which we refer when talking about autonomy, understanding that ultimately it is its 
interpretation (related to human beings within a predefined political structure and thus subject 
to power relations) that really makes a difference between being forced to stay alive and being 
allowed to die. 
 
For this reason, in Chapter 4, I decided to broaden even further the spectrum of the cases, 
taking into account a number of comparable situations where respect for the patient’s 
autonomy had been inconsistent.  
 
The need to consider these cases was vital to the strengthening of the validity of the critical 
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analysis engaged in up to that point: after having introduced the reader to the complexity of 
conceptions of autonomy in Western bioethics through the contrast of enforced treatment in 
cases involving mental illness (and thus competence), I realised that considering contexts in 
which the lack of mental competence was less of a central issue might underline even more 
clearly the fact that the real entitlement to use one’s autonomy is a function of its political 
acceptability. 
 
This biopolitical strand of the thesis (through a reading of the similarities and differences of 
the cases) allowed me to point out that -contrary to the tendencies of much of the American 
bioethical community- bioethics cannot, and should not, be considered as a different field 
from the rest of philosophy. And, most importantly, we should not think that the autonomy to 
which we refer when debating a certain given practice or policy is not affected by the political 
context in which it develops, takes place and becomes a bioethical reality. 
 
As already noted in passing, due to the structural limits of scope associated with a Ph.D. 
thesis, not every tangential point worthy of attention could be exhaustively explored, and for 
this reason I unhesitatingly acknowledge that (as in every research project) my choices as to 
what is relevant and what is not are open to challenge and to criticism. Given the intention of 
this work to link various subjects not commonly considered in such close proximity, there is 
at once a greater risk of undervaluing certain dimensions of the problems tackled and building 
in structural faults from the outset.  Nonetheless, I believe that I have managed to produce a 
coherent and linear argument that is not jeopardised by the necessary underdevelopment of 
certain peripheral topics. 
 
Some final clarifications should be made before proceeding into the main body of the thesis. 
Firstly, I have voluntarily chosen to use -even in cases of major authors- a limited number of 
sources from which to derive quotations and direct references. The reason behind this 
decision is the conviction that applying a more balanced and equal representation of the work 
of both the more and the less well-known philosophers used herein will prevent the reader 
from becoming distracted by the potential inputs that each of them might have had if moved 
into a more central role. My priority is rather to ensure that none of the sources applied in this 
context obfuscates the central argument of this work. 
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Hence, the use of Foucault, for example, is limited in terms of utilisation both of space and of 
literature, but there are two reasons for this. The space given to his work is limited because I 
did not want to make this thesis a Foucauldian one, but only to use some of his more valuable 
insights in support of my project of reconnecting bioethics to its philosophical roots. Foucault 
proved very useful and apt in this enterprise, yet I did not want the thesis to be absorbed by 
his ideas. 
 
That is why -especially in Chapter 4- I refer mainly to one text of his. Without wanting to 
deprive him of his well-deserved renown nor deny the validity of his broader analysis of 
power relations, my intention was to treat him as all of the other authors used in the thesis are 
treated. That is, using their ideas only where they serve to develop the work towards its 
intended trajectory. 
 
Lastly, I want explicitly to affirm that the interchangeability of “she/her” and “he/him/his” is 
also intentional. This decision might not satisfy every reader in stylistic terms, but it is the 
most convincing way for me to ensure that the thesis remains gender neutral without 
depriving the individuals considered within (sometimes not directly named but still existent) 
of their humanity.  
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CHAPTER 1 
On Autonomy  
 
Introduction 
 
In order to enter the specificity of the debates related to the application of the notion of 
autonomy in current bioethical contexts, I shall first construct a more general framework 
within which the cases presented in the following chapters will be evaluated. Starting from a 
historical analysis of autonomy, I will then apply it to biomedical contexts, drawing a critical 
map of the current inconsistencies in its application to cases of enforced treatment (be it by 
not allowing withdrawal or by forced continuation depending on the circumstances), 
suggesting ultimately that a possible solution for properly identifying possible improvements 
in our approach could come from an investigation of the political meaning and value of the 
choices made by (medical) authorities.  
 
To start my critical analysis, I will follow the structure suggested by Tom Beauchamp and 
James Childress in their influential book Principles of Biomedical Ethics,1 focusing first on 
Kant and Mill first to give a more historical view of the path that Western society has taken to 
arrive at its current conception of autonomy. Subsequently, I will consider important works 
that have been published in recent decades and that, due to the appearance of bioethical 
problems that were unthinkable until recent years, have provided new inputs to our 
understanding of autonomy and brought into question the validity of the previously dominant 
definition. This part of the thesis will consider, amongst others, the views of Onora O’Neill, 
Simona Giordano, Robert Paul Wolff, Thomas Szasz, Bruce Jennings and Ronald Dworkin.  
 
1.1-How can we define Autonomy? 
 
The definition of what constitutes autonomy is needed since it remains difficult to grasp and 
explain in a way that will satisfy the many different schools of thought that deal with it. Our 
current notion of autonomy -the one that we have implemented in our judicial, medical and 
moral set of social values- is considered to be based particularly strongly on the ideas of two 
great thinkers: Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Central to both of these authors’ thought, 
                                                 
1 Beauchamp, T., L., & Childress, J., F., Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 2nd edition, OUP, 1983. 
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but also to the problematic nature of defining autonomy, is the idea that morality requires 
autonomous persons. Even if broadly shared by many different philosophies, this statement 
has not been sufficient to clarify the concept, but has rather succeeded in producing a wide 
spectrum of alternative conceptions of autonomy. Depending on the philosophical inclinations 
of the reader, the focus of autonomy could be free choice, rights of individual liberty, the right 
to privacy, having an independent moral position or being able to choose for oneself.   
 
We live in a historical moment, at least in the Anglo-American healthcare tradition, where 
respect for autonomy has come to be considered valuable in every context, including the 
biomedical. In fact, it is often argued that patient autonomy must be deemed the first factor to 
take into account when considering in ever more frequent bioethical debates whether or not a 
given procedure is morally and legally permissible. The centrality of the role of autonomy has 
reduced the sphere of influence that previously dominant approach to biomedical problems 
had, namely paternalism. But is that really so? Or are we unconsciously reverting to new 
forms of paternalism? If such a change exists, it needs to be addressed for two reasons: on the 
one hand, if its re-emergence is negative, the sooner we detect it the better. And on the other 
hand, if it is something positive, it would be appropriate to acknowledge it in a more accurate 
and tangible way in order to maximise its benefits to the current situation. 
 
An excessive emphasis on the autonomy of the individual, some critics argue, might reduce 
the importance of other aspects of the patient-doctor relationship, producing unstable and 
unsatisfactory results. I will begin this investigation of the validity of such an affirmation by 
sketching the historical path by which we have arrived at the current mainstream definition of 
autonomy. 
 
1.2-The concept of Autonomy in a Historical prospective 
 
Autonomy is a notion that has been present in philosophy since ancient times, and it results 
from the combination of two old Greek words: auto (self) and nom[os] (rule/law). Autonomia, 
or autonomy in English, tends to be translated into the literal rendering of “self-ruling”. The 
original context in which it was introduced was the Greek city-state (Polis), Plato having 
coined this neologism in the course of his work The Republic.2 For this reason, it seems 
                                                 
2 Plato, The Republic, (ed. and trans.) Lee, H., D., P., Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd, 1984. 
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obvious why autonomy was initially utilised only in political contexts and was not related to 
individual autonomy (though I am aware that some of the interpretations of Plato’s ideal city 
have suggested that it constitutes a metaphor of a human being -resulting in a use of the 
notion related to a single individual- this distinction will not be investigated further here). 
 
Despite these social origins, the most common way of defining personal autonomy has been 
through the idea of self-governance: the possibility of expressing one’s own personality, 
preferences and uniqueness without external interference, be it physical or psychological. 
According to two of the major Anglo-American bioethicists, Beauchamp and Childress: 
 
“The autonomous person determines his or her course of action in accordance with a 
plan chosen by himself or herself. Such a person deliberates about and chooses plans 
and is capable of acting on the basis of such deliberations, just as a truly independent 
government is capable of controlling its territories and policies.”
3 
 
A person who is judged to have limited autonomy, as in cases of Anorexia Nervosa (AN), for 
example, is instead under the control of others, constrained in putting into action her own 
judgements by the limits placed on her by them, and thus deprived of her state of self-
government. This political reading of the notion of autonomy will be analysed in greater depth 
later in this chapter, but first we shall focus on the term autonomy as applied to individuals in 
a broader sense. 
 
Two prominent figures within the philosophical community in the Western tradition have been 
responsible for developments crucial to understandings of autonomy: Immanuel Kant and 
John Stuart Mill. The former saw autonomy as freedom of the will, the latter as freedom of 
action. This distinction is crucial to this work, and therefore I will now go on to explore in 
greater depth the respective positions of the two philosophers. 
 
In numerous of his writings,4 Kant argued in favour of his well-known maxim that people 
should always be treated as autonomous ends in themselves and never merely as means to the 
ends of others. One of the formulations of his Categorical Imperative affirmed that: “I should 
                                                 
3 Beauchamp, T., L., and Childress, J., F., Op. Cit, p.59-60. 
4 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, (trans.) Guyer, P., and Wood, A., CUP, 1998; Grounding for the 
Metaphysics of Morals, (trans.) Ellington, J., W., Hackett Publishing Company, 1981. 
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never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal 
law.”5 
 
Kant’s principle of respect for autonomy shows the relevance given to the value of autonomy: 
persons are unconditionally worthy rational agents that cannot be treated as “things” of 
conditional value, incapable of making decisions. In his analysis of autonomy, Kant contrasts 
it with heteronomy (rule by other persons or conditions). On the one hand, being autonomous 
means to be able to govern oneself in accordance with moral principles contained in the 
multiple formulations of Universal Law,6 which could be willed to be valid for everyone. 
Acting heteronomously, on the other hand, can include both external and internal 
determinations of the will, but it does not include moral principles. One can act in accordance 
with what the law establishes to be “right” (not refusing medical treatment, for example) but 
if the resulting action does not arise from an internal autonomous acceptance of the validity of 
such an action as a universalisable one, it would mean that the given behaviour would only be 
a forced result of the specific (political) circumstances in which the individual existed. This is 
a crucial distinction to which we shall return as the work evolves.     
 
While Kant focuses on the moral dimension of autonomy, Mill is more concerned with 
establishing a system to address autonomy in more practical terms. In fact, he even prefers to 
refer to autonomy in a slightly different manner as the individuality of action and thought. In 
On Liberty Mill points out that we can accept social and political control over individuals as 
legitimate only if it is a necessity to prevent harm to other individuals. The principle of utility 
constructed by Mill stresses exactly this system of drawing the line of acceptability: every 
citizen is free to develop her potential according to her preferences, as long as the resulting 
actions do not interfere with an equivalent freedom of expression that must be granted to 
others. In Mill’s eyes, in contrast with imposing a standardised set of policies that damages 
society by reducing individual productivity and creativity, what maximises the shared benefits 
of the community -its utility, as it were- is the promotion of autonomy, meaning promotion of 
one’s own values and priorities. In this line of thought Mill affirms that only those persons 
“without character” keep on being influenced and controlled by authorities such as the state, 
                                                 
5 Kant., I., Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Op.Cit., p.14. 
6 For example, Onora O’Neill distinguishes between the formula of universal law (FUL), the formula of the 
end in itself (FEI) and formula of autonomy (FA). O’Neill, O., “Rationality as Practical Reason”, in The 
Oxford Handbook of Rationality, (ed.) Mele, A. R., and Rawling, P., OUP, 2004, p.93-109.  
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parents or the church. In fact, it is only the person with true character that has a genuine 
individuality. In other words, even if perhaps in a less Nietzschean way than I am presenting 
him, Mill suggests that only those capable of detaching themselves from the predefined 
notions of good and bad are in truth autonomous, and in some sense, worthy of true respect 
and consideration. This certainly is not only my interpretation but is rather a widely accepted 
view. On this issue, Beauchamp and Childress write: 
 
“‘Firmness and self-control’ as well as ‘choosing a plan of life’ are declared by Mill as 
essential to a proper framing of one’s character. ‘The government of a strong will’ he 
takes to be essential to this goal.
7
”
8 
 
Mill’s position is interesting for two reasons: one, it presents a dissident citizen as the most 
likely candidate to be autonomous in political terms. Two, the above affirmations become 
even more striking in relation to a specific case that will be considered more in depth in the 
next chapter, namely that of AN. In this context, indeed, it should be stressed that the vast 
majority of people suffering from this mental disorder are indeed strong personalities capable 
of affirming themselves in many different contexts (school, work, gym) through the 
application of their “strong will, firmness and self-control”. 
 
It appears clear, then, that Mill and Kant had different intentions when analysing the concept 
of autonomy. The former gave relevance to the personal point of view in his account of 
autonomy and self-determination. He argued in favour of the respect of one’s individuality as 
the primary element in ensuring a morally acceptable form of autonomy. The latter focused on 
the moral dimension of autonomy: the idea of following a moral law in which the notion of 
self-determination is acceptable only within a pre-set framework of morally valid principles. 
The substantial difference between the positions is that, for Kant, purely individual actions are 
outside the moral order.  
 
Bruce Jennings suggests that perhaps a way of better understanding what we mean by 
autonomy in a contemporary context would be to use the term autonomy to refer to the 
                                                 
7 Beauchamp, T., L., and Childress, J., F., Op. Cit, p.61. 
8 Mill, J., S., Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Essay on Mill, (ed.) Warnock, M., New American Library, 1974, 
p.136-138 & p.184-189. 
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definition given by Kant, as opposed to liberty when referring to Mill.9 In addition, Jennings 
points out that frequently in the field of bioethics what we mean by autonomy is not the 
Kantian version of the notion but something much closer to Mill’s idea of liberty, as 
subsequently expanded by Isaiah Berlin into the distinction between negative and positive 
liberty (the common bioethical version of autonomy falling within the former category).10 
This schematisation of the two variants would lead us to see that such a distinction in the 
current way of understanding autonomy is not as neat as it might initially seem. It is no 
surprise, in fact, that when looking more closely at how we come to define autonomy in 
practical terms, a synthesis of the two notions appears. 
 
I agree with Jennings’ affirmation that we experience a form of autonomy that bears greater 
resemblance to Mill’s liberty than to Kant’s autonomy: in most cases in biomedicine we 
consider the individual values as the ultimate way of affirming one’s autonomy, and we 
therefore consider it morally acceptable. Without entering into the details of the debate and 
whatever position one might have on the topic, it is undeniable that the famous argument of 
Judith Jarvis Thomson in defence of abortion represents an example of the acceptance of the 
precedence of the individual in both the academic and the legal systems.11 In some cases, 
however, the acceptability of a decision goes back to the authorities on the presumption that 
the patient could not possibly wish for treatment to take place or be withheld. As this work 
develops, I will briefly consider some political aspects of the complex concept of autonomy, 
but before proceeding with an analysis of autonomy in bioethical contexts, I should point out 
that the reason for choosing to highlight -albeit in a limited way- such dimensions of 
autonomy is based on the conviction that an analysis of the political implications is necessary 
to any understanding of specific applications of autonomy in enforced treatment. 
 
In relation to what has been explained above, what must be strongly considered is that the 
nature of the justification for this switch back to paternalism -and with it the notion of 
“knowing best”- presumes an optimal solution to any situation can be achieved through the 
application of reason to the specific case. In other words, we would be applying a Kantian 
approach rather than a Millian one. It is for this reason that Onora O’Neill’s attempt to 
reframe our manner of adapting Kant to bioethics is of crucial importance, and it will thus be 
                                                 
9 Jennings, B., “Autonomy”, in The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, (ed.) Steinbock, B., OUP, 2007, p. 75-76. 
10 Berlin, I., “Two concepts of Liberty”, in Four Essays on Liberty, OUP, 2002, p.118-172. 
11 Thomson, J., J., “A Defence of Abortion”, in Applied Ethics, (ed.) Singer, P., OUP, 1986, p.37-56. 
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analysed in greater detail as the thesis develops.12  
 
Jennings argues that O’Neill’s attempt at reviving the use of Kantian ethics in bioethical 
debates13 is bound to fail since there is a clear distinction between academic philosophy and 
bioethics (at least in the USA, he affirms) and defining autonomy in a satisfactory way for 
both would be impossible. The reason for this impossibility lies in the fact that Jennings 
believes that certain Western values are so rooted in our society that it would be unrealistic to 
presume that people would be able to detach themselves from notions such as individualism 
or self-expression. 
 
In other words, the way in which Western society has referred to autonomy in recent decades 
has generated a subconscious popular adaptation to what is acceptable and what is not based 
on the version of autonomy that has been established as the only acceptable one. This applies 
to bioethics as much as to other contexts, and for this reason when I think of the political 
significance of autonomy in the course of history I have to disagree with Jennings’ position. 
His attempt to limit what I believe to be a very interesting contribution made by O’Neill 
seems to suggest that, in the course of history, initiatives that intended to reveal the limits of 
the prevailing view at the time could never have taken place owing to a lack of initial support. 
This kind of default rejection of challenges to the status quo will be considered more in depth 
as the thesis develops, particularly in Chapter 5. 
 
In his book Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Values, Peter Singer 
argues that "the traditional Western ethic has collapsed" and that we are entering "a period of 
transition in our attitude to the sanctity of life".14 In analysing what this reshaping process 
should entail, Singer affirms that we as a society should develop our emotional reaction to 
certain events through being increasingly more in contact with the new reality that comes into 
being thanks to an initial rational choice. For instance, as a result of the development in our 
society of certain values we now evaluate negatively the killing of a harmless fellow man; 
                                                 
12 Surely the distinction between the Kantian and Millian versions of autonomy provided in this chapter is far 
from satisfactory if perceived as an attempt to give a conclusive portrayal of the ideas of the authors. This, 
however, is obviously not my intention. My aim is to give a general version of the two approaches such that 
the reader can understand the reasons behind my inclination towards a Kantian analysis (subsequently 
supported by O’Neill’s) as a way to solve the controversial cases considered in this thesis. 
13 See Chapter 5 for further exploration of O’Neill’s ideas. 
14 Singer, P., Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Values, St. Martin’s Griffin, 1994. 
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amongst these values is the non-violent input that has somehow been artificially implanted in 
the “emotional scheme” of the offspring of those that rationally chose to abolish the death 
penalty, for example. I disagree with Singer’s view on many topics, but in relation to the 
present work the use of this idea can be extremely valuable in helping us understand a 
weakness of Jennings’ critique of O’Neill: if on the one hand it is difficult to foresee what the 
implications of a certain policy might be in the shaping of the moral acceptance of the people 
affected by a given law, on the other hand it is impossible to assert that such influences would 
necessarily turn out to be negative. 
 
In order to expand on this distinction and to understand more accurately the various ways of 
describing autonomy in current bioethical debates, the next section of the chapter will explore 
more recent conceptions of autonomy. 
 
1.3-Modern Conceptions of Autonomy  
 
In recent times autonomy broadened its relevance to more “individual-centred” issues, finding 
its apex in the emerging field of bioethics. There are many and varied attempts to define 
autonomy in the contemporary medical ethics literature, each one of which highlights 
particular aspects of the concept. 
 
In her “The concept of autonomy and its interpretation in health care”, Anne-Marie Slowther15 
uses a schema that divides autonomy into four different groups. I shall adopt a similar 
schema, making some minor modifications, in order to explain the recent development of 
diverse conceptions of autonomy.  
 
Autonomy as affirmation of a predefined moral decision 
 
Onora O’Neill’s book Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics16 lays the foundations of a conception 
of autonomy that sees the autonomous agent as one obliged to make her choices within a 
predefined moral set of normative values. Slowther rightly points out that even if O’Neill has 
                                                 
15 Slowther, A., “The concept of autonomy and its interpretation in health care”, Clinical Ethics, vol.2, 4, 2007, 
p.173-175. 
16 O’Neill, O., Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, CUP, 2002. 
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a personal preference in defining the principle of duty or obligation17 as the decisive factor in 
establishing that a choice is autonomous, other value frameworks are possible. The peculiar 
aspect of this approach to the notion of autonomy is the relevance given to responsibility. The 
responsibility of the agent taking the decision differs greatly from the previous definition of 
autonomy. In a very Kantian fashion, O’Neill suggests that the means of reaching a truly 
autonomous judgement in a given situation are available, but it is up to the individual in 
question to make an effort in following -and even interpreting- the already present moral 
framework that can ensure autonomy. Gordon Stirrat and Robin Gill18 went further in 
O’Neill’s direction in reaching the conclusion that a principled autonomy in the case of 
patients would require the patient to choose her medical treatment responsibly and in 
consideration of others. On the one hand, this suggestion aggravates the differences with the 
previous model of autonomy, as for those not sharing an O’Neillian formulation of principled 
autonomy, a “requirement” of this kind could easily be seen as an external constraint limiting 
the patient’s liberty (which is to say, autonomy). On the other hand, this application of Kant 
seems to be much less deontological than classical interpretations. I will return to this 
approach and its potential implementation in the last chapter of the thesis. 
 
Autonomy as freedom to have one’s will respected 
 
The representative chosen by Slowther for this category is Isahia Berlin.19 In fact, the 
libertarian view of autonomy that is understood as the freedom to choose between different 
options without external restrictions or obligations seems to correspond significantly to 
Berlin’s concept of negative freedom, which -we should not forget- evolved out of Mill’s 
concept of liberty and thus came to be defined as “libertarian”. In such cases, respect for 
autonomy would be limited to the acceptance of the patient’s will without any evaluation of 
the validity of such a choice. Enforced treatment thus could not be justified where the patient 
is considered to be sufficiently competent to give -or deny- her permission for the application 
of a particular healthcare procedure. It is very important (but often overlooked) that 
implementing this method of dealing with the issue of autonomy must bring the clinician’s 
role into the equation. In other words, the acceptance of respect for the patient’s autonomy 
does not, and should not, assume an automatic responsive duty on the part of doctors involved 
                                                 
17 Slowther, A., Op.Cit, p.173. 
18 Stirrat, G., M., and Gill, R., “Autonomy in medical ethics after O’8eill”, J Med Ethics, 31, 2005, p.127-130. 
19 Berlin, I., Op. Cit. 
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in the patient’s treatment.  
 
Autonomy as substantive-procedural conception 
 
In her book Understanding Eating Disorders Simona Giordano underlines further the link 
made between autonomy and practical rationality, pointing out its limits especially in relation 
to mentally ill patients. This group is especially at risk of not being eligible to express their 
will due to the presence in wider society of an embedded acceptance of notions described by 
John Rawls (ideal rationality)20 and Danny Scoccia (social acceptability).21 However, as John 
Harris points out, in situations such as that of anorexic patients, not considered “genuinely 
autonomous”, we would end up tolerating the paradoxical situation of claiming to respect 
them by not respecting what they really want.22 Clearly, this premise of “genuine autonomy” 
risks establishing a biased approach to what is justifiable. Giordano writes: “a substantive 
conception of autonomy, in fact, leads to the justification of an authoritarian attitude towards 
the patient and disregard for patient autonomy.”23 An alternative to this controversial 
conception -which will later be analysed in greater depth and in relation to its political 
implications- is a procedural (or formal) conception of autonomy, and it is this that constitutes 
the legal approach to decision-making capacity in the UK, as defended by numerous liberal 
philosophers.24 The key aspect is that in this latter conception, decision-making capacity is not 
dependent on the status25 of the patient but is instead a decision-relative concept.26 
 
Autonomy as consistency with past decisions  
 
In his Life’s Dominion, Ronald Dworkin affirms that a key aspect of defining a choice as 
autonomous is the consideration of its consistency with past choices made by the same 
individual. The centrality of personal integrity, or identity, is what is most important in this 
model of autonomy. Respecting one’s autonomy should always take into account the need on 
the part of the authorities to ensure that individuals -where established to be competent- be 
                                                 
20 Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, OUP, 1999, p.248-250. 
21 Scoccia, D., “Paternalism and Respect for Autonomy”, Ethics, 100/2, 1989-1990, p.318-334. 
22 Harris, J., The Value of Life, Routledge, 1994, p.194. 
23 Giordano, S., Understanding Eating Disorders, OUP, 2005, p.48. 
24 See for example: Engelhardt, T., The Foundation of Bioethics, 2nd edition, OUP, 1996, & “The many faces of 
autonomy”, Health Care Annual, 9, 2003. 
25 McHale, J., and Fox, M., Health Care Law, London, Maxwell, 1997, p.280-281. 
26 Harris, J., The Value of Life, Op. Cit, chapter 10. 
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allowed the chance to live their lives in accordance with their “distinctive sense of their own 
character”27 A very important development of this view was made by George Agich,28 who, 
still giving major importance to the role of one’s identity in assigning the level of respect for 
one’s autonomy, expanded the entitlement to affirm an individual’s choice to third parties 
sufficiently capable of representing (in Dworkian terminology) the individual’s character. To 
give a practical example, the surrogate decision-maker of a patient in a vegetative state should 
be entitled to decide to end artificial feeding as long as she would be able to demonstrate that 
this decision would be in line with the values expressed by the patient over the course of her 
life.29 Speculations of this kind have brought us morally to justify the institution of the 
biological will; this is particularly relevant to our case as it leaves room for the possibility of 
combining respect for the patient’s autonomy with the pursuit of her best interest.  
 
Autonomy as capacity to choose validly   
 
A final contrasting way of defining autonomy places the emphasis not on the values of the 
patient as in the conception outlined above, but rather on the decision-making process. In 
order to establish the level of autonomy thus, we need to ensure that the patient is capable of 
processing the information given, reflecting on it and reaching a “reasonable” conclusion. 
What has to be established, in other words, is whether the patient is competent or not. This 
approach has produced legislation such as the Mental Capacity Act 200530 and the more 
recent Mental Health Act 2007 in the UK31 which stipulate assessment of the patient’s level of 
“proper” understanding of a given situation. Some similar models even suggest the necessity 
for critical reflection,32 but a deeper look at each of these models makes evident the enormous 
dependence of an individual’s practical possibility of exercising autonomy on the method of 
competence assessment used by the authority. This contrast between authority and autonomy, 
as well as the varied means of assessing the competence of patients suffering from different 
forms of mental impairment, are crucial aspects of this way of understanding autonomy. 
                                                 
27 Dworkin, R., Life’s Dominion, Harper Collins, 1993, p.222-229. 
28 Agich, G., Dependence and autonomy in the old age: An ethical framework for long-term care, CUP, 2003.  
29 I am aware that the legal entitlements of such a practice vary greatly between states and sometimes even 
regions, and as such I will not refer to any particular legal system here, but only to the a priori condition that 
any such system would have to guarantee. 
30 Mental Capacity Act, 2005, available at: www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/ukpga_20050009_en_1 [accessed 
on  3 January 2011] 
31 Mental Health Act 2007, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/12/contents [accessed on 12 
January 2011] 
32 See, amongst others: Dworkin, G., The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, CUP, 1998. 
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Before moving the investigation onto the intersection of autonomy and politics (with all its 
resulting controversies), the next section will expand on the importance of ensuring consistent 
respect for autonomy. 
 
1.4-Respect for Autonomy  
 
Since its first edition, Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics has had an 
enormous impact on both the philosophical and medical worlds. Their most influential idea 
has been that in the vast majority of problematic cases in the sphere of medical ethics we are 
obliged “only” to choose the most appropriate option for a given situation amongst four key 
principles proposed by the authors: autonomy, nonmalificence, beneficence and justice.  
These principles have proved to be a relatively effective way of solving delicate 
controversies. 
 
Perhaps the simplicity of this solution has been one of the main reasons for which some critics 
have rejected principled ethics as an unsatisfactory solution.33 Without questioning the 
validity of the formulation in such depth, I shall focus on another aspect that often appears to 
limit the utility of the four principles approach: the uneven importance granted to each of 
them. In fact, it could hardly be denied that of the four principles autonomy remains the most 
relevant in current bioethical evaluations. As a result, when two or more of the principles 
clash, autonomy is always preferred. As Raanan Gillon34 put it, “autonomy is first among 
equals”. But why is that so? What is so special about autonomy? 
 
In fact, the very affirmation of considering autonomy to be the “queen of virtues”, is highly 
questionable in cases of refusal of treatment, especially in cases where the autonomy of the 
patient is considered to be affected in a way that does not allow her to be competent. 
 
Using the “four principles approach” the patient is granted by the principle of autonomy the 
right to an informed choice about medical treatment as long as she is established to be of 
competence sufficient to decision-making without coercion or under the influence of others. 
 
                                                 
33 See, for example: Harris, J., “In praise of unprincipled ethics”, J Med Ethics, 29, 2003, p.281-286. 
34 Gillon, R., “Ethics needs principles -four can encompass the rest- and respect for autonomy should be ‘first 
among equals’”, J Med Ethics, 29, 2003, p.307-312. 
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As rightly pointed out by Karen Faith, however,35 there can surely be cases where the 
principle of autonomy represented by a refusal of treatment will conflict with the principle of 
beneficence, as this latter principle requires the physician to act in the best interest of the 
patient. Clearly, this is not a notion that differs much from the supposedly outmoded 
alternative of paternalism. 
 
The counterargument to such a critique would affirm that the key aspect that makes the two 
approaches different lies in the fact that while paternalism affirms a consistent superiority of 
the medical judgement over the patient’s -including when she is competent- the principle of 
beneficence undermines only temporarily the will of the patient until the true autonomy of the 
patient is rescued. The idea of justifying involuntary treatment on these grounds has led 
Marian Verkerk36 to defend the concept of “compassionate interference”. Clearly, this idea 
presumes that there is one “best” way of dealing with a certain situation and that it can be 
achieved and understood through the use of reason. This is a very Kantian way of 
understanding autonomy, and as such it does not follow other interpretations that the current 
Anglo-American system utilises in other cases, including medical ones. 
 
In other words, we decide to restrict a patient’s autonomy as long as she is not capable of 
reaching, or deciding not to reach, the only correct answer that she can provide and that we 
will accept as the valid answer of a truly autonomous agent. This, however, seems to me 
neither an extension of Mill’s nor of Berlin’s definition of autonomy, but rather appears to be 
inspired by Kant’s. A version of autonomy that sees: 
 
“the rational being of legislating universal laws, so that he is fit to be a member in a 
possible kingdom of ends, for which his own nature has already determined him as an 
end in himself and therefore as a legislator in the kingdom of ends. Thereby he is free as 
regards all laws of nature, and he obeys only those laws which he gives to himself. 
Accordingly, his maxims can belong to a universal legislation to which he at the same 
time subjects himself.”
37 
 
                                                 
35 Faith, K., E., “Addressing Issues of Autonomy and Beneficence in the Treatment of Eating Disorders”, 
available at: http://www.nedic.ca/knowthefacts/documents/Addressingissuesofautonomyandbeneficence.pdf 
[accessed on: 25 January 2009] 
36 Verkerk, M., “A Care Perspective on Coercion and Autonomy”, Bioethics, 13, 1999, p.358-368. 
37 Kant, I., Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Op.Cit., p.41. 
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This understanding of the true nature of autonomy in contemporary biomedical contexts will 
give rise to an additional question related to those two mentioned above: could autonomy 
have been given such a privileged position because it has functioned as a perfect deterrent for 
people not to question (medical) authorities?  In the next section I will seek to provide an 
answer.  
 
1.5-Autonomy & Rationality 
 
In this section, I will interrogate a particular aspect of enforced treatment: can we 
convincingly affirm that the assessment of autonomy in relatively similar cases is only based 
on medical grounds? 
 
To answer this question, we need first to understand the dynamics involved in choosing to 
accept or not the possibility that an individual can refuse medical treatment. There are two 
issues related to the idea that refusal of treatment should not be morally -or legally- 
permissible: first, an autonomous agent would never rationally choose to give up her life if 
free not to; second, as a consequence of the first assumption, everyone falling outside of this 
category should be deemed incompetent to take decisions regarding their own life by the 
competent authorities for the very reason that their desire to make an irrational decision 
reveals their deficient autonomy. In other words, the patient is not allowed to make a choice 
regarding her own life due to a perceived lack of autonomy, or, we might say, because 
authorities opt not to recognise the presence of autonomy in her. If this is the case, however, 
the commonly held idea of preserving the medical interest of the patient seems instead to cede 
ground to a conception allowing the citizen to pursue her own best interest. In other words, 
the acceptability of what is permissible would shift from a medical to a political dimension.  
 
I will now consider the first “dogma” that considers refusal of treatment unacceptable as 
disrespectful of the patient’s autonomy: suicide is irrational.38 
 
First of all, it is important to underline that not all societies have regarded euthanasia or even 
suicide as something immoral in the way that contemporary Western society does. For 
                                                 
38 For a matter of convenience, I will use only the term suicide in a broad sense without listing refusal of 
treatment or euthanasia every time. 
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instance Euripides wrote: 
 
“I hate the men who would prolong their lives 
By foods and drinks and charms of magic art 
Perverting nature’s course to keep of death 
They ought, when they no longer serve the land 
To quit this life, and clear the way for youth.”
39 
 
This quotation clearly shows that in ancient Greece the perception of euthanasia or suicide 
was very different from ours. The individual is expected to end her life once no longer able to 
help the community in any other way. The ancient Greek culture is not the only one in which 
the elderly were expected to understand when it was their time: “Eskimo, American Indian, 
and some traditional Japanese cultures have practised voluntary abandonment of the elderly, a 
practice closely related to suicide.”40  
 
This awareness should lead us to understand that to see suicide as irrational might pertain in 
most cases but not in all of them, because if to establish the rationality of an action we need to 
look at its social acceptance and effects,41 then it is our current society that pre-establishes the 
limits of our autonomy. I want to underline that the mere fact that our society has reached a 
level of scientific development to sustain lives in even the most extreme cases does not 
constitute a valid ethical justification for doing so unconditionally; it is not a priori irrational 
not to want to use these artificial means to sustain life. 
 
In this respect, John Keown should be considered when he writes:  
 
“Despite the major advances in medicine and palliative care witnessed by the last 
century, many patients, even in affluent western nations, still die in pain and distress. 
Some entreat their doctors to put an end to their suffering either by killing them or by 
                                                 
39 Euripides, Suppliants 1109, as quoted by [pseudo-] Plutarch, A Letter of Condolence to Apollonius, 110C, 
(trans.) Babbitt, F., C., Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 2, Harvard University Press, 1928, p.153. 
40 Battin, M., P., The Least Worst Death, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.191. 
41 See, for example:  [For an act to be considered rational] “the state of affairs promoted by that choice or act 
must be worth promoting. That is, it must promote some objectively valuable state such as well being, 
achievement, knowledge, justice and so on.” Savulescu, J., “Desire-Based and Value-Based 8ormative 
Reasons”, Bioethics, 13/5, 1999, 405-413. 
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helping them to kill themselves.”
42 
 
Hume points out in “On Suicide”43 that one of the main critiques mobilised against the 
acceptability of suicide in our society is based on the assumption that it is an action against 
God. He argues that it is inconceivable not to accept suicide as an act in accordance with 
divine law, for God would not have given us the possibility to perpetrate the act if he did not 
want us to do so. Other perspectives on suicide, such as that of Aristotle,44 see suicide as an 
act of cowardice doubly unacceptable as much for its vicious meaning at an individual level 
as for its negative political impact on society: that is, a person should not commit suicide as 
this would damage the common spirit of the community. Adapting this thought to cases of 
AN, it could be argued that refusal of treatment cannot be tolerated by our society because 
this action -as provocatively suggested in the previous section- could destabilise the whole 
moral system that is currently in use, putting the political establishment at risk as a result. 
 
In this respect, it is interesting to note the Brad Hooker’s analysis in his “Rule-utilitarianism 
and Euthanasia”45 when evaluating our contemporary situation: due to scientific 
developments we are more capable than ever of prolonging life, but this possibility raises a 
crucial question: is it not reasonable to say that in certain cases it is both more moral and 
rational to be willing to die quickly? After all, it is hard to disagree with John Scally when he 
writes: “Although it is cruel not to attempt to sustain life, it may be equally cruel to extend 
care unconditionally.”46 
 
This acceptance, then, calls into question what real value decision-making authorities 
responsible for patients -namely healthcare professionals- are trying to preserve at all costs if 
not life. Might it instead be power? 
 
In order to be able to answer this question (and to explain the second “dogma” at stake in 
enforced treatment), the next section will examine a number of more conventionally political 
ways of defining autonomy. 
                                                 
42 Keown, J., Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.1. 
43 Hume, D., “On Suicide”, in Applied Ethics, (ed.) Singer, P., Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 22-23. 
44 Aristotle, Nicomechean Ethics, (trans.) Thomson, J., A., K., London, Penguin Books Ltd, 1976, p. 130. 
45 Hooker, B., “Rule-utilitarianism and Euthanasia”, in Ethics in Practice, (ed.) LaFollette, H., Blackwell 
Publishers, 1997, p. 42. 
46 Scally, J., Whose Death Is It Anyway?, Basement Press, 1995, p.32. 
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1.6-Autonomy & Authority 
 
Joel Feinberg writes: “I am autonomous if I rule me, and no one else rules I.”47    
 
This is certainly a definition that creates more difficulties in establishing who is entitled to 
claim to be defending the autonomy of the patient if not herself. An even more unorthodox 
reading of autonomy is the one given by Robert Paul Wolff: 
 
“As Kant argued, moral autonomy is a combination of freedom and responsibility; it is 
a submission to laws that one has made for oneself. The autonomous man insofar as he 
is autonomous, is not subject to the will of another.”
48 
 
In this respect, Wolff49 gives us a suggestive way of reading Kant: even if he explicitly 
condemns it in some passages, Kant’s philosophy does not in fact clash with the idea of 
anarchy. In relation to this interpretation, it is interesting to consider Morris Ginsberg’s50 
explanation of Kant’s clear claim not to have a duty to interfere directly in the lives of others, 
as long as we live rightly and in accordance with virtue and without undermining the 
possibility for others to do the same in their own, autonomous way. Again, this interpretation 
seems to suggest some problems in justifying enforced treatment.   
 
There is one crucial aspect in understanding Kant’s philosophy that deserves brief 
consideration: autonomy contrasts with heteronomy, and the latter is the ultimate moving 
principle of law enforcement within a state; without a state forcing us to do something, we 
would not. If we were all to act spontaneously in a moral way without caring for the legal 
consequences of our actions, there would be no need for the state, and everyone would be 
acting autonomously. In following instead what is established by the state as legal, we are not 
acting autonomously if we do so in order to avoid breaking the law. Obviously, this 
consideration also has direct implications for the level of culpability of an individual within a 
                                                 
47 Feinberg, J., “The Idea of a Free Man”, Education and the Development of Reason, (ed.) Dearden, R., F., 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, p.161. 
48 Wolff, R., P., In Defense of Anarchism, New York, Harper and Row, 1970, p.14. 
49 See also Wolff’s more extreme claims in his article “On Violence”, Journal of Philosophy, 66, October 1969, 
p.608, where he affirms that: “obedience is heteronomy [sic]. The autonomous man is of necessity an 
anarchist”. 
50 Ginsberg, M., On Justice in Society, Penguin Books Ltd, 1965, p.80. 
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given legal system; these implications will be more fully addressed in Chapter 3. 
 
What is important to notice in this instance, however, is that instead of focusing on the 
maximal preservation of the patient’s autonomy, in Western medical ethics the leading 
principle since antiquity has been another: the Hippocratic Oath.51 Under this oath there is no 
reference to any need to involve the patient in the decision-making process, nor, as an obvious 
consequence, is there any mention of the principle of autonomy. Instead the doctor is required 
to use her skills and abilities to benefit the patient and prevent her suffering and harm. 
 
Clearly, this view on the matter can only make sense if we presume that the doctors in 
question know “the right answer”. In fact, this axiom is so strongly taken for granted that we 
accept the complete non-involvement of the patient in the decision-making process. The 
justification for this decision assumes that even were she to be sufficiently competent and 
informed regarding her situation, her actual informed consent would not alter the value of a 
procedure’s justification, or indeed its rejection.  
 
On the same issue, an important factor pointed out by Tuija Takala must be borne in mind: 
 
“Although in most cases it is true that medical professionals hold superior knowledge in 
terms of what would be medically best for the patient, many decisions taken in the 
modern health care setting are not only about the medical good, and the medical good 
is not the only good that people are after. Most decisions are also valuable judgements 
about what people see as valuable to them in their current situations. And in these 
decisions the doctor holds no special expertise.”
52 
 
It seems clear that this way of giving relevance to the values of the individual rather than to 
some external definition of value fits well with some of the previous characterisations of 
autonomy, particularly that of Ronald Dworkin. However, of greater relevance to the current 
investigation is the realisation that -in cases of AN, for example- combining the above 
quotation with the Giordano’s acknowledgement53 that the anorexic’s “defective condition” is 
                                                 
51 See, amongst others: Edelstein, L., From The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation, and Interpretation, 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1943. Available at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath_classical.html. 
52 Takala, T., “Concepts of ‘person’ and ‘liberty,’ and their implications to our fading notions of autonomy”, J 
Med Ethics, 33, 2007, p.228. 
53 Giordano, S., Op. Cit, p.230. 
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part of who they are54 should lead us to question the justifiability of paternalistic intervention 
in their treatment even where we consider AN to be a mental illness. 
 
In this regard, having already underlined the gradual involvement of politics in the definition 
and implementation of autonomy according to its interests, the final section of this chapter 
will focus on the role and use of mental illness (and the related notion of putatively lacking 
competence) as a decisive justificatory instrument in cases of enforced treatment. 
 
1.7-Mental illness is subject to Power 
 
In order to produce a relevant understanding of mental illness that will prove useful for this 
part of the work, as well as helping the reader reflect on the second “dogma” referred to in 
section 1.5, I will take into account Thomas Szasz’ position on the power dynamics of mental 
illness, psychiatry and politics. 
 
In line with the approach of this chapter, Szasz wants us to focus on a very important aspect 
of psychiatry: we should understand its historical path, and, more importantly, we should be 
aware of its political significance. His argument is based on the assumption that mental illness 
does not really exist but is constructed by our society in order to explain (and justify) the 
differences in dealing with similar cases that would otherwise be impossible to understand. 
What is peculiar about this scholar is his extreme tendency to criticise what he might be 
expected to support in the first place: the positive role of psychiatry in our society. His 
argument is so extreme that in his “Involuntary Mental Hospitalization: A Crime against 
Humanity” he compares the incarceration of mentally ill people to slavery, writing: 
 
“The practice of ‘sane’ men incarcerating their ‘insane’ fellow men in ‘mental hospitals’ 
can be compared to that of white men enslaving black men. In short, I consider 
                                                 
54 In a recent study on eating disorders published by Jacinta Tan, Tony Hope and Anne Stewart, one anorexic 
patient replied as follows to the question “would you make the illness magically disappear if you could?”: A-
“Everything. My personality would be different. It’s been, I know it’s been such a big part of me, and-I don’t 
think you can ever get rid of it, or the feelings, you always have a bit- in you.” Tan, J., O., A., Hope, T. and 
Stewart, A., “Anorexia 8ervosa and Personal Identity: The Accounts of Patients and their Parents”, 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 26, 2003, p.533-548. See also in the same journal: Tan, J., O., 
A., “Competence to refuse treatment in anorexia nervosa”. 
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commitment a crime against humanity.”
55  
 
According to Szasz, “mental illness” is a metaphor, as its definition implies no connection 
with any sort of mental disease or disorder. Rather, such a term has had an instrumental value 
in deceiving us, preventing us from understanding that the acceptance of such a definition as 
valid is useful from a social point of view rather than from a medical or a therapeutic one. It 
follows quite obviously that if “mental illness” is not pathological, there cannot be a medical 
justification for authorities to attempt to protect us from such non-existent diseases. In 
addition, the level of uncertainty over the character of mental illness (defined by highly 
subjective standards for assessing the severity of the illness) is undoubtedly based in large 
part on the specific interaction between the patient and the psychiatrist. Such inconsistency of 
evaluation undermines the actual relevance of the medical role in these cases, and according 
to Szasz, shows once again that the use of this justification is based on our society’s need to 
obscure its real intentions (i.e. eliminate those that do not fit within the established 
framework) by providing us with reasons based on “scientific facts”.  
 
Generally speaking, in Western societies it is believed and accepted that the individual “owns” 
her body and personality,56 therefore the physician can only be allowed to take action in cases 
where the patient consents. Szasz cites57 the explicit affirmation of John Stuart Mill: “each 
person is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual” 
affirming that, obviously, “commitment is incompatible with this moral principle.”58 
Therefore, there is no moral justification for hospitalising an individual against her will: 
neither with the intention of helping them nor with the intention of insulating others from a 
potential danger. Szasz’ suggestion is that our society should simply deal with any arising 
situation in accordance with its sphere of competence. In other words, we should apply 
different reactions to different situations regardless of the prejudicial impression that we 
might have of the individual involved in a specific case; a murderer should be imprisoned, 
while a non-violent anti-social individual should be “punished” with moral sanctions such as 
social ostracism, for instance. 
 
                                                 
55 Szasz, T., S., “Involuntary Mental Hospitalization: A Crime Against Humanity”, in Classic Works in Medical 
Ethics, (ed.) Pence, G.,Boston, MA, McGraw-Hill, 1998, p.299. 
56 Szasz, T., S., “The Ethics of Birth Control; or, Who Owns Your Body?”, The Humanist, 20, 1960, p.332-336. 
57 Szasz, T., S., “Involuntary Mental Hospitalization: A Crime Against Humanity”, Op.Cit, p.301. 
58 Mill, J., S., On Liberty, Chicago: Regnery, 1955, p.18. 
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The most crucial element of Szasz’ whole analytical project concerning mental illness is his 
historical interpretation of the construction of its definition. His suggestion is that we should 
first of all analyse certain historical facts from a point of view distinct from that preferred by 
society. The standard view of mental hospitals is that they help those who are inside them and 
that it has always been so. The only change in mental hospitals is that our scientific progress 
has managed to improve their level of success in curing, or at least reducing, the negative 
effects of some, if not all, mental illnesses. Szasz aims to convince us that this is not the real 
evolutionary path that “mental illness” has taken. Nor is this the way mental hospitals 
developed. Szasz, like Michel Foucault59 before him, uses the example of Paris in the 
seventeenth century, underlining that at that time it was not even necessary for the authorities 
to justify the incarceration of certain members of the community. It was not necessary for 
such individuals to be defined as mentally ill; all that mattered was that they were a worry for 
the “respectable” community and the easiest way to eliminate the “problem” was to confine 
them to the Hôpital Général. The position that Szasz holds purports to show that evaluations 
of who is mentally ill do not differ significantly from those of the past, but of course the real 
intention of insulating the “good” people from the “bad” now needs to be better camouflaged. 
In conclusion, he is arguing that people are: 
 
“committed to mental hospitals neither because they are ‘dangerous’ nor because they 
are ‘mentally ill’, but rather because they are society’s scapegoats, whose persecution is 
justified by psychiatric propaganda and rhetoric.”
60  
 
Again, Foucault agrees with this view on many occasions, not least when considering the 
Soviet Union.61  
 
Clearly then, there are a number of reasons why respect for the autonomous decision of 
refusing medical treatment is currently minimal. One of them surely relates to the loss of 
power on the part of medical authorities which would result from this decision. Another might 
be the negative influences that such a change would have in biomedical contexts, but also in 
wider society. This justification, however, is a political rather than an ethical one, and my 
                                                 
59 Foucault, M., The Foucault Reader, (ed.) Rabinow, P., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991, p. 8. 
60 Szasz, T., S., “Involuntary Mental Hospitalization: A Crime Against Humanity”, Op.Cit, p.303. 
61 Foucault, M., Politics, philosophy, culture: interviews and other writings, 1977-1984/ translated [from the 
French] by A., Sharidan and others, (ed.) Kritzman, L., D., New York: Routeledge, 1988, p. 180-183. 
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dissatisfaction with the current situation lies in the fact that such an approach should be 
clearly stated rather than camouflaged by certain laws that claim to defend individual rights 
and the patient’s autonomy. 
 
To substantiate such a political reading of the way Western society has dealt and still deals 
with cases of enforced treatment, the next chapter will bring specific examples to the fore in 
order to give some of the theoretical claims made in this chapter a more contextualised 
dimension. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This first chapter has shed more light on a topic which is itself plagued by ambiguity. The 
need for changes in our approach to delicate matters concerning autonomy (be it that of the 
patient or of the doctor) is inalienable from the times we live in. The level of uncertainty 
regarding how best to judge and legislate for the ever-increasing number of controversial 
cases in bioethics is so high that debates on these issues are no longer limited to academic 
contexts. On the contrary, it is more and more common to find articles or TV programmes 
attempting to address or explain problematic cases, in which, as has been pointed out 
throughout the chapter, the notion of autonomy is frequently central. This social reaction is 
symptomatic of a period of “reassessment of values” which calls for the attention of experts in 
the field of biomedical ethics, above all academics. Our response should certainly not bend to 
what the masses want to hear in order to preserve power, but should instead attempt to 
understand the core of the problem: namely, we lack a just approach when dealing with subtly 
yet importantly differentiated cases concerning the freedom of the individual. Especially in 
instances of pro-life versus pro-choice conflicts, or, as explained at the outset, where respect 
for autonomy and medical paternalism are juxtaposed. In the course of this chapter, I have 
explained the evolution of the notion of autonomy from antiquity to the present day, 
highlighting a number of modern interpretations of the notion. Subsequently, I argued that 
over the past twenty years the increasing importance in biomedical decisions of individual 
autonomy has served as a tool towards the preservation of the status quo. The final section of 
the chapter reflected on the legitimacy of affirming mental illness as an objective medical 
assessment, since it is also subject to the same dynamics of power and control. The 
proceeding chapters will shift our analysis to a more practical level, beginning with a more 
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thorough examination of controversial cases of AN. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Anorexia /ervosa: enforcing medical treatment to keep a person alive 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to introduce the main problems present in debates over the [mis]use of enforced 
medical treatment, I will begin my specific analysis of controversial cases involving this issue 
by focusing on Anorexia Nervosa (AN). The particularly controversial nature of the current 
way of dealing with AN stems from the question of whether or not we should consider 
anorexics autonomous enough to refuse medical treatment, given that AN is generally 
classified as a mental disorder. In this chapter I will more closely consider this approach, 
attempting to establish whether or not AN can be classified as a mental illness.  Further, that 
being the case, I will ask to what extent this aspect can undermine the patient’s competence 
when reaching decisions over the acceptance or refusal of naso-gastric treatment. Before 
moving into the philosophical sphere of the discussion, however, a more accurate examination 
must be carried out of how and in which ways this epidemic condition affects its sufferers. 
 
2.1-Anorexia /ervosa: numbers and impasses 
 
In his book Psychopolitics, Peter Sedgwick62 relates his dismay when, as a young, left-wing 
“active partisan” he discovered that from a leftist point of view issues related to mental illness 
were virtually non-existent, as it was the fashion of the time to deny the very fact that people 
do suffer from various mental disorders.63 
 
Similarly, I have come to observe an inconsistency in the application of the principle of 
autonomy and respect for individual choice in cases of refusal of treatment in AN as well as in 
other mental disorders. This inconsistency is frequently evident in liberal societies such as the 
UK, the US and -to a certain extent- Italy, where individual choice and autonomous decision 
                                                 
62 Sedgwick, P., Psychopolitics, Pluto Press, 1982, p. 4 
63 Certainly the Anti-psychiatric movement led by Thomas Szasz was very much in line with this idea, even 
though the bottom line was perhaps not to deny entirely the existence of some kind of dysfunction in the 
mind of certain people, the core revolution that the movement wanted provoke was to stress the “mechanical” 
aspect of brain malfunction; i.e. it was curable with appropriate medicines rather than through the 
reassessment of the values of the individual. 
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are vehemently defended under “normal circumstances”. I think it is time for us to make the 
same mature step and understand an inconvenient truth about the processes currently at work 
in cases of refusal of treatment. But first we need better to understand what AN is. 
 
AN is a specific version of those recently emergent illnesses,64 namely Eating Disorders (ED 
henceforth), that have increasingly come to affect Western and Westernised countries. In the 
past 30 years all kinds of ED have seen sufficient incremental growth as to suggest a need for 
urgent attention to this problem. Without wanting to underplay the importance of problems 
such as obesity, binge eating and bulimia nervosa,65 this work will focus on AN alone. 
 
Before describing the symptoms of AN in more scientific terms, it is important to underline 
one aspect of this condition that might easily go unnoticed and thus reduce the quality of the 
current analysis. By acknowledging the rise of ED, and more specifically AN, in Western 
contexts, we immediately begin to prepare the ground for a linear critique of the illness not in 
medical terms but rather in socio-historical ones. I will better explain this distinction when 
tackling the biopolitical dimension of the AN controversy in Chapter 5. For the time being, 
suffice it to say that, given the internal readjustment that Western society has undergone in 
recent times -giving rise to greater self-criticism with regard to past actions and inactions- the 
analysis of AN (and other ED) began from a contested position, making it impossible from the 
outset to claim objectivity for any “scientific” analysis. 
 
2.2-Anorexia /ervosa: the particular understandings of sufferers, doctors and lawyers  
 
Despite being the psychiatric illness with the highest mortality rates,66 AN remains 
                                                 
64 A definitive assessment of when ED emerged is not the remit of this work, and for reasons of simplicity I will 
accept the standard date of the 17th Century as the beginning of these kind illnesses. To understand the 
impact of such illnesses see: Klump, K., L., Bulik, C., M., Kaye, W., H., Treasure, J., and Tyson, E.,  “Eating 
Disorders Are Serious Mental Illnesses”, International Journal of Eating Disorders, 42:2, 2009, p.97-103.  
65 Not everyone agrees that obesity is an ED, but for a closer look at the current debate over this and other  
aspects of ED see, amongst others: Fairburn C., G., and Brownell, K., D., (eds)., Eating Disorders and 
Obesity: A Comprehensive Handbook (Second Edition). New York: Guilford Press, 2002; Palmer, R. L., 
“Concepts of eating disorders”, in Treasure, J., Schmidt, U., & Van Furth, E., (eds.), Handbook of eating 
disorders, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.1-10.  
66 Ramsay, R., Ward, A., Treasure, J., Russell, G., F., “Compulsory treatment in anorexia nervosa: short-term 
benefits and long-term mortality”, Br J Psychiatry, 1999, 175, p.147-153, Franko, D., L., Keel, P., K., Dorer 
D., J., et al., “What predicts suicide attempts in women with eating disorders?”, Psychol Med, 2004, 34, 
p.843-853, Pompili, M., Mancinelli, I., Girardi, P., et al., “Suicide in anorexia nervosa. A meta-analysis”, Int 
J Eat Disord, 2004, 36, p.99-103. 
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paradoxically the one condition that has managed to produce the least effective 
countermeasures to its impact. One of the main reasons for this peculiar situation lies in the 
crucial factor that makes AN unique: the vast majority of anorexics do not commit themselves 
to escape the illness. On the contrary, their embracing of the condition as a vital part of their 
identity results in an additional layer of ethical dilemmas that all those concerned with AN 
have to face. As highlighted in one study carried out by Jacinta Tan, Tony Hope and Anne 
Stewart: “the decision to accept treatment can become heavily loaded with the implication of 
giving up a part of themselves, which can affect their decision.”67  
 
From an historical perspective, the term Anorexia Nervosa -the most common way of 
referring to this condition both in English and in the international debate- was first introduced 
in 1873. Even though it remains unclear who first coined this term,68 it is widely accepted that 
Charles Lasègue did carry out numerous studies on this eating disorder, defining it most 
commonly as “anorexie hystérique”69 (hysteric anorexia) with all the sexist implications that 
such a definition entails. It is perhaps also for this reason that Mara Selvini Palazzoli would 
prefer the term “anoressia mentale”70 (mental anorexia), because, on top of avoiding scientific 
confusion, it would also detach AN from a common inclinations to link the illness only to 
women. We can see quite easily that this reading is erroneous as in the last decade the 
percentage of males affected by AN in Western countries has increased to 8% of the overall 
cases,71 a figure which continues to rise.72 All of the definitions listed above, however, have as 
their key word anorexia -etymologically meaning “lack of appetite”- which also constitutes 
the most common popular and media referent. However, as Simona Giordano points out, the 
illness does not express itself through the absence of appetite in the sufferer: the individual 
does have the “normal” input of feeling hungry -the presence of appetite- but she will force 
herself to resist it as proof of her self-discipline. She will become obsessed with food and, at 
the same time, with exercising her capability to resist the temptation of eating. 
                                                 
67 Tan, J., Hope, T., & Stewart, A., “Anorexia nervosa and personal identity: the accounts of patients and their 
parents”, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 26, 2003, p.546. 
68 Simona Giordano suggests in her book that this might instead have been William Gull. Giordano, Op.Cit., 
p.18. 
69 Lasègue, C., E., “On histerical anorexia”, Medical Times and Gazette, 2, 1873, p.265-266 and 367-369. 
70 Selvini Palazzoli, M., L’anoressia mentale: Dalla terapia individuale alla terapia familiare, 9th ed., Feltrinelli, 
1998. 
71 Fichter, M., and Krenn, H., “Eating Disorders in Males”, in Treasure, J., Schmidt, U., & Van Furth, E., 
(eds.), Handbook of eating disorders, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.369-383. 
72 For example, in their recent report “Treatment Decision-Making in Anorexia 8ervosa”, Jacinta Tan, Anne 
Stewart and Tony Hope reported an increase in the figure of male anorexics to 10%. (p. 3) available at : 
http://www.psychiatricethics.org.uk/ANwebreport/report.pdf [accessed on 1 March 2011] 
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In this light, it should not come as a surprise to the reader that, in the vast majority of cases, 
the sufferer represents the prototype of a “successful individual”. She would be first in class, a 
hard worker, striving for perfection. This “psychological identikit” is obviously limited, and it 
does not pretend to achieve the unachievable by defining in scientific terms the average 
anorexic profile. However, I believe that it is important to highlight certain common 
characteristics of sufferers -also in broad non-medical terms- to include a wider group of 
people in the analysis in which this work intends to engage. 
 
I am well aware that the present exploration of the clinical dimension will necessarily prove 
severely limited but, both for lack of space and of professional competence, this work cannot 
investigate the medical dimension of mental illnesses -AN more specifically- in great depth. I 
am confident, however, that many interesting and valuable works have been produced in 
recent years that allow a particularly interested reader to expand their knowledge on the 
topic.73  
  
In the most recent version of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) produced by 
the WHO, AN can be found under “mental and behavioural disorders” (Chapter V), and 
more specifically within the section covering behavioural syndromes associated with 
psychological disturbances and physical factors. The definition as presented reads: 
 
“A disorder characterized by deliberate weight loss, induced and sustained by the 
patient. It occurs most commonly in adolescent girls and young women, adolescent boys 
and young men may also be affected, as may children approaching puberty and older 
women up to the menopause. The disorder is associated with a specific psychopathology 
whereby a dread of fatness and flabbiness of body contour persists as an intrusive 
overvalued idea, and the patients impose a low weight threshold on themselves. There is 
usually undernutrition of varying severity with secondary endocrine and metabolic 
changes and disturbances of bodily function. The symptoms include restricted dietary 
choice, excessive exercise, induced vomiting and purgation, and use of appetite 
                                                 
73 See amongst others: Kaplan, A., S., and Woodside, D., B., “Biological aspects of anorexia nervosa and 
bulimia nervosa”, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55(5), 1987, p.645-653, Carney, T., Tait, 
D., Richardson, A., and Touyz, S., “Why (and When) Clinicians Compel Treatment of Anorexia 8ervosa 
Patients”, European Eating Disorders Review, 16, 2008, p.199-206, Tureka, L., Wayne, W., Bowers, A., 
Andersen, A., “Involuntary Treatment of Eating Disorders”, Am J Psychiatry, 157:11, November 2000, 
p.1806-1810. 
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suppressants and diuretics.”
74 
 
Even though the clinical criteria highlighted by the ICD have a measure of undeniable 
scientific accuracy -insomuch as is possible in medicine- it would be to offend the reader’s 
intellectual ability not to acknowledge that in this description there are present numerous 
value judgements that I opt not to emphasise. I am certainly not claiming that the idea of 
thinness in anorexia is not overvalued by those individuals suffering from it, but it is unclear 
where we should draw the line between a noxious attitude towards life and a situation in 
which we can begin to speak of mental illness. For example, tobacco and alcohol abuse also 
figure within the “mental and behavioural disorders due to psychoactive substance use” 
section of Chapter V, but there is no mention of the value that these substances are guaranteed 
in terms of socio-cultural acceptability and common usage. In other words, an alcoholic is 
presented in this description as a sane person who becomes sporadically “insane” due to the 
use of alcohol, or in more technical terms, he enters a phase of chronic alcoholism, but there 
is no direct attack on the value of alcohol itself. As a result, while on the one hand the value of 
thinness (strongly present in our society, tolerated and encouraged most of the time) is 
deemed to be “overvalued”, while on the other hand the same does not occur with the value of 
more damaging phenomena such as drunkenness and/or alcoholism. The reason behind such a 
discrepancy in relatively similar cases has to do with the fact that alcohol remains central to 
so many cultures and countries around the world that a full-scale attack on it would be too 
destabilising to a number of other institutional certainties that authorities do not want to see 
called into question. This statement should not come as a surprise to the reader as it has 
already been affirmed that the intention of this thesis is to reveal that such inconsistent 
dynamics are particularly strong in cases concerning the application of the notion of 
autonomy. It follows that, differently from widespread diseases such as alcoholism, AN can 
be expressly attacked because it affects a relatively low number of people and, most 
importantly, any attempt to save the lives of its sufferers does not jar with modern values. It is 
important to notice, however, that even accepting this reading as valid a clash would still 
exist. That would be the inconsistent use of terminology, serving to preserve that stability that 
authorities desire but that has to do with power rather than with the real nature of the illness.   
 
                                                 
74 WHO, International Classification of Diseases (ICD), available at: http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ 
[accessed on 1 March 2011] My emphasis. 
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In this light, two aspects of the WHO’s account of AN deserve attention. The first point I want 
to raise is a provocative one. It is interesting to underline that, following a logic of exclusion 
often used in schematic and relatively scientific methods, there exist grounds to affirm that, 
when moving from the more general group of disorders towards the more specific one, the 
“mental dimension” of the disorder has been cast aside to leave the focus on the “behavioural 
dimension”. Of course, this should be seen as a clinical categorisation of mental illnesses that 
aims to describe the disorder, hence behaviour -intended in the broadest sense- emerges as the 
main feature of AN. 
 
However, the same logic could well prove the opposite: the definition has to focus on -and 
negatively emphasise- the anorexic [mis]behaviour in order to legitimise its reading of this 
very particular mental state as a mental disorder. Obviously, though, the fact that society does 
not consider a certain behaviour as rational, or even virtuous, does not function as a 
justification for classifying that particular state of mind as a threat to an individual’s 
competence and autonomy. Otherwise, by parity of reasoning we should also stop drinkers 
and smokers from continuing in their “behavioural disturbances”! The overall perception 
evident in this description raises additional questions regarding the current situation which 
find their echo in other unconvincing contributions, leading to a more technical second point. 
 
When reading more carefully the ICD’s section on AN, there is a peculiarity not immediately 
evident on first reading: the definition does not apply to all cases of AN. In the very beginning 
of section F50 (concerning ED) there is a list of which variants of these disorders are 
excluded, within which figures Anorexia NOS.75 NOS stands for Not Otherwise Specified and 
is normally used for more general ED76; a puzzling definition when considered alongside 
Anorexia. More precisely, if there are insufficient grounds to state with relative certainty that 
the disorder fits the definition of AN, how can it be then approximated to Anorexia NOS? 
 
The answer to this question comes also from the WHO’s ICD schema, which in its subsequent 
blocks on “disorders of adult personality and behaviour”, provides some material valuable to 
the sceptical reading developed here: 
                                                 
75 WHO, International Classification of Diseases (ICD), ibid. 
76 See, amongst others: Fairburn, C., G., and Harrison, P.,  J., “Eating disorders”, Lancet, 2003, 361, p.407-416, 
and Eating Disorders: Anorexia, Bulimia & Eating Disorder NOS, available at:  
http://cpancf.com/eatingdisorders.asp [accessed on 1 March 2011] 
Mirko Daniel Garasic                                                                                                   Chapter 2 
43 
 
“This block includes a variety of conditions and behaviour patterns of clinical 
significance which tend to be persistent and appear to be the expression of the 
individual’s characteristics. [...]They represent extreme or significant deviations from 
the way in which the average individual in a given culture perceives, thinks, feels and, 
particularly, relates to others.”
77  
 
It seems sufficiently clear that here -going back to the distinct notions of autonomy described 
in the previous chapter- the approach taken by the WHO is far more Kantian than Millian. 
And yet the superiority of the authorities in charge in contradiction of the [mis]judgement of 
the individual is not explicitly affirmed. It follows therefore that there is a reluctance to state 
clearly that certain choices are not the expression of the individual, but rather that they appear 
to be so. This ambiguity contributes to the undermining of the respect for the clinical data 
analysed and supports the aim of this thesis in demanding a more coherent and credible way 
of dealing with controversial cases that revolve around the issue of autonomy.  
 
In relation to this unconvincing use of psychiatry to justify enforced treatment -but more 
generally to legitimise its own authority- in her influential book Understanding Eating 
Disorders, Simona Giordano has a very interesting section in her book that examines what she 
calls “the Fallacy of Psychiatric ’Explanations’”; this notion deserves to be considered in 
greater depth. Interestingly enough, the focus of her discussion is schizophrenia, the very 
same mental illness that will be considered in the next chapter’s exploration of the Singleton 
case. Giordano’s argument is both very simple and also very strong: in its explanation of the 
symptoms and effects of a mental illness psychiatry often uses an approach that fails to be 
logically acceptable. The logical error comes from the tautological justification given in 
contexts where instead the authorities involved should have the courage to accept -and 
publicly admit- their limits. This revolutionary way of conceiving of the patient-doctor 
relationship (viewing the doctor as someone who might not know) is only partially present in 
our society at the moment.  As we shall see later when focusing on Onora O’Neill’s work, we 
have lost our trust in doctors but have not yet found an alternative way to benefit actively 
from the acceptance that doctors, too, are human and therefore in need of assistance in 
situations where it can be particularly difficult to find the “right answer”. We shall come back 
                                                 
77 WHO, International Classification of Diseases (ICD), Op. Cit. My emphasis. 
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to this aspect in the last chapter of the thesis, but, at this stage, it is interesting to consider the 
reasons why it remains difficult to encounter a situation where the tautological statement 
“why does X suffer from schizophrenia? Because X is schizophrenic” is considered 
inconceivable. On the contrary, this is the standard approach used in many contexts, including 
ED and, more specifically, AN. Giordano’s scheme (figure 1) allows us to understand the 
logical fallacy applied to ED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1                  
 
A Fallacy in Some Explanations of Anorexia 4ervosa 
 
Anorexia Nervosa 
= 
(a clinical term that) refers to/summarizes a number of disturbances 
(loss of weight over stated limits, amenorrhoea, etc.) 
 
(proper definition) 
 
Question 1: Why have you received the diagnosis of anorexia nervosa? 
(or: ’Why are you-called-anorexic’?) 
Answer 1: Because you manifest the following disturbances: 
loss of weight over stated limits, amenorrhoea. 
 
(proper answer, logically correct) 
 
Question 2: Why do you manifest the following disturbances? 
(or:’Why do you diet, you have amenorrhoea...?’) 
 
Answer 2a: We are trying to understand it. 
 
(proper and true answer) 
 
Answer 2b: Because you suffer from anorexia nervosa. 
 
(tautological answer) 
 
= 
 
You manifest the following disturbances because you manifest the 
following disturbances (having anorexia nervosa, in fact, means that you 
are manifesting the following disturbances). 
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Giordano’s interesting conclusion in this section of her important work, points out that, if we 
accept and establish that -in the vast majority of cases-78 psychiatry can only give a 
descriptive picture of the mental illness, it follows that such mental disorders (including of 
course AN) do not compromise the autonomy of the person in question. 
 
As she writes: 
 
“In the majority of cases when it is said that a person has a mental illness, what is meant is 
that she manifests some disturbances. In most cases the psychiatric diagnosis is only a short 
cut to describe a pattern of disturbances: it has no explanatory value. In all cases in which 
the diagnosis merely has a descriptive value (and this is the majority) it is simply not true that 
’mental illness’ jeopardizes people’s autonomy. Mental illness is a ’description of events’, and 
as such it does not and cannot jeopardize ’autonomy’.”
79 
 
Given the sceptical nature of this consideration, in the next section we will focus more closely 
on the definition of mental illness.  We will then apply it to AN in order to criticise the 
justifications used to define AN as a mental illness, implying also a consideration of the 
consequences of this general consensus. 
 
2.3-Mental illness 
 
Although not directly defining mental illness, the WHO constitution describes a person as in 
good mental health not only because of the mere absence of mental disorder. As an extension 
of this approach, the WHO website reads: 
 
“Mental health is a state of well-being in which an individual realizes his or her own 
abilities, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and is able to 
make a contribution to his or her community. In this positive sense, mental health is the 
foundation for individual well-being and the effective functioning of a community.”
80
 
 
By the vocabulary used, it seems evident that the definition above points out two implicit 
                                                 
78 Giordano, S., Understanding Eating Disorders, OUP, 2005, p.68-69. 
79 Giodano, S., Op.Cit., p.70. 
80 WHO, available at: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs220/en/  [accessed on 15 March 2011] 
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aspects of mental illness (the absence of mental health). First, the capability to produce (a 
central notion in a capitalist society) is a crucial factor in establishing whether or not a person 
can be considered sane. Second, the actions of the individual must also be functional to the 
community. These variables, however, appear to be more political than medical.  
 
Continuing with this deconstructive approach, and being provocative for the sake of the 
argument, one could even attempt to defend the idea that AN needs to be seen as a mental 
illness in order to avoid uncomfortable situations of biased judgements over relatively similar 
cases. After all, as Giordano rightly points out:  
 
“The person with an eating disorder is far removed from the common idea of the 
’insane’ and may be a skilled and competent person in virtually all areas of her life. 
[…] If people are normally entitled to choose their lifestyle, however dangerous or 
irrational it may appear to others, why should not people be able to choose what and 
how they want to eat?”
81 
 
Even more so, the fact of having AN outside of the standard ways of classifying a mental 
illness can surely be argued to be convenient for a certain project. In fact, having AN as non-
classifiable “normal” case of refusal of treatment could be seen as a very useful way out for 
the judicial system in situations where the role of mental illness, competence and autonomy 
can be used in inconsistent ways to favour the prevailing political trends. 
 
I will go on to focus on the role of the biopolitical readjustments that autonomy often suffers 
in Chapter 5, but for the time being -without wanting to enter into a deep technical debate on 
the definition of mental illness- I will highlight the main implications for decisional processes 
of suffering from such an illness. In other words, I will take AN to be a mental illness, but I 
will question the meaning of precisely this definition.  
 
The key aspect of this consideration will be to establish whether or not a mentally ill patient 
can still be deemed competent. In this respect we should consider the view of Thomas 
Szasz,82 amongst others. According to this view, if we were to consider mental illness an 
                                                 
81 Giordano, S., Op.Cit., p.30-31. 
82 Szasz, T., S., The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct, Paladin, 1972. 
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actual illness, it would be one of the brain, not of the mind. With such an approach towards 
cases of AN, for instance, it should become clear that once the incapability of the doctors to 
improve the situation, or more simply to cure the illness, is accepted, the decisional power 
should return to the competent patient. This idea will be analysed in greater depth in the next 
section of this chapter, but, before taking that path, we shall consider an additional aspect 
relevant to a full understanding of AN. In relation to the evaluation of AN as a pathology 
particularly linked to female characteristics, we must understand these as gender-specific 
limits shaped by historical injustices. Helen Malson’s very interesting work, The Thin Woman, 
provides an analysis of the “genealogy of anorexia”, pointing out that, despite recent 
improvements in the relationship between genders that have given more respect to women, 
there is still an acceptance of the intrinsically masculine concept of “healthiness”.83 
 
Such an acknowledgement is certainly worthy of attention, but, despite supporting Malson’s 
application of Foucault to the current analysis of AN -and the resultant belief that to 
understand it fully we cannot limit ourselves only to the result of a historic-medical discourse- 
I believe that certain characteristics of AN are objective realities that signify illness regardless 
of their links to a specific gender. As proof of its “intergenderness” it would be worthwhile to 
consider once again that in recent years the number of males affected by AN has drastically 
increased and can sometimes even produce more problems related to the specific biological 
structure of male sufferers.84 
 
This recognition leaves us with two considerations to take into account: the first is that, if we 
had to accept the conservative male-centred view of AN, this would be perhaps a good 
occasion to understand that if the illness is “transmittable” between genders, the problem lies 
in the external factors that produce the precondition for AN to develop (obsession with body 
image, need to prove one’s will power). This accepted, the conservative view would be 
knocked off its chauvinist pedestal. The second consideration that deserves attention is that, as 
for Szasz, the mere awareness of the fact that something was abused in the course of history 
                                                 
83 Malson, H., The Thin Woman: feminism, post-structuralism, and the social psychology of anorexia nervosa, 
Routledge, 1998, p.47-48. 
84 In this respect it is interesting to note the different reaction that females and males have towards involuntary 
treatment. A good example of this distinction is Silber, T., Robb, A., S., Orell-Valente, J., K., Ellis, N., 
Valadez-Meltzer, A., and Dadson, M., J., “Case Report 8octurnal 8asogastric Refeeding for Hospitalized 
Adolescent Boys with Anorexia 8ervosa”, Journal of Developmental & Behavioral Pediatrics, December 
2004, Vol 25, Issue 6, p.415-418. 
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in order to prolong the continuation of an injustice is not sufficient reason to refute the 
scientific validity of those data that we currently have. As a matter of fact, Szasz himself did 
not claim that psychiatry does not exist, but only that we should reshape its use.85 
 
2.4-Can competence coexists with A/? 
 
We have already explained in the previous chapter the definition of competence vis-à-vis the 
notion of autonomy and its legal and medical status. In this section, we will look at this 
definition in closer relation to AN. To evaluate the impact of AN on the competence of those 
refusing naso-gastric treatment, it has been accepted that AN is a mental illness. In arriving at 
this acceptance, however, the question that we have raised focused on affirming that even 
given such a scenario there is no clear evidence that the incapability to judge competently in 
decisions related to food would necessarily jeopardise the competence of the anorexic in any 
given context.  
 
As we have seen above, it is not entirely clear whether or not the anorexic sufferer can be 
claimed to be incompetent in every context. In truth, it appears well accepted that they are 
indeed competent in most cases. They are perhaps incompetent when it comes to food, but not 
when asked about their quality of life. This is clearly the main problem to deal with: if they 
are competent, can we still override their will and force-feed them? 
 
Some positions would argue that there are cases, even if very small in number, where such 
refusals should be heeded, and the reason for such an affirmation is that in these given 
instances the patients would be in a position to make a competent decision. One very common 
position would then argue that patients suffering from AN are not capable of making any 
competent decisions regarding feeding or, more generally, any issue relating to food. These 
views accept this position but highlight that in cases of naso-gastric treatment concerning 
“experienced” and relatively “stable” patients (persons that have already been through such 
therapy and that are in no immediate danger of death) the issue to consider relates not to food 
but rather to concerns over quality of life. These patients would be able to make competent 
decisions, because these decisions would not be related in any direct way to food. Critiques of 
this point are based on the further development that affirms that if we recognise anorexics as 
                                                 
85 Szasz, T., The Myth of Mental Illness, Op. Cit. 
Mirko Daniel Garasic                                                                                                   Chapter 2 
49 
competent, we should be ready to affirm their autonomy as well. Such critiques and their 
counterarguments shall be addressed through the analysis of the key concepts of competence 
and autonomy. As Heather Draper suggests in her paper:   
 
“What needs to be established, and what is very difficult to establish in the case of 
anorexia nervosa, is whether the person with anorexia nervosa is an autonomous agent 
who is incompetent to make some judgements, or a non-autonomous agent who is 
competent to make some judgements.”
86 
 
Yet, it is important to take into account another crucial factor: in the cases considered, doctors 
are not expecting the situation to improve, their intention is only to postpone death insomuch 
as possible. Under these conditions, however, it seems obvious that the moving principle 
behind the decision not to interrupt a treatment or switch off a vital machine has to do with 
the moral view of the doctor on the matter. But should it be so? Should the will of the patient 
not be respected if the actual consequences of the most extreme decision would only result in 
the acceleration of a process otherwise incredibly painful? After all, the Anglo-American 
norm in medical contexts it is to accept the decision of the competent patient as decisive, 
including when their decision would result in death. 
 
2.5-Moral justifications for treatment refusal in cases of Anorexia /ervosa 
 
As a moral justification for refraining from artificially feeding a patient suffering from AN it 
could be argued that it would be a practical form of the doctrine of double effect. In fact, this 
interesting argument is pursued by Fiona Randall and Robin Downie in their book Palliative 
Care Ethics: 
 
“the doctrine of double effect which relies on a moral distinction between intended and 
foreseen events allows the use of measures to relieve suffering even though they carry a 
significant risk of shortening life.”
87 
 
I shall argue that adapting this approach to the interruption of naso-gastric treatment would 
                                                 
86 Draper, H., “Anorexia 8ervosa and Refusal of 8aso-Gastric Treatment: a Reply to Simona Giordano”, 
Bioethics, 2003, p.4. 
87 Randall, F., and Downie, R., S., Palliative Care Ethics, 2nd edition, OUP, 1999, p. 127. 
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produce the effect of defending this option as functional to the reduction of the patient’s 
suffering with the unintended result of letting the selfsame patient die. For the sake of the 
argument, it might be claimed that from a utilitarian point of view it could even be justifiable 
to force treatment on anorexic patients because their internal suffering would still produce less 
“moral” damage to the consciences of the persons around them (family, friends, and doctors) 
than would their death. This approach, however, would deny the centrality of ensuring that the 
patient’s autonomous decisional power be defended in all cases where the patient’s 
competence has been established.  
 
In fact, I want to suggest that one of the justifications for the disparity of strictness in 
accepting the will of the patient as morally permissible and based on competence may well be 
linked to the possible consequences of denying such freedom to translate choices into actions. 
The reason is self-evident: while in the case of terminally ill patients the hope for recovery 
has completely disappeared and nothing will prevent the patient from dying, in the case of AN 
the hope may always exist, including for the patient herself. To not accept any refusal is often 
seen as a way of gaining time in which the patient might “come to her senses” and move away 
from a condition of extreme AN towards a less extreme stage of the illness at least. However, 
it is through the acceptance of such a strategy (that may often be rooted in noble intentions) 
that I hope to have highlighted what does not satisfy me about the present discrepancy 
between different types of treatment refusal, all of which would eventually result in death. For 
the situation just considered would imply a level of paternalism on the part of the doctors that 
we claim to be unjustified when the patient has the capability to make a competent decision. 
In other words, if the patient is found to be competent, we must allow her to pursue her 
destiny despite our concerns over the “chances of success” were any refusal of treatment to be 
accepted. We should be ready, as Giordano says, to make the “brave claim”.88 Admittedly, this 
is not a decision to be made light-heartedly and for this reason in the next section of this 
chapter we will shift our attention on to the unique complexity of the problems surrounding 
AN. 
 
2.6-Deep-rooted dilemma in Anorexia /ervosa 
 
The deep-rooted dilemma in AN is that it is a very peculiar condition which, in developing as 
                                                 
88 Giordano, S., Op.Cit, p. 246-250. 
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early as the age of twelve (this figure falls each year as the pressure on youngsters grows), 
makes it extremely difficult to ascertain precisely when the patient has recovered from the 
mental illness, because in most cases the mental illness itself has evolved as part of their own 
personality and way of being. We could say that in some ways abruptly breaking this link with 
a part of their selves could prove seriously destabilising, a point that should probably be given 
greater consideration than is usually the case. A metaphorical representation of what it means 
to develop AN might be the science-fiction-type situation where some children grow up with 
tinted glasses fixed to their eyes. In time, their particular way of seeing the world (through 
green-tinted lenses, say) will become their only accessible and conceivable reality. With this 
simple yet hopefully valuable scheme in mind, two considerations arise in relation to AN. 
 
The first consideration concerns the potential damage done by removing the sunglasses too 
abruptly from the eyes of the patient. As the reader might know from personal experience, 
such an action is always followed by a moment of temporary blindness. In the imaginary 
scenario portrayed above, the situation entails an exponential increase both of the time of 
exposure to the sun and the time in which the eyes adapt to seeing the world through green 
filters. As a result, it should be easily understandable that a precipitous choice -aiming to 
show the true colours of the world to the patient through sudden removal of the “anorexic 
sunglasses”- might result in a more damage than benefit, at least in the short term. 
 
The second aspect to consider -and the one more closely linked to the purposes of this work- 
relates to the value that we assign to the role of the green-filtered sunglasses when 
establishing the level of competence of the individual in question. More specifically, crucial is 
the certainty with which we can affirm that this distortion of reality impairs the person’s 
ability to analyse competently important features other than colour; to deny respect for 
general competence on the grounds of possible incompetence in a certain domain would 
hardly be justifiable. Continuing with our metaphor, then, we could say that, on the one hand, 
it would be reasonable to accept that in the condition described it would be unrealistic to 
expect the person with sunglasses to be able to distinguish between two objectively distinct 
shirts (one green and one white) that to her green-filtered eyes will result undistinguishable.  
 
On the other hand, however, would it not be unreasonable to claim instead that due to her 
sunglasses, if put in the condition of having to do so, the person in question would not at least 
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try to dodge a (grey) stone thrown at her? Instinctively, no one would deny that the absence of 
competence in regard to the (partial) colour-blindness of the person would not still represent a 
sufficient impediment substantially undermining the self-preservative nature of the individual 
who will do anything in her power to avoid the potential pain caused by the stone. Though 
simplistic, this example could well function as a launch pad to enter into a more sophisticated 
discussion of this peculiar -and controversial- aspect of AN: the shaky ground on which rests 
the assessment of partial incompetence. 
 
2.7-What is to be done with Anorexia /ervosa? 
 
To avoid a serious confrontation on this topic, with all its potential consequences in the 
political sphere, many proposals have been touted. For example, the possibility of using 
nocturnal naso-gastric treatment89 is significant and worthy of particular attention as it 
attempts to reduce the clash between the medical obligation to treatment and the explicit 
overriding of the patient’s will. But while it might succeed in making this contrast less 
violent, it still fails to provide a satisfactory solution. 
 
We might feel entitled to feed the patient while she is asleep without asking her permission, 
perhaps without even informing her of the treatment in order to avoid problems related to 
standard naso-gastric treatment. To do so, however, would entail the sidelining of the question 
of whether or not the patient is competent or not, the patient being left bereft of any 
possibility to decide how to deal with her situation. As such -aside from the purely technical 
aspects- the nocturnal naso-gastric treatment does not differ in any significant way from a 
standard paternalistic approach that would naturally presume the incompetence of the 
anorexic patient.90  
 
The brief analysis produced in this chapter will lead us back to the initial question that haunts 
those attempting to find an acceptable solution to the ethico-legal problems associated with 
                                                 
89 See footnote 83 above and Robb, A., S., Silber, T., Orell-Valente, J., K., Valadez-Meltzer, A., Ellis, N., 
Dadson, M., J., and Chatoor, I., “Supplemental nocturnal nasogastric refeeding for better short-term 
outcome in hospitalized adolescent girls with anorexia nervosa”, American Journal of Psychiatry, 159(8), 
2002, p.1347-1353. 
90 Halse, C., Boughtwood, D., Clarke, S., Honey, A., Kohn, M., and Madden, S., “Illuminating Multiple 
Perspectives: Meanings of 8asogastric Feeding in Anorexia 8ervosa”, Eur. Eat. Disorders Rev., 2005, 13, 
p.264-272. 
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AN: what should authorities do when faced with such cases? How should we, as a society, 
behave in such an ambiguous situation? Where to draw the line of respect for freedom of 
choice and for life? 
 
In her recent article ’Anorexia: a Role for Law in Therapy?’,91 Terry Carney focused on a very 
practical way of dealing with the issue, namely ensuring that law would guarantee the 
preservation of life insomuch as possible. She writes: 
 
“It (is) hard to reject a role for law in the authorisation of the use of coercion in some 
form in the case of emergency or life-saving interventions for severe anorexia nervosa. 
But […] it is equally difficult not to accept that a guardianship-type order/jurisdiction92 
has a legitimate role as well, and indeed should serve as the preferred initial measure 
when legal intervention is required.”
 93 
 
Thus, despite having an intuitive leaning towards the preservation of life as the ultimate duty, 
the law should first respect its own limits, and accept that at this stage in the majority of 
Anglo-American legal systems the principle of autonomy resists any attempt to be diluted.  
 
This awareness, combined with the commonsense intuition that it would be morally wrong to 
allow the loss of life of certain anorexics (many of whom will later prove grateful for having 
received enforced treatment) for the sake of respecting this self-imposed predominance of 
autonomy, should lead us to ask if this system based on an individualistic version of 
autonomy is indeed as suitable as we currently believe it to be.  I will come back to this point 
in the last chapter by proposing reforms to the notion of autonomy in line with Onora 
O’Neill’s work that might produce the preconditions for a legal system capable of ensuring a 
consistent use of the notion of autonomy whilst allowing coercive measures in cases of AN 
without undermining the legitimacy of such procedures.  
 
 
                                                 
91 Carney, T., “Anorexia: a Role for Law in Therapy?”, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, Vol.16, No.1, March 
2009, p.41-59. 
92 Here Carney refers to a specific term used in Australian contexts in relation to a third person (a 
guardian/tutor) deciding on behalf of the patient in question. Obviously, if the anorexic is found to be 
competent enough to make a decision, the guardianship remains with her.  
93 Carney, T., Op.Cit., p.41-59. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the course of this second chapter we have moved the analysis of the notion of autonomy in 
bioethical cases from a more theoretical discussion towards a more empirical, fact-based 
approach. More specifically, our focus has turned to controversial cases of enforced naso-
gastric treatment in AN, developing further -and in greater contextual depth- the concepts of 
competence, autonomy and mental illness relevant to all of the cases considered in this work. 
Through an investigation that has brought to the fore the medical peculiarity of ED -and more 
specifically AN- when evaluated in terms of autonomy and competence, it has been pointed 
out that patients suffering from AN cannot be so easily separated from their illness as can 
those undergoing most other medical procedures. As shown with the arguments sustained and 
convincingly articulated by Giordano, we have shifted the debate over the legitimacy of 
enforced treatment in AN into a field that questioned more vigorously the limits that authority 
can (or should) have in relation to the values of individual. In doing so, we have reinforced 
the conviction that, while AN might not jeopardise the level of the patient’s competence to 
such an extent that enforced treatment can take place under current legal and moral standards, 
the unacceptability of the refusal of treatment in AN is related to the impact that such an 
acknowledgement would have on wider societal values. The inconsistent use of autonomy as 
a function of its political context will be further analysed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Singleton case: enforcing medical treatment to put a person to death 
 
Introduction 
 
In the course of this chapter I will highlight a very controversial way of implementing the 
notion of autonomy as previously considered. In October 200394 the Supreme Court of the 
United States allowed Arkansas officials to force Charles Laverne Singleton, a schizophrenic 
prisoner convicted of murder, to take drugs that would render him sane enough to be 
executed. On January 6 200495 he was killed by lethal injection, raising many ethical 
questions. By reference to the Singleton case, this chapter will analyse in both moral and legal 
terms the controversial justifications of the enforced medical treatment of death-row inmates. 
I will begin by providing a description of the Singleton case, before highlighting the prima 
facie reasons for which this case is problematic and merits attention. Next, I will consider the 
justification of punishment in Western society and, in that context, the evolution of the notion 
of insanity in the assessment of criminal responsibility during the past two centuries, both in 
the US and the UK. In doing so, I will take into account the moral justification used to enforce 
treatment, looking at the conflict between the prisoner’s right to treatment and his right to 
refuse medication where not justified by reasonably foreseeable positive outcomes for the 
individual. Finally, in contrast with some retributivist arguments in favour of enforced 
treatment to enable execution, I will propose a possible alternative, necessary if we are to 
consistently uphold the notion of autonomy. It will be argued that, within the current Anglo-
American legal framework, in cases of capital punishment where the inmate was competent at 
the moment of sentencing, the death penalty should be carried out as normal, since the 
immutability of the sentence makes it impossible to justify enforced treatment in either legal 
or moral terms.  
 
3.1- The Singleton case 
 
In 1979 Charles Laverne Singleton killed a grocery clerk in Arkansas and was sentenced to 
                                                 
94
 Singleton v Arkansas, 124 S.Ct. 74 (2003) (Cert. Denied). 
95 Available at: http://www.clarkprosecuter.org/html/death/US/singleton887.htm accessed on 11 July 2008. 
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death that same year. Once on death row, he began taking psychotropic medications to 
alleviate anxiety and depression. However, in 1987, his mental health deteriorated further to 
the extent that he claimed that his victim was still alive and that he himself was possessed by 
demons. Singleton was diagnosed as schizophrenic and prescribed antipsychotic medication. 
During the following years he oscillated between agreeing and refusing to take the 
medication. As a result, when he spontaneously refused to take it, it was forced on him. When 
he went off the medication, the paranoid and delusional behaviours returned. By 1997 
antipsychotic medication had become so necessary that the prison placed Singleton under an 
involuntary drugging regime, subject to annual review. Under this regime, Singleton’s mental 
health improved to the extent that the State of Arkansas authorities considered him eligible for 
execution, scheduling it for March 2000. Singleton then filed a petition for habeas corpus,96 
contending that he was only competent because of the medication he was being forced to take 
and that it was unconstitutional to use enforced medication to raise his competence such as to 
become eligible for execution. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was called upon to decide 
whether the state could execute someone forcibly medicated in order to meet the competence 
requirements for proceeding with the execution. The following sections will focus on the 
arguments arising out of this decision.  
 
3.2- Prima Facie problems 
 
The Singleton case has produced a paradoxical position on the part of the relevant authorities, 
since they claimed that the best outcome was for Singleton to be forced to take the medication 
and then executed, rather than living in psychosis and imprisonment. In order to defend the 
fairness and righteousness of such an interpretation, various -sometimes contrasting- 
principles have been invoked as proofs of its legitimacy. In order to satisfactorily take into 
account the multiple principles, values and laws involved in the judging process, I will divide 
the multilayer structure of the Singleton case into smaller pieces, separating the chapter into 
sections and sub-sections that will each focus on a relevant aspect of the justification of the 
final decision reached by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
 
Hence, to understand more appropriately the ethical dilemmas involved in the Singleton case, 
                                                 
96 A legal action of English origin which has been a historically important instrument to ensure protection of 
individual freedom against arbitrary state action, and which can be used to seek relief from unlawful 
detention. 
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we shall start by looking at its prima facie problems. Three questions arise from the 
controversial position just described. First, how, if at all, can we evaluate the attainment of a 
satisfactory level of competence that would allow for execution? It should be noted, that 
Singleton’s lawyer claimed his client’s restored competence to be based on an “artificial 
sanity”97 not related to the original individual. This aspect is important because, as will be 
highlighted later in the chapter, sanity is a crucial factor in the assessment of the legal 
responsibility of an agent in perpetrating a criminal action. This also suggests an additional 
problem regarding the non-continuity of the agent over time and calls into question the level 
of responsibility that the present agent can have for the actions of the past agent. As a result, 
the presence of an alternative sanity unrelated to the original agent would make the whole 
process of re-establishing mental competence pointless. Second, why should the state insist in 
curing a prisoner against his will if such an imposition would inevitably result in death? Is 
there a need to provide an exemplary punishment for those outside prison, or is the main aim 
to ensure the fully conscious suffering of the competent prisoner as an integral part of the 
punishment? If the latter, these reasons need to be made explicit, rather than claiming that 
enforced treatment is in the best interest of the prisoner, as happened in this case. Third, if the 
penalty cannot be changed, would it not be more logical, and perhaps more humane, to 
execute the prisoner no matter what his mental state is at the time of the execution, instead of 
prolonging his agony? After all, even when legislation allows ethics committees to override 
patient’s informed refusal -as in Israel, for example- three conditions must be satisfied: 
 
1) Physicians must make every effort to ensure that the patient understands the risks of 
non-treatment. 
2) The treatment which physicians propose must offer a realistic chance of significant 
improvement. 
3) There are reasonable expectations that the patient will consent retroactively. 
 
Of these three points listed by Michael Gross,98 at least two of them seem not to be satisfied 
in the Singleton case, and it would be difficult to claim that there would be an improvement 
for the agent suffering the enforced treatment, and, most of all, that the patient would consent 
                                                 
97
 Singleton v 8orris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) (Habeas-Competency). Available at: 
http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/dll/singleton_8circ2.htm accessed on 11 July 2008, p. 16. 
98 Gross, M., L., “Treating competent patients by force: the limits and lessons of Israel’s Patient’s Rights Act”, 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 31, 2005, p. 29-34. 
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to the treatment retroactively, as he would be dead. This aspect is indeed of primary 
significance and will be kept in consideration throughout the chapter. 
 
In line with this view, in the State v Taylor99 case there was a claim for the unconstitutionality 
of enforced treatment. One of the main reasons for this claim was the fact that the condition 
resulting from the enforced treatment was actually more damaging than beneficial to the 
agent. It should also be noted that the involvement of doctors and psychiatrists in such a 
specific case would clash with the AMA Code of Medical Ethics.100 This aspect should be 
considered by the competent authorities as an important factor in evaluating the moral 
acceptability of the enforcement of this law. The result would perhaps undermine any positive 
perception of such a procedure, as the whole process represents a problematic situation for the 
doctors and psychiatrists implicated in the practice.101  Although this is an important aspect to 
acknowledge, for reasons of space it will not be discussed any further here. Rather, I will now 
direct my attention to the idea that enforced medical treatment is justified on the grounds that 
the rights of the prisoner can be overridden in his best interest as the better of two evils. 
However, when the death penalty is involved, this approach becomes quite paradoxical, and if 
the ultimate aim of society is to execute the agent, why should we override his or her wishes if 
the positive outcome of re-establishing an “acceptable” mental state would abruptly disappear 
with death? I will aim to answer these questions in the following sections. 
 
3.3- /euroscience, enforced treatments and other perspectives 
 
Before entering the core of my investigation, some clarification regarding the scope of this 
work should be given. A variety of issues could be considered, but not being able to discuss 
all of them in proper depth here, I can only acknowledge and elucidate my engagement with 
some of these more peripheral concerns. First of all, the Singleton case deals with an extreme 
form of punishment, namely, the death penalty. I am well aware that capital punishment is a 
debated issue in itself and that is why this chapter will be limited to an analysis of this 
particular case within its legal boundaries without questioning the moral justifications for 
                                                 
99
 State v Taylor, S83428. 
100
 Code of Medical Ethics, American Medical Association, Opinion 2.06, Capital Punishment. 
101 See, amongst others: Peloso, P., F., and Bandini, T., “Follia e Reato nella Storia della Psichiatria. 
Osservazioni Storiche sul rapporto tra Assistenza Psichiatrica e carcere”, in Rassegna Italiana di 
Criminologia, Anno 1, 2, Pensa Multimedia Editore, 2007, p. 245-266. 
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their existence. The focus will therefore be directed towards the idea of restoring an agent’s 
competence in order to punish in accordance with the degree of responsibility assigned to him 
or her. Obviously, the kind of punishment involved in the Singleton case makes a difference to 
this evaluation. However, at this stage, what should be considered as the central question to 
ask is: in a case of life imprisonment, rather than execution, would it be tolerable to enforce 
medical treatment in order to ensure the appropriate level of competence throughout the 
experience of the punishment? I will aim to show that while in this latter case enforced 
treatment could be justified, when capital punishment is involved the evaluation changes 
significantly. 
 
A second aspect that could be considered in this context is the aforementioned doctrine of 
double effect. Would it make any difference if the state argued that the reason for enforced 
treatment was mainly the health of the prisoner, and the fact that restoration of his mental 
capacity would result in his execution simply an unintended consequence? I think that this 
question should be answered negatively because during a state of “temporary” competence 
Singleton refused treatment. Under normal circumstances, his decision should have been 
respected as long as he was found to be competent, but in Singleton’s case treatment was 
enforced in order to ensure that punishment could be carried out. Surely this aspect could be 
further analysed, but here I only want to show why claiming to enforce treatment on Singleton 
primarily for his health, rather than to allow for punishment to take place, is currently 
unjustified. In relation to this aspect, a third point should be taken into account. Some will 
argue that involuntary treatment should never take place. Again, the evaluation of the validity 
of such a position in absolute terms, as well as within the specific legal system considered, 
could be the object of a separate study in itself. In relation to the present analysis, though, I 
will limit myself to pointing out that a full-scale defence of the role of voluntariness in the 
acceptance of treatment does not differ greatly from the position of this chapter. For the 
ultimate intention to not medicate and then execute is in line with the acceptance of a 
retributivist approach to law but, at the same time, does not pretend hypocritically to affirm 
that we should override the prisoner’s refusal of treatment in order to accommodate the need 
for our law to make the criminal pay.  
 
A final, but very important, issue to consider -and even though this chapter focuses upon the 
role of medical inputs through the use of psychotropic medicines- is that other biomedical 
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means102 are currently available to restore competence in a patient in order to ensure the much 
needed “moral enhancement” vital to the justification of the whole procedure. Indeed, they are 
even considered to be morally acceptable by positions such as the one defended by Thomas 
Douglas in his article “Moral Enhancement”.103 The enforced restoration of competence does 
not only apply to extreme cases of capital punishment, but can, and often does, also include 
situations in which involuntary medication is used to make the defendant Competent to Stand 
Trial (CST).104 Obviously, the assumption for such enforced treatment is that, under normal 
circumstances, an adult human being is a responsible being, and therefore liable under the 
law. It is the duty of authorities, therefore, to re-establish that lost “normality” in the 
individual in order to ensure the prompt return to standard procedures of responsibility 
assessment. This, at least, is the background justification for the vast majority of such 
treatments. But one wonders whether the “benevolent” capacity of these treatments to restore 
competence, a significant part of what constitutes a given individual, might instead function 
only as a way of ensuring the suffering of an “alternative agent”105 not clearly responsible for 
past actions. If this is the case, would their use be still morally sound?  
 
Again, I cannot discuss this aspect in depth,106 but for the present investigation, it is important 
to note once more that we can consider the possibility of enforcing treatment in order to 
ensure the appropriate punishment of the responsible agent only by accepting the continuity of 
agency in time. Were we to call that premise into question, the whole idea of punishment 
would have to be revised. This component is indeed very important, for it is normally given 
that the continuity of the agent remains intact in time. Otherwise, it would be very difficult -if 
                                                 
102 Amongst other methods such as brain surgery, TMS and deep brain stimulation, one of the most debated 
approaches to restoring competence is  represented by Electro-Convulsive Therapy (ECT). Concerning this 
treatment see, amongst others: Ladds, B, “Involuntary Electro-Convulsive Therapy to Restore Competency to 
Stand Trial: A Five Year Study in 8ew York State”, Journal of Forensic Sciences, Vol. 40, Issue 2, March 
1995, p. 183-187. 
103 Douglas, T., “Moral Enhancement”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2008, p. 228-245. 
104 See, amongst others: Gerbasi, J., B., and Scott, C., L., “Sell v. U.S.: Involuntary Medication to Restore Trial 
Competency-A Workable Standard?”, The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, Vol. 
32, No. 1, 2004, p. 83-90. 
105 See footnote 97 above. 
106 To be more specific on the issue of the temporal dimension of responsibility, it should be noted that there is 
wide agreement that responsibility can be looked at in at least two different temporal directions: backward 
and forward. For reasons of space, I cannot discuss this point in greater depth here, but what is important to 
note for the purposes of this work is the general acceptance that if certain variables change over time, the 
assessment of responsibility can be influenced in accordance. For a more complete account of this issue see, 
amongst others: Vincent, N., A., “What Do You Mean I Should Take Responsibility for My Own Ill Health?”, 
Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Vol. 1, 2009, p. 39-51, Kutz, C., “Responsibility”, in Coleman, J. 
and Shapiro, S., (eds.), Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, OUP, 2004, p.548-587, Duff, R., A., 
“Responsibility”, in Craig, E., J., (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, 1998, p. 290-294. 
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not impossible- to find a consistent way to assign responsibility for an action to a given 
individual. This key aspect will be analysed in the next section within the framework of the 
idea of punishment, albeit only briefly. 
 
3.4- Punishment, insanity and responsibility 
 
The Singleton case is particularly controversial because it managed to combine aspects of the 
moral and legal spheres that were already difficult to deal with in themselves. In order to 
disentangle this twine of background notions involved in the judgement procedure, in the 
following three sub-sections, I will focus separately on the notions of punishment, insanity 
and responsibility. To do so, the historical idea of punishment, and the correlated role of 
insanity in the assessment of culpability, will be considered in the first and second sub-
sections respectively. In the third sub-section I will instead take a closer look at the 
retributivist argument that defends the court’s decision as a synthesis of the two previous sub-
sections, guaranteeing in this way the fairness of the judgement.107 
 
3.4.a- The idea of punishment 
 
“In everyday contexts, when lawyers, judges, parents, and others are concerned with 
issues of responsibility, they know, or they think they know, what in general the 
conditions of responsibility are. [...] Is this person mature enough, or informed enough, 
or sane enough to be responsible? Was he or she acting under posthypnotic suggestion 
or under the influence of a mind-impairing drug? It is assumed, in these contexts, that 
normal, fully developed adult human beings are responsible beings.”
108  
 
In the light of these remarks of Susan Wolf on the background notion of responsibility under 
normal circumstances, we shall now look at the idea of punishment in the Western tradition in 
order to contextualise better the position of Singleton before the law. There are, of course, 
                                                 
107 I am aware that other ways of justifying enforced treatment could be considered. Amongst these, certainly the 
Hegelian idea of reconciliating Singleton to society (and to an extent to his true self) could be seen as a 
powerful argument. However, without denying its validity, an important clarification must be made. This 
thesis will not focus on these parallel approaches for two reasons: first of all, properly explaining those 
arguments would require a much more detailed investigation than the scope of this work permits. Secondly -
as will become apparent later on in the chapter- my intention is to model this part of the work on a pre-
existing article that places retributivism at its centre.  
108 Wolf, S., “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”, in Watson, G., (ed), Free Will, OUP, 2003, p. 372. 
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views in philosophy that would disagree with the premises of this work. However, it is my 
intention, -in some ways comparable to those of Wolf and others-109 to approach the specific 
case with a method of investigation that will go beyond the debate between determinism, 
libertarianism and compatibilism. I want to focus in very practical terms on the justifications 
behind this approach in law that aims to see the prisoner’s competence restored before 
continuing with the procedure of capital punishment. A prior acceptance of the Anglo-
American legal apparatus based on the use of punishment should therefore be admitted, and 
three considerations about the conception of punishment should be made. Firstly, if on the one 
hand, the agent is considered not to be responsible for his actions as a deterministic approach 
might suggest, there would be no reason to re-establish his competence in order to justify his 
execution. If, on the other hand, the agent is considered to be a free willing individual -and 
our current legal system indeed presumes a “normal” person to be so- then the competence of 
the agent becomes undeniably relevant to any assessment of the level of intentionality, and, 
consequently, the degree of guilt. This is what makes the distinction between mens rea 
(“guilty mind”) and actus reus (“guilty action”) crucial in establishing the appropriate 
punishment in a sentence.  
 
Secondly, the continuity of the agent in time should be taken into account. As mentioned 
above, the connection between the time of the crime, the time of the sentence and the time of 
execution is what makes the Singleton case so unique and indeed so controversial. I am aware 
that the degree to which we can affirm continuity in the actions of an individual can be, and 
has been, debated. Sometimes -for example in cases of dementia-110 we might even question 
the extent to which a person is the same as before, even if he remains in the same body. In a 
similar approach, in Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit111 criticises the dogmatic idea that the 
same individual at different moments in time is the representation of the same person, 
suggesting that a prisoner should have the punishment reduced proportionally according to the 
looseness of the connection with the “past self” that committed the crime. According to this 
view there are, in a sense, two different accountable individuals. However, without wanting to 
deny that such an approach can be successfully used as a theoretical basis in a rehabilitation 
process of wrongdoers, I shall claim that an argument in favour of non-continuity in the 
                                                 
109 See, amongst others: Wolf, S.,ibid., p. 372-387, and Bok, H., Op.Cit., p. 130-167 both in Watson, G., (ed), 
Free Will, OUP, 2003. 
110 Hope, T., “Personal Identity and Psychiatric Illness”, in Griffiths, P., A., (ed.), Philosophy, Psychology and 
Psychiatry, CUP, 1994, p. 131-143. 
111 Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, 1984. 
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evaluation of the person would prevent society from producing an accurate account of an 
individual’s actions, and make any decision perpetually changeable in accordance with mental 
changes that occurred in the patient. Obviously, this perpetual instability would be of little 
help from a legal point of view and, as a result, for the purposes of this work.  
 
Thirdly, Herbert Hart’s112 description of the two conditions required to justify punishment 
must be highlighted. The first regards conviction by court: the criminal act must be 
established to be that of a responsible agent “eligible” for punishment. The second condition 
is related to the court’s sentence: the punishment must find “its proportion” to the criminal 
act, establishing the right price to be paid to society. Given that both of these conditions were 
met by the Singleton case at the time of the sentence, what further purpose would be served 
by enforced treatment of this death-row inmate? Ultimately, as pointed out by Hart himself,113 
the general possession of the capacities of understanding is a condition of the efficacy of law. 
For it is only in their presence that the state can presume to communicate to its citizens the 
orders, commands, or other rules or principles upon which rests the existence of law. 
However, as we will see below, cases like that of Singleton should not affect the efficacy of 
law as the understanding of facts is fully available to the agent at the moment of sentence, him 
or her having been defined as fully aware of the legal consequences of their actions at the time 
of the crime. In this light, we could perhaps seek the answer in a more political dimension. 
Authorities want to ensure that no-one can escape the payment of their crimes to society, even 
if they develop mental illness after having been sentenced. But, as Mitchell Berman points out 
in her article “Punishment and Justification”,114 we should draw a distinction between 
punishment and suffering. Suffering can be acceptable in the given punishment if and only if 
the suffering is not seen as intrinsically good, but as something that the wrongdoer deserves. It 
would therefore not be morally justified to enforce medical treatment on a non-consenting 
prisoner on the basis that his mental state should be restored in order for him to suffer 
“competently” the result of his actions. So, is a minimal level of competence needed by 
society in order to ensure that the prisoner is granted all of his rights until the very last 
minute, or do we instead want to make sure that the inmate’s suffering during his final 
moments is fully felt and perceived? Before answering these questions, the role of insanity in 
law will be considered in the next sub-section. 
                                                 
112 Hart, H., L., A., Punishment and Responsibility, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968, p. 160. 
113
 Ibid., p. 229. 
114 Berman, M., N., “Punishment and Justification”, Ethics, January 2008, p.272-273. 
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3.4.b- The evolution of the role of insanity in law  
 
In the development of the role of insanity in Anglo-American legal systems, the establishment 
of the full competence of the moral agent at the time of a criminal action has gradually 
become more relevant to establishing the level -or absence- of responsibility.  
 
“To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must clearly be proved that, at the 
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of 
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was 
doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.”
115  
 
Even if the history of recognising mental conditions is much longer,116 the so-called 
M’Naghten Rule of 1843 established the standard for the insanity defence. It did so by 
considering the mental capability relevant for the assessment of the mens rea in a criminal act. 
Central to its relevance was the idea that if a person is mentally ill and unable to distinguish 
between right and wrong, for example, then he or she cannot be held criminally culpable in 
our society. The principle upholds human dignity and ensures that those individuals acting 
against the law without malicious intent -such as people with severe delusions- will not be 
unfairly punished. This rule, however, was criticised for being too rigid, since it allows only 
severely mentally ill agents to be excused for their criminal conduct. In order to make it more 
flexible, in 1886 the decision in the Parsons v Alabama117 case introduced some additional 
criteria for insanity defence. The court decided that a person could appeal by defence of 
insanity if she could prove through the application of what became known as the “Irresistible 
Impulse Test” that: 
 
“by reason of duress of mental disease he had so far lost the power to choose between 
right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at 
the time destroyed.”
118  
 
                                                 
115 M’Naghten’s case [1843] UKHL J16 (19 June 1843), available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1843/J16.html [accessed on 26 November 2009]. 
116 Eigen, J., P., “Delusion’s odyssey: Charting the course of Victorian forensic psychiatry”, International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 27, 2004, p.395-412. 
117
 Parsons v Alabama,  81 AL 577, So 854 1886 AL. 
118
 Ibid. 
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The justificatory presumption would be that no matter the circumstances, for instance even in 
front of a police officer, the individual would not refrain from acting in the prohibited manner 
thus proving his or her lack of control. Subsequent cases further underlined control as an 
essential element of the mens rea119 until 1970 when the American Law Institute introduced 
the Model Penal Code (MPC) with the intention of solving the increasing number of 
controversial cases related to the mental state of agents involved in criminal acts. The MPC 
denied responsibility of the agent involved in a criminal offence if:  
 
“at the time of such conduct as a result of a mental disease or defect, he lacks 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law.”
120 
 
Having considered the evolution in Anglo-American law of the role of the agent’s mental 
sanity prior to the sentence, we can now move on to the next sub-section, in which we will 
combine all the elements considered thus far in a more exhaustive analysis of the 
controversial justification given in the Singleton case to enforce treatment on a person whose 
mental state deteriorated after the death sentence was passed. 
 
3.4.c- A retributivist argument  
 
In his article “Between Madness and Death: The Medicate-to-Execute Controversy”,121 Barry 
Latzer considers the Singleton case in detail, arguing that the decision of the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals to forcibly medicate in order to carry out the execution procedure was a 
constitutional decision and, above all, a morally sound one. In other words, Latzer suggests 
with no hesitation that the court decision was in line with all the principles and directives 
highlighted in the course of this work. In this sub-section, I will explain his position in greater 
detail so as to then criticise its reading of the facts and propose an alternative solution in the 
subsequent parts of the chapter. 
 
                                                 
119 See, amongst others: Sinclair v State of Mississippi, 132 So. 581 1931 MS, State v Strasburg, 110 P. 1020 
1910 WA, Leland v Oregon, 343 US 790 1952 OR, Durham v United States, 214 F.2d 862. 
120
 Model Penal Code, American Law Institute, Philadelphia, 2007 in Maeder, T., Crime and Madness, Harper 
and Row Publishers, 1985, p.95.  
121 Latzer, B., “Between Madness and Death: The Medicate-to-Execute Controversy”, Criminal Justice Ethics, 
Volume 22, Issue 2, Summer/Fall 2003, p. 3-14. 
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Latzer’s reasons concern the state’s need to legitimise its role as administrator of justice and 
to avoid exposing the system to exceptions to the retributivist principles at the very base of 
our current legal framework. Latzer proposes the following three policy options to deal with 
an inmate sentenced to death, suffering from mental illness, and potentially treatable such that 
competence to carry out the sentence could be achieved: 
 
A- Medicate and Execute. 
 
The state carries out the standard procedure after having forcibly medicated the inmate and 
restored the minimal level of competence necessary. 
 
B- Don’t Medicate, Don’t Execute. 
 
The execution of the death sentence has to be postponed indefinitely until the competence is 
restored either by unforeseeable factors (such as unusually positive developments of 
schizophrenia, dementia, etc.) or by autonomous decision by the prisoner to undergo 
treatment. 
 
C- Medicate, Don’t Execute. 
 
The state “bargains” for enforced treatment by downgrading the sentence to non-capital 
punishment. 
 
On the one hand, as Latzer rightly points out, although option C might seem more humane at 
first glance, the use of such an approach would represent an injustice towards all those 
prisoners not developing any mental illness after having been sentenced to death. Due to a 
lack of space this problem will not be investigated further in this chapter, but surely the 
enormous discrepancy between sane and insane prisoners sentenced to death cannot allow us 
to consider option C as a morally justified and logically sound approach to future cases 
similar to that of Singleton. Concerning option B on the other hand, it might be argued that 
executing the prisoner without prior medication could be as cruel as rendering him competent 
at the time of execution, since he would thus live in an appalling mental state until the full 
capital punishment procedure was carried out. In some ways, Latzer supports this view by 
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suggesting that option B is “unacceptably cruel”.  
 
In this light, we could say that not curing the prisoner and letting him live would be worse 
than curing and killing him. It would follow that if we could find a comparable punishment -
for example, 10 years of imprisonment without medication prior to execution- to ensure 
respect for the retributivist principles needed by society, we should apply it without adding an 
extra punishment to those developing mental illness in prison. This aspect would surely 
represent an unfair addition to the suffering of already unfortunate individuals, making it 
difficult to defend as morally justifiable. However, a reliable way of assessing such a 
punishment is not currently available, and therefore the “readjustment approach” of option B 
is not possible, as the full avoidance of the capital punishment because of mental illness 
would also produce an unfair asymmetry between sane and insane inmates sentenced to death. 
Option A, Latzer affirms, is in truth the most convincing and consistent way of dealing with 
controversial cases like that of Singleton, as it ensures respect for retributivism -which is 
lacking in option C- as well as for the dignity of the individual -which is not guaranteed by 
option B. However, as Lawrence Gostin rightly points out: 
 
“The Court holds that compulsory treatment must be medically ‘appropriate,’ but what 
if treatment will lead -directly or indirectly- to capital punishment? […] The treatment 
would, at best, alleviate a patient’s symptoms, but only in order to achieve a distinctly 
non-therapeutic end, namely, execution.”
122 
 
Before proceeding in proposing a different option to those listed by Latzer in the final part of 
the chapter, in the next section I shall underline the importance of the link between the moral 
and legal justification, fundamental if we want to have a stable and consistent approach to 
what is morally sound. I will do so by taking into account cases that have functioned as 
cornerstones for the establishment of what is morally -and therefore legally- permissible when 
mental conditions are at stake. These cases were perhaps considered insufficiently by Latzer. 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 Gostin, L., “Compulsory Medical Treatment: The Limits of Bodily Integrity”, The Hastings Center Report, 
Sep-Oct 2003, p.12. 
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3.5- Right to treatment or duty to be treated? 
 
“In Anglo-American law, the criteria of criminal responsibility converge with the 
criteria of moral responsibility: where moral claims are warranted, so generally is legal 
sanction; and where there is moral excuse or justification, so too there is legal excuse or 
justification.”
123  
 
However, it is important to underline that, as Christopher Kutz correctly emphasises, the key 
aspect is whether the forcible administration of drugs in the Singleton case had moral 
justification or not, for if it did not, its legal justification would be undermined too. In the 
decision process undertaken by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals various landmark cases 
concerning prisoners affected by mental illness were considered. The first of these was the 
1986 Ford v Wainwright case, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the possibility of 
executing the insane was implicitly prohibited by the Eighth Amendment against cruel and 
unusual punishment. Judge Powell Jr. stated that: “the Eight Amendment forbids the 
execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why 
they are to suffer it.”124 
 
This case became so relevant for the evaluation of the level of the mental capacity that it is 
now standard procedure to assess the eligibility for execution of prisoners on death row in 
relation to their “Ford competence”. For the Singleton case, it is important to note that such 
competence refers to the prisoner’s level of competence at the time of the execution rather 
than at the time of sentencing or of perpetration of the crime. This aspect refers to the issue of 
personal identity already considered, which requires further clarification at this stage. The 
CST to which we referred in section 3 was certainly present, but a possible objection is raised 
by the fact that the diminishment of mental capacity during incarceration resulted in a 
situation in which the Competence to Be Sentenced (CBS) was lost. As with the Singleton 
case, in the Ford case no one disputed the full mental capacity of the defendant at the time of 
the crime, the trial or the sentencing. But Singleton lost his CBS after the sentence and despite 
having been assigned a penalty in line with the standards of the legal system, it is undeniable 
that incompetence at the time of the execution created a problem as his mind had by then 
                                                 
123 Kutz, C., Op. Cit, p. 571. 
124
 Ford v Wainwright, 477 US 422 (Justice Powell, concurring). 
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deteriorated sufficiently to require a reconsideration of the original sentence. Clearly, the latter 
part of Judge Powell Jr.’s statement would conflict with the execution of a prisoner in a 
debilitated state of mind, as it would be difficult to consider him capable of understanding 
why he would be executed at the time of the actual execution. However, as seen above, the 
justification behind the continuation of the criminal punishment procedure would lie in the 
fact that, at the time of the initial sentence, the prisoner did understand the reasons behind his 
execution, thus making Singleton eligible for capital punishment. 
 
As explained in earlier sections of the chapter, the a priori presumption is that there is 
continuity of the agent’s personal identity over time. Under normal circumstances, therefore, 
all the treatment intends to do is to re-establish that “normality” present at the time of the 
sentence and the crime. The precedent for enforcing treatment on a prisoner was thus the US 
Supreme Court decision in the Washington v Harper125 case, which introduced the definition 
of “Harper involuntary medication”. Some consideration of the differences between these 
related cases should be given, however: on the one hand, we should note that in the Ford case 
-unlike that of Singleton- the mental illness could not be eliminated entirely. In the Harper 
case, on the other hand, the main difference is that Harper was not on death row, and therefore 
curing him against his will would not have resulted in his death.  
 
Also relevant is the 1989 case of Penry v Lynaugh,126 in which the Supreme Court stated that 
“it is not cruel and unusual to give the death penalty to mentally retarded criminals”. Juries, 
however, must be allowed to decide whether defendants should be given a prison sentence 
instead of the death penalty in light of their mental impairment. We should observe, in relation 
to the M’Naghten Rule considered above, that the judgement in the Penry case represents a 
significant change in the consideration of liability for individuals with mental impairment, 
deeming them as eligible for the death penalty as anybody else. Only the actus reus, and not 
the mens rea, is considered.  
 
If that is the case, however, it would be fairer to assess the punishment in accordance with 
such a scheme. In other words, if the evaluation of the culpability of the agent does not take 
into account the mens rea, why should the resulting punishment be directed towards a 
                                                 
125
 Washington v Harper, 494 US 210. 
126
 Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302.  
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restoration of a mental state that did not figure in the equation that led to the passing of the 
sentence in the first place? In the last section of this chapter, I will propose a solution that 
seems more coherent with the principles and cases involved in the judgements above.  
 
3.6- A further option 
 
In this final part of the chapter, I will briefly recapitulate the key points highlighted above, as 
this will provide the theoretical basis by which to understand the claim that this chapter aims 
to make.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I listed three conditions that would guarantee the “fairness” 
of forcing medication on a prisoner, and I concluded that at least two of them are not 
applicable in the Singleton case. Through the analysis of landmark cases, I then considered 
possible alternative justifications for the treatment that would still be consistent with the 
standard approach to both punishment and mental illness. The final part of section 4 
considered Latzer’s synthesis, wherein the legal and moral dilemmas of the Singleton case 
can only be resolved by medication then execution, as this is the only way of respecting both 
retributivist principles and the dignity of the individual.  
 
In section 5 however, I have questioned this position by upholding that, even if it may be 
constitutionally sound, enforced medical treatment is less morally justified than Latzer 
affirms. Evidently, my critique is based on a very different interpretation from Latzer’s of how 
satisfactorily the precedential judgements underpinning the Singleton case were utilised. 
 
Hence, if the key aspect of restoring competence before execution is to be consistent with 
retributivist principles, I could accept -as Latzer does- his option A as morally sound if and 
only if the authorities involved -the state as well as the more specific court issuing the 
sentence- were ready to clearly affirm that the motivation for re-establishing competence is 
simply to ensure the well-being of society and the continuity of its rules and legislative 
system. Currently, however, as shown in the Singleton case, the restoration of competence is 
presented as something in the best interest of the patient, and not of society. This 
inconsistency between the need for strictness and at the same time an unwillingness to 
publicly admit the real values at stake in such a decision makes option A unconvincing.  
Mirko Daniel Garasic                                                                                                   Chapter 3 
71 
 
In order to overcome this deadlock, I will propose one additional option on top of those 
provided by Latzer: 
 
D- Don’t Medicate, Execute. 
 
The death penalty procedure should be carried out without taking into account the lack of 
competence the patient might be temporarily or more permanently suffering from. 
 
This alternative might appear inhumane at first, but of the four options available within the 
current Anglo-American legal system it is possibly fairer for both the inmate and the state. 
Differently from the other options, my formulation would for two reasons apply more 
consistently the various principles put forward in the analysis of the Singleton case. Firstly, it 
would not distort the interpretation of such principles in one sense or the other according to 
convenience. Secondly, it would also make a more convincing use of the cases used in the 
deliberation of the Singleton judgement.  
 
Regarding the first point, I would claim that despite accepting the need for the retributivist 
principles to be respected, we have acknowledged in the course of this chapter that the 
restoration of competence in an individual involves many contested issues still far from being 
definitively resolved. After all, there is not yet even agreement on whether to consider the 
agent in question fully retraceable to the perpetrator of the original crime! If we want to 
guarantee justice and fairness in such a nebulous context, we need to be sure that we are not 
provoking unnecessary harm. Given that enforcing medical treatment could well be seen as an 
avoidable harm, we might be better off avoiding its implementation for the time being. By 
allowing for the execution to take place, however, this option would ensure that the 
retributivist principles prevalent in society would still be served.  
 
In relation to the second point, in the previous section key legal cases were introduced in 
order to re-examine the more empirical frame of reference used by the judges. We underlined 
that both the Ford case and the Harper Case played an important role in the passing of the 
sentence. Their relevance to the Singleton case, however, is not unquestionable, as differences 
from Singleton’s situation existed in each of them. The application of option D would avoid 
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inconsistent interpretation of the Ford and Harper verdicts when applied to relatively similar 
cases. Without taking away the inherent value of achieving a more stable usage of those cases, 
yet more important is the fact that my proposed alternative would deal with the distinction 
between the actus reus and the mens rea in a more clear-cut manner. A coherent application of 
the Penry case would be guaranteed throughout the whole process, including the capital 
punishment procedure itself. If the actus reus is the only factor that counts in the equation 
when assessing the punishment, so it should be accepted that there would be no more -moral 
or legal- justification to restore the mental conditions presumed by mens rea not previously 
taken into account in establishing guilt. By executing without forcibly curing the prisoner this 
very controversial aspect of the Singleton case could be avoided in similar future situations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, I have tried to show that within the current Anglo-American legal system the 
justification for forcible medical treatment of death-row inmates is difficult to defend on 
either moral or legal grounds. On the one hand, the impossibility of changing the prisoner’s 
sentence makes it problematic to claim that involuntary drugging would represent a better 
option for him. On the other hand, the will to re-establish competence in the patient in order to 
ensure that his suffering is fully proportionate to the crime committed is difficult to accept.  
 
To broaden the perspective on how we should deal with future cases similar to that of 
Singleton, a historical analysis of the idea of punishment in the Western tradition was taken 
into consideration, with a special emphasis on the evolution of the role of insanity in law. 
Subsequently, to highlight the diverse interpretations that insanity has had in different 
contexts, various landmark cases were analysed, giving rise to important questions about the 
consistent application of the principles and justifications underpinning their final judgements. 
In order to critique the current acceptance of the position evident in the Singleton case, I 
employed Barry Latzer’s influential work, ultimately going beyond it in proposing an 
additional way out of the Singleton quandary. 
 
In considering the three options suggested by Latzer, I agreed that option C would certainly be 
the most tempting from a “humanitarian” point of view as this option would have the law 
allow a possible readjustment of the death sentence after the enforced medical treatment 
Mirko Daniel Garasic                                                                                                   Chapter 3 
73 
(perhaps to lifelong imprisonment). In this way, the claim that enforced treatment serves the 
best interest of the patient could be justified, but this possibility naturally flags up the related 
issue of the inequality of treatment between prisoners who develop mental illness while on 
death row and those who do not. This would leave competent death-row inmates 
paradoxically hoping to develop some kind of mental illness in order to avoid capital 
punishment. As a result, I concluded that all three options, including the one (option A) used 
by Latzer to legitimise the legal and moral acceptability of the decision taken in the Singleton 
case, are indeed unsatisfactory on both moral and legal grounds. 
 
Synthesising the analysis carried out in this chapter, I conclude that the only reason for such a 
treatment would be based on its political value, and the need to re-establish competence is 
only related to the desire of the relevant authorities not to allow a “soft message” to filter out 
from this case. I do not aim to question the acceptability of such a justification here, but it 
should become apparent at this stage that the enforcement of treatment has been based on 
fictional principles such as consideration of the prisoner’s best interest. This distinction 
between the hidden message of the sentence and its “politically correct” version is what, in 
my opinion, makes its moral foundations inevitably unstable. As a result, to support this kind 
of approach in future cases similar to that of Singleton seems unjustifiable. 
 
Rather, to avoid the continuation of such injustices in future, I suggested a new approach to 
cases resembling that of Singleton. I argued that it would be more coherent to hold that, once 
the agent is established to have been indisputably competent at the time of the death sentence, 
the authorities should continue with the capital punishment procedure without any further 
hesitation related to the mental condition of the prisoner. 
 
Alternatively -should this option be regarded as inhumane- we would have to find a new and 
more consistent way of dealing with cases involving autonomy and competence. Before doing 
that, however, in the next part of the thesis a contrasting use of enforced treatment will be 
considered: namely, its use to keep a person alive even when they are considered to be 
competent. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The inconsistent use of autonomy: additional cases and doubts 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to substantiate the claim made in Chapter 3, the attention of this thesis will now shift 
towards a further two controversial cases relating to the [mis]use of the notion of autonomy. 
The first case relates to the forced treatment of a burns victim desirous of death, and despite 
dating back nearly three decades, it remains very topical, raising important questions pertinent 
to the current study. Indeed, the relevance of this case is such that it is amongst the most 
frequently examined in bioethics courses at US institutions.127 
 
The second case is rather more recent and focuses instead on the absence of forced treatment 
of a hunger striker in Italy. Given that this project aims to provide an accurate perspective of 
autonomy in Western contexts beyond strictly Anglo-American boundaries, the geopolitical 
element of this case constitutes an additional reason for including it in the work. Compared to 
other issues within the European Union (EU), hunger strikes (HS) have been of relatively 
minor importance. However, a recent case occurring in Italy has focused attention on the 
issue, underlining a general uncertainty within the EU with regards to the topic and 
suggesting that a more firm and consistent standpoint is required. 
 
Amongst the member-countries of the EU there is still little clarity over the approach that the 
law should take towards respect for patient autonomy. There are a number of reasons for this: 
first of all, approaches to the notion of autonomy can differ substantially if tackled against a 
more secular or more religious backdrop. These differences are noticeable in many contexts, 
and they surely represent an interesting theme worthy of investigation. In this chapter, 
however, the focus will be directed instead towards a specific representative of the [more 
religious] southern member-states of the EU, namely Italy, and the application of the principle 
of autonomy within that context. 
 
                                                 
127 Given the extent of literature produced on this case, this thesis can only pay attention to some specific aspects 
of the numerous controversial issues raised by it.  
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The reason why these two cases figure within the same chapter is simple: differently from the 
two situations considered previously, in both of the cases foregrounded in this chapter the 
presence of a mental illness is far from given. Nonetheless, strong claims are made as to the 
temporary competence of the people involved in them. What is particularly interesting when 
comparing these relatively similar circumstances is, once again, the absence of uniformity in 
affirming when and how a person is autonomous -or, to use a term more strictly related to the 
psychiatric dimension: competent. The current analysis aims to raise additional doubts as to 
the appropriateness of disparities of treatment justified in the name of the same notion of 
autonomy. 
 
4.1-The Dax case 
 
On the 23 July 1973, Donald “Dax” Cowart’s life changed beyond all recognition. Due to a 
gas leak and a series of unfortunate events, he and his father remained trapped in an inferno 
caused by a propane explosion. They were both brought to a local casualty unit, but his father 
died on the way to the hospital. Donald Cowart’s life was saved due to the extensive and 
painful treatment that he received explicitly against his will. He consistently expressed his 
desire not to continue his life as he was aware that what was awaiting him was going to be 
unbearably different from the life he was accustomed to. 
 
Before the accident, Donald was a young man full of energy, with a great sense of 
independence and with good prospects on both the professional and the sentimental fronts. He 
was weighing up his career options; whether to continue training to be a pilot or to finish law 
school and join his father’s business. He had also recently started a relationship with a young 
woman. Following the accident, Donald knew that he was bound to be dependent on other 
people from that moment on and did not want to continue living. 
 
However, despite his insistence on being allowed to die, the team of doctors in charge -
morally pushed to continue by Donald’s mother and legally uncertain about their potential 
liability-128 decided to override the express wishes of this competent patient and continue 
medical treatment. The justificatory principle used at the time was that of soft paternalism: 
                                                 
128 For the sake of intellectual honesty it must be underlined that at that time the Texan approach to allowing 
competent patients to refuse treatment had just changed in favour of a less permissive attitude towards the 
patient’s will. Donald Cowart was particularly unfortunate in this respect also. 
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once Donald had reached the other side of this painful journey and come to appreciate -even if 
in a more limited and certainly different way- life again, he would retrospectively agree that it 
had been the right decision to take.129 
 
Despite losing his sight and the use of both hands, he eventually left hospital, managing to get 
a law degree and become an attorney. He changed his name to Dax130 and married (although 
he is now divorced). He also successfully sued the company liable for the accident that took 
his father’s life and part of his own. 
 
4.2-Resulting problems 
 
The fact that Dax Cowart managed to finish law school, get married and run a relatively 
successful company might lead us to think that forcing medical treatment upon him against 
his will was indeed the right choice to be made. This initial impression, however, should soon 
be challenged alongside the moral justification underlying this undeniably paternalistic 
approach to the Dax case. 
 
The first point that should be taken into account is that, in order to justify treatment, his 
mental state, his competence to make a decision over his own body and life were called into 
question, infringing in the most direct way a Millian standard of non-interference with the 
liberty of another individual. Even if an argument for a temporary lack of autonomy could be 
made,131 it would be indefensible to claim that we could allow this exception to cover the 
entire period during which Dax had to suffer the treatments and operations as this lasted 
nearly ten years. 
 
The reason for needing to prove the absence of competence at the moment of the decision to 
refuse treatment was based on the standard procedure used in the US. As correctly 
summarised by Tristam Engelhardt in his commentary on the Dax case: 
 
                                                 
129 In relation to this point see the three conditions provided by Michael Gross and listed in Chapter 3. 
130 There are different interpretations of the reason for this choice, but what is common to all of them is that the 
name change was directly related to the accident. 
131 When describing the Dax case (referred as Mr. G), Robert Burt writes: “It may seem that some new label 
should be devised to categorize Mr. G’s confusion -perhaps ‘temporary incapacity’- that would not tar him 
with the mental illness brush.” Burt, R., Taking care of strangers, Free Press, 1979, p.13. 
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“When the patient who is able to give free consent does not, the moral issue is over. […] 
In short, one must be willing, as a price for recognizing the freedom of others, to live 
with the consequences of that freedom: some persons will make choices that they would 
regret were they to live longer. But humans are not only free beings, but temporal 
beings, and the freedom that is actual is that of the present. Competent adults should be 
allowed to make tragic decisions, if nowhere else, at least concerning what quality of 
life justifies the pain and suffering of continued living. It is not medicine’s responsibility 
to prevent tragedies by denying freedom, for that would be the greater tragedy.”
132 
 
In his analysis of the Dax case, Engelhardt suggests -on top of the vital importance of 
respecting a competent patient’s decision- an additional aspect that in his opinion deserves 
attention: time. We are after all temporal beings and what makes the difference in the way we 
live life are the choices that we make in the present. However, as already mentioned in 
Chapter 3, for reasons of space this work cannot enter into the debate over the continuity of 
the agent in time.  
 
Nonetheless -and this is the second point- it might be interesting to consider that in Dax’s 
particular case, even the future Dax was going to be against the treatment. Contrary to 
standard expectations, in fact, Dax has consistently claimed that he should have been allowed 
to die, even when his quality of life returned to a tolerable level. That is, after ten years of 
forced treatment.133 It follows that the condition of the principle of proportionality that 
allowed forced treatment would fail in this case. Regarding the definition of such a principle 
in this context, the description provided by Albert Jonsen can be useful: 
 
“8o form of treatment, such as nutrition and hydration or resuscitation or antibiotics, 
can be considered universally warranted or obligatory. This conclusion is sometimes 
described as the principle of proportionality, in which an assessment of the proportion 
of benefits to burdens, as evaluated by patients, physicians, and families, dictates the 
                                                 
132 Engelhardt, H., T., Jr., “The Limits of Personal Autonomy: The Case of Donald ‘Dax’ Cowart”, in Kliever, 
L., D., (ed.), Dax’s Case-Essays in Medical Ethics and Human Meaning, Southern Methodist University 
Press, 1989, (2nd Edition), p.96. 
133 Concern for Dying: Dax’s Case, videotape, 1985, Unicorn Media, New York. 
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ethical conclusion.
134
”
135 
 
It seems clear that in the deliberation process for Dax, the first of these elements -namely 
patient Dax- was not considered at all. 
 
What is most striking in this case, from Dax’s point of view, is that despite having been found 
to be competent enough to make decisions over his own life -a substantial difference from the 
situations highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3, the enforcers of his treatment decided that his 
choice not to continue with medical procedures was to be ignored. In other words, Dax was 
not allowed to freely shape his destiny, nor was he allowed to die, even though this is what 
would have happened if treatment had not been provided from the beginning of this dramatic 
story. This was because the authorities in question -doctors and family- chose another destiny 
for him: the doctors involved were clearly also worried about the legal consequences of their 
actions, while the family members -especially his mother- were moved by good intentions, 
but probably also by a form of selfishness in not wanting to let him go. Ultimately, everyone 
was satisfied with the decision except the one suffering its consequences. 
 
Dax Cowart explicitly decided to put an end to his life from the very beginning of -what 
would have then become- his second life. He asked the first person coming to his aid 
following the explosion to give him a gun with which to shoot himself; then he told 
ambulance staff that he did not want to be kept alive; and finally, once at hospital he clearly 
stated that he did not want to undergo treatment, a position he sustained well into the 
advanced stages of his incredibly painful and challenging recovery process. 
 
It is important to notice that during an interview for his film “Please Let Me Die”,136 Dax 
shows an incredible sensitivity towards the positions in which all those involved found 
                                                 
134 The words "proportionate" and "disproportionate" are not in the text of the report, but they do appear in a 
footnote on the same page as the abovementioned conclusion, in a citation from the Vatican’s Declaration on 
Euthanasia (June 26, 1980) which is reprinted in an appendix to the report. While there are subtle differences 
between the Vatican’s concept of proportionate care and the Commission’s conclusion, there is a common 
theme: a treatment is not morally obligatory when, in the patient’s view, it produces greater burdens than 
benefits. See President’s Commission on Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, Defining Death: A Report on the Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Definition of Death 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p.89 as quoted in Jonsen, A., The Birth of 
Bioethics, OUP, 2003, p.260. 
135 Jonsen, A., The Birth of Bioethics, OUP, 2003, p.260. 
136 “Please Let Me Die”, transcript of videotape available in Areen, J., et. al., Law, Science and Medicine, 
Mineola, Foundation Press, 1984. 
Mirko Daniel Garasic                                                                                                   Chapter 4 
79 
themselves, providing for a profoundly compassionate reading of the motivations of the 
individuals concerned. Nonetheless, while there can be no debate over the moral propriety of 
the first man on the scene or of the paramedics (neither actor being allowed to evaluate the 
patient’s competence for the practical reason of needing to focus on saving her life), the same 
cannot be said of the doctors -and their power- involved in the case. 
 
In their case, the choice not to heed Dax’s will was perpetuated over time, so the only way to 
justify this long-term treatment was to jeopardise not only Dax’s competence -a point 
stretched to the maximum but bound to fail- but also his very values. This pre-selection of 
what constitutes an “acceptable value” seems to be strongly illiberal and conflicts with the 
very idea of respecting one’s autonomy as long as one remains competent. 
 
Once again this inconsistent way of dealing with difficult cases was made possible by yet 
another redefinition of how exactly we are to respect a person’s autonomy. In the Dax case it 
appears that the preferred way of understanding autonomy was to see it -very conveniently- as 
freedom of action.137 This is the third point to consider: what was called into question, in fact, 
were Dax’s values. As rightly pointed out by Richard Zaner: 
 
“How could it possibly happen, Dax constantly implored, that in a society such as ours, 
whose moral focus is so firmly set in the right of the individual to determine his or her 
own course in life, precisely that right could at the same time be denied? An adult who 
was declared clearly competent and thus a person who just as clearly ought not to be 
denied the right of self-determination, yet just this was in fact denied, and Dax was 
forced in the most literal way to undergo extraordinary and agonizing treatments 
against his own specific and declared wishes. Massively compromised in bodily 
abilities, profoundly and permanently disfigured, he was made to face a future devoid of 
everything he valued.”138 
 
To better understand the meaning of such a statement, it is helpful to consider Robert White’s 
analysis of the Dax case: “I think we shall never know whether Dax wholeheartedly wanted to 
                                                 
137 See footnote 143 below for a more specific reference.  
138 Zaner, R., M., “Failed or Ongoing Dialogues?”, in Kliever, L., D., (ed.), Dax’s Case-Essays in Medical 
Ethics and Human Meaning, Southern Methodist University Press, 1989, p.43-44. My emphasis.  
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die. But he demanded to die, and that was the issue that had to be dealt with at the time.”139 
 
The point highlighted by this quote is crucial: we can never be absolutely certain about the 
“true” intentions of a person when she makes a decision, not even if we are that person. The 
“wholeheartedness” itself hints at the inherent vagueness of such assessments, taking as it 
does the heart -a universal symbol of irrationality and unpredictability- as its point of 
reference. 
 
Can we assert with any certainty that Mr X was fully competent and sufficiently informed to 
give his (unwavering) consent via his signing of a new mobile phone contract? Would we stop 
the procedure until that certainty could be reached? No, we would not, and this attitude would 
be based on the accepted practice and presumption that there is no way would to achieve such 
a level of certainty. So, in order to prevent the entire market from grinding to a halt, we allow 
for the fact that this degree of inherent uncertainty is embedded in the very nature of human 
beings and continues to exist in the negotiation of a new mobile phone contract. 
 
Here we can clearly see that the problem is not the level of certainty that we can have over 
genuinely autonomous individual choices but, rather, the question of what constitutes an 
acceptable choice. We do, in fact, have a tendency to consider this behaviour in line with 
one’s predictable way of interacting with society. This is because the way of affirming one’s 
autonomy (understood here as authenticity)140 converges with the values that our society 
expects to be accepted. There are no grounds to affirm or suppose that Dax was not acting in 
line with the “linear autonomy” of his own values. What did not work in favour of his 
decision was the fact that his values were considered unworthy of respect, an approach that is 
the epitome of paternalism and has nothing to do with the defence of autonomy. 
 
In relation to this point, Robert Burt’s interesting analysis points out that refusing treatment 
could be a way of paradoxically reaffirming that same version of individual autonomy so 
strongly defended by modern Western society. Regarding the clash between the individual and 
societal values, he instead writes: 
 
                                                 
139 White, R., B., “A Memoir: Dax’s Case Twelve Years Later”, in Kliever, L., D., (ed.), Dax’s Case-Essays in 
Medical Ethics and Human Meaning, Southern Methodist University Press, 1989, p. 18. 
140 Here I refer to the definition of autonomy given by Ronald Dworkin and highlighted in Chapter 1. 
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“Dr. White was initially brought to interview Mr. G by physicians who asked whether 
Mr. G. might be diagnosed as mentally ill so that the state civil commitment laws could 
be invoked to force treatment on him regardless of his consent.”
141 
 
4.3-Additional considerations 
 
To conclude the analysis of the Dax case in relation to the present investigation two 
interesting parallels with the cases presented in Chapter 2 and 3 can be drawn. These 
underline a disturbingly systematised incoherence in the application of the concept of 
autonomy. 
 
The first point relates to AN and underlines the particular difficulties that we have in 
accepting the importance of the role that a patient’s life-expectancy and life-quality play in 
our judgements relating to refusal of treatment. As James Childress and Courtney Campbell 
wrote: 
 
“Please Let Me Die […] effectively challenges viewers to consider how they would 
balance the principles of respect for persons and patient benefit when a patient refuses 
life-prolonging treatment even though he or she is not terminally ill, i.e. is not 
irreversibly and imminently dying, and life could be prolonged indefinitely with 
reasonably good quality.”
142  
 
The second point that deserves attention, again from Childress and Campbell, is that amongst 
the versions of autonomy that could have been applied to the Dax case, he: “was not 
autonomous in the sense of free action, in contrast to effective deliberation, it might be argued 
that continuation of treatment was essential to restore his autonomy as free action.”143  
 
This consideration has challenging inputs in both of the previously analysed cases. In relation 
to AN, this point is particularly interesting if evaluated in light of the percentage of suicides 
recorded after enforced treatment takes place. In the Singleton case, meanwhile, this freedom 
                                                 
141 Burt. R., Op. Cit., p.3. 
142 Childress, J., F., and Campbell, C., C., “Who is a Doctor to Decide Whether a Person Lives or Dies? 
Reflections on Dax’s Case”, in Kliever, L., D., (ed.), Dax’s Case-Essays in Medical Ethics and Human 
Meaning, Southern Methodist University Press, 1989, p.23. 
143 Ibid., p.32. 
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of action appears to be more related to his executioners rather than to him, as he would stay in 
prison anyway, with a very limited form of freedom of action. 
 
After having considered some of controversial points raised by the Dax case, in the remaining 
sections of the chapter, I will move the attention to a more recent case of hunger strike where 
the level of competence of the patients in question was considered sufficient not to enforce 
treatment. In analysing this divergent way of respecting autonomy, I will try to establish the 
extent to which this is due to a “cultural evolution” in the application of the law, or rather 
down to pure convenience for the authorities involved. 
 
4.4-Autonomy and Hunger Strikes 
 
As noted in previous chapters, the supremacy of autonomy among other principles in the field 
of biomedical ethics has in recent years come under increasing challenge from many 
quarters144 as an unsatisfactory base from which the law hopes to affirm its legitimate super 
partes role. In focusing on a recent case in which respect for autonomy was used as the 
central justification for the approach used by authorities in dealing with a controversial 
situation, the intention of this part of the chapter is to provide a linear comparison with the 
Dax case described above, sensitising the audience to the inconsistency of the application of 
the principle of autonomy and proposing that an alternative is required in order to guarantee 
fairer treatment in future. 
 
To highlight this inconsistency, I will now put forward a critical -and more focused- analysis 
of the biopolitical application of the law. The utilisation of “biopolitical” terminology implies 
a reference to Foucault, the intention being to underline the lack of fairness in the application 
of the law in bioethical cases. The application of principles that should be coherently 
employed in a particular case should not be subject to the contextual weight of their decision. 
This is what occurred for Dax, and this is indeed the case in most situations where authorities 
have the ultimate decisional power over one’s life. 
 
                                                 
144 See, amongst others: Foster, C., Choosing Life, Choosing Death-The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical 
Ethics and Law, Hart Publishing, 2009; Gillon, R., “Ethics needs principles -four can encompass the rest- 
and respect for autonomy should be ‘first among equals’”, J Med Ethics, 29, 2003; O’Neill, O., Autonomy 
and Trust in Bioethics, CUP, 2002; Harris, J., The Value of Life, Routledge, 1994. 
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Through an analysis based on relatively similar cases worldwide, a reading of the 
aforementioned Italian example will be offered, putting forward three biopolitical reasons for 
the non-interventionist attitude evident in the cases described below. 
 
4.5-The Mbarka case 
 
In September 2009 a very controversial interpretation of the principle of autonomy developed 
in a prison in Pavia, Italy. Sami Mbarka Ben Garci, a Tunisian prisoner charged with rape died 
in his cell as a result of self-inflicted starvation. The reason for his hunger strike was related 
to the criminal charge itself: he denied being guilty of rape and, not being able to continue his 
life with such shame on his honour, he decided to slowly terminate his life as a form of protest 
against what he perceived to be an unfounded charge. 
 
It would be impossible to establish convincingly Mbarka’s guilt or innocence, and out of 
respect towards both the deceased Mbarka and the rape victim, this work will not question the 
court’s verdict regarding the culpability of Mbarka. Rather, my focus will be on attempting to 
establish the extent to which the social preconditions of an individual prior to a certain 
[criminal] action can change the value assigned to the life of a given human being in a 
particular (Italian) society. It will be argued that in Mbarka’s case this was indeed what 
happened, leading to a fierce defence of the principle of autonomy completely unprecedented 
in the Italian context. This lack of precedent in itself provokes many questions as to why tacit 
consent was given to Mbarka in this particular case of HS. 
  
In fact, his autonomy was so deeply respected that no one decided to intervene forcibly even 
when his health was clearly deteriorating to a dangerous extent. After Mbarka’s death, the 
director of the prison, now under investigation for murder, claimed that: “to deprive someone 
already in prison of their self-determination power is cruel”.145 It seems obvious that such a 
“respectful” view of prisoners’ autonomy is -fortunately- not the most common approach that 
                                                 
145 See, amongst others: La Repubblica,  9 September 2009, available at: 
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2009/09/09/sciopero-della-fame-detenuto-muore-
pavia.html [accesed on 18 January 2010], Il Corriere della Sera, 9 September 2009, available at: 
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2009/settembre/09/Pavia_morto_detenuto_tunisino_che_co_9_090909040.sh
tml [accessed on 18 January 2010], http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=3.0.3746339292 
[accessed on 18 January 2010], http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8335092.stm [accessed on 18 January 
2010]. 
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prisons have towards their inmates, otherwise we might feel ethically entitled not to intervene 
if we see a prisoner hanging himself without this producing any sense of guilt in us.  
 
Mbarka was admitted to hospital on 3 September. The next day his conditions, rather than 
improving, get worse. On 5 September, at 3:45 a.m., Sami Mbarka Ben Garci dies, leaving 
many questions over the culpability of a system not seeming to have convincingly tried to 
save his life.  
 
Given that a criminal investigation is still underway, brought by the Procura di Pavia for the 
charge of murder in relation to this case, there is currently little juridical information, but the 
few facts already available exhibit a lack of clarity meriting our attention. 
 
At the end of August 2009, prison doctor Pasquale Alecci decided to contact the relevant 
authorities about the deteriorating state of Mbarka’s health. The prisoner had given up eating 
solid food more than 40 days prior, and was at that point drinking only water with sugar. He 
lost 21 kilos and could hardly stand. He was, however, conscious and convinced of his choice, 
as it was his intention to actively protest against a penalty that he considered unjust. 
 
With his condition deteriorating to a critical level, first the doctor, then the Magistrato di 
Sorveglianza (Surveillance Judge), asked the Ministry of Justice146 to intervene by moving the 
prisoner to an institution capable of guaranteeing the appropriate care to the prisoner/patient. 
More specifically, they requested placement in an adequate centro diagnostico terapeutico 
(therapeutic diagnostic centre) with all the facilities necessary for the recovery of the inmates.      
 
While waiting for clarification regarding the possibility of relocation, Mbarka was moved on 
1 September to an emergency hospital, because the quality of healthcare provision at the Torre 
del Gallo prison had declined so badly that neither a cardiologist nor a psychiatrist was 
available at the prison. When Mbarka arrived at the hospital, he -in line with his longstanding 
position- refused any treatment. He was then visited by the psychiatrist of the hospital who 
found him fully competent and, therefore, ineligible for trattamento forzato obbligatorio 
(obligatory enforced treatment, TFO). Mbarka was sent back to prison. 
                                                 
146 Availaible at: 
http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Resaula≤g=16&id=00431236∂=doc_dc-
allegatob_ab-sezionetit_icrdrs&parse=no [accessed on 2 March 2011] 
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On 2 September the Ministry responded negatively to the Magistrato di Sorveglianza’s 
request. The lack of justification for transferring the prisoner was based on the claim that Italy 
could not count on centri clinici penitenziari (penitential clinical centres) able to deal 
appropriately with HS. It was suggested, however, that close watch be kept over the prisoner 
with possible intervention via TFO. The same day, the mayor of Pavia signed documents 
permitting such treatment. 
 
Also on 2 September, the magistrate involved in the case decided to override the Ministry’s 
decision and arranged for the transfer of Mbarka to a non-penitentiary institution (Policlinico 
San Matteo). He justified his decision by claiming to find himself in disagreement with the 
principles underpinning the Ministry’s response: the objective of hospitalising the prisoner 
was not to cure him, but only to ensure that his medical condition did not become life-
threatening. 
 
This is the key point of the whole issue: are we allowed to intervene in order to preserve the 
sanctity of life147 beyond any other principle, namely that of autonomy? In other words, 
should the authorities have put aside an evaluation of competence in the prisoner in favour of 
a focus only on the gravity of his medical condition? 
 
Given a positive responsive to these questions, the priority of saving life over any other 
principle would have been affirmed, but clearly -while this was true for Dax- this was not the 
case for Mbarka. The next question that we must pose, then, is: was this due to the fact that 
Mbarka was a foreign prisoner, an element that society does not care so much about? In the 
following sections we will attempt to provide an answer to this disturbing question.  
 
4.6-Hunger Strikes 
 
HS produce a number of medico-ethical questions. We can schematise them as follows: 
                                                 
147 For the sake of the current discussion, the reader should consider a definition of the sanctity of life very much 
in line with that described by Ronald Dworkin in his book Life’s Dominion, Harper Collins, 1993. However, 
when analysing the specific Italian context, it is appropriate to take into account the deep influence that 
Catholicism still plays in bioethical controversies, with a resulting attitude that tends to see life as something 
to be preserved under any circumstances, no matter how extreme. However, we shall later discover that -due 
to their biopolitical value- some exceptions have been made to this normally intransigent way of portraying 
sanctity of life.  
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Step 1 - Do we respect the person’s will in the extreme or do we have to intervene 
when life is at stake? 
 
Step 2 - If we decide to intervene, does the preservation of life have such primacy as to 
allow force-feeding to take place no matter how invasive this procedure might 
be, or can we accept that there are cases where keeping a person alive will 
result in more suffering than letting him die? 
 
Step 3 - If we allow for the possibility that some forms of force-feeding entail 
excessive suffering, we will have to reconsider our whole approach to the 
sanctity of life as an absolute principle; the recognition of this would take us 
back to Step 1. 
 
We shall explore Steps 2 and 3 later on in the work when considering additional HS cases, 
but, in relation to Step 1, we must bear in mind the current definition of HS in law, as well as 
its dependence on the notions of autonomy and, more specifically, competence. A hunger 
striker has recently been characterised by the World Medical Association (WMA) as a 
mentally competent person “who has indicated that he has decided to refuse to take food 
and/or fluids for a significant interval”148 
 
However, this loose definition should not lead us to believe that there is no connection 
between HS -being rooted in political or personal motives- and mental illness. On the 
contrary, there is substantial evidence that supports the idea that, even where initially 
competent, prisoners partaking in HS suffer from a multiplicity of mental disturbances related 
to their imprisonment. 
 
As rightly pointed out by Mary Kenny, Derrick Silove and Zachary Steel149 in a study on US-
                                                 
148 World Medical Association. Declaration of Malta on hunger strikers (adopted by the 43rd World Medical 
Assembly in Malta, November 1991 and revised at the 44th World Medical Assembly in Marbella, Spain, 
November 1992). Geneva: WMA, 1992. 
149 Kenny, M., A., Silove, D., M., and Steel, Z., “Force Feeding Hunger striking asylum seekers”, Medical 
Journal of Australia, 180, 5, 2004, p.237-240. 
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based asylum seekers’ HS,150 despite being fully competent and willing to commit to their 
cause (obtaining asylum) at the beginning of their protest, towards the end of their detention -
especially in those cases where their asylum applications had already come back negative- the 
continuation of the HS was motivated not by a desire to protest but rather by a will to die in 
order to avoid the suffering of the extremely hostile situation they would face once 
repatriated. This awareness leads us to question the advisability of affirming the presence of 
competence in these situations. 
 
Similarly, we should also note that some studies conducted on political hunger strikers in 
South Africa during the Apartheid regime found that levels of clinical depression amongst the 
prisoners involved were as high as 77%.151 
 
In relation to this issue, it is also interesting to consider the analysis carried out by Gürkan 
Koçan and Ahmet Öncű in relation to HS in Turkey.152 The main focus of their research was 
an exploration of the political value of HS in the Turkish context, concluding that HS 
undertaken in Turkey have to be recognised not only as political battles that deserve respect 
for their meaning but also as competent choices made by citizens with regard to their own 
lives. 
 
In considering the moral justifications underlying possible intervention by authorities -as has 
occurred in Turkey-153 the authors adopt a Kantian standpoint on the issue, affirming that 
intervention denies the respect of individual autonomy and, as a result, dignity. Given the Dax 
case, this affirmation seems peculiar to say the least. It should be noted, however, that their 
way of interpreting Kant is open to counter critiques. For example -still using a Kantian 
approach- one could provide at least two arguments that would undermine such a justification 
of HS: first of all, even if dying is not the ultimate intention of the prisoner, death is 
foreseeable and therefore should be avoided, Kant coming out explicitly against suicide 
irrespective of the motive principles behind the act. 
                                                 
150 Brockman, B., “Food refusal in prisoners: a communication or a method of self-killing? The role of the 
psychiatrist and resulting ethical challenges”, J Med Ethics, 25, 1999, p.451-456. 
151 Kalk, W., J., Felix, M., Snoey, E., R., and Veriawa Y., “Voluntary total fasting in political prisoners: clinical 
and biochemical observations”, S Afr Med J, 83, 1993, p.391-394. 
152 Koçan, G., and Öncű, A., “From the Morality of Living to the Morality of Dying: Hunger Strikes in Turkish 
Prisons”, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, July 2006, p.349-372. 
153 See, for example: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1722075.stm, and footnote 11 below. 
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Second, the utilisation of any human being as a tool or -to use more Kantian terminology- a 
means to an end, is not permissible. This principle should be applied even to one’s own body, 
resulting in a condemnation of this self-inflicted death in service of a political message. 
 
Remaining in a Turkish context, and still focusing on the questions raised above, it is 
interesting to note Murat Sevinç’s point in his “Hunger Strikes in Turkey”154 that we should 
acknowledge that HS have frequently been redefined as death fasts (DF) so as to stress the 
striker’s awareness of the risk that his fast represents. The conscious choice not to avoid death 
for a higher cause -and the reaction of authorities to such a decision- will be considered more 
in depth in section 4.8, but for the time being, suffice it to say that this form of protest often 
produces very harsh reactions from institutions of power, as described above.155 
 
This consideration emphasises another important dimension of HS and DF. These phenomena 
represent in many contexts the only available “tool” with which to attempt to send out a 
political message. Not allowing for their continuation in the name of the respect for strikers’ 
lives can thus be seen as an efficient way for the authorities to mitigate the political effects of 
the strike. This certainly is a limiting factor for an individual’s right to choose competently 
what is best for him.  
 
Given the difficulty of reaching a consensual agreement on the definition of autonomy to be 
applied in cases of HS, the next section will examine the more medico-legal definition of 
autonomy and rationality -namely competence- as well as the role it plays in decisional 
processes concerning HS. 
 
4.7-Is the prisoner’s competence really to be considered reliable? 
 
As a result of the considerations outlined above, could we convincingly affirm that the choice 
of the prisoner is not affected by external events? The position of this work would suggest that 
we should not. After all, we should not forget Anita Ho’s point that: “discussions of patient 
autonomy in the bioethics literature, which focus on individual patients making particular 
                                                 
154 Sevinç, M., “Hunger Strikes in Turkey”, Human Rights Quarterly, 30, 2008, p.655-659. 
155 It should be noted that in order to ensure the “successful” preservation at all costs of the lives of prisoners, 
Turkish authorities, through the utilisation of the Army, ended up producing a shocking number of casualties 
during the process of force-feeding.  See, for example: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1739041.stm  
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decisions, neglect the social structure within which health-care decisions are made.”156 
 
This surely merits a more in-depth explanation, as do the two main factors involved in debates 
over the bioethical dimension of respect for one’s autonomy: the first is the establishment of 
the full mental capacity of the patient; the second the absence of external coercion. In the 
cases explored in the previous section, it is clear that neither of these fundamental features is 
present in HS, but rather the opposite. 
 
As rightly pointed out by Sheila McLean in her book Autonomy, Consent and the Law,157 in 
relation to the first point, it should be considered that, the unique, single-bodied notion of 
competence itself, has been questioned by numerous authors. Among these, Eike-Henner 
Kluge158 affirms that there are as many as three different version of competence: cognitive, 
emotional and valuational. 
 
While the first of these would overlap with the standards of mental capacity based on 
rationality, the latter two also take into account the value of an individual’s wishes. In the 
Mbarka case -as in most HS cases- the aim was to protest, not to die. In some sense, then, we 
could affirm that both emotional and also valuational competence were absent in that 
situation, raising the suspicion that something more should have been done, possibly even 
with regard to the very acceptance of competence as the final way of deciding when it 
becomes acceptable for the state to intervene. 
 
Even the first version of competence could potentially be called into question, but the focus of 
this chapter will not involve a deeper assessment of mental capacity in this instance. It is 
necessary, however, to bear in mind that doubts remain over the level competence involved in 
a hunger strike. 
 
Even more important is the acknowledgement that the absence of external coercion -the 
second fundamental condition indispensable to respect for autonomy- is inherently impossible 
in cases of HS. In fact, be it for political or personal reasons, HS is a form of protest that 
                                                 
156 Ho, A., “The Individualist Model of Autonomy and the Challenge of Disability”, Bioethical Inquiry, 5, 2008, 
p.193-207. 
157 McLean, S., A., M., Autonomy, Consent and the Law, Routledge-Cavendish, 2010, p.19. 
158 Kluge, E., H., “Competence, Capacity and Informed Consent: Beyond the Cognitive-Competnence Model”, 
Canadian Journal on Aging, 24, 2005, p.295-304. 
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requires reference to other individuals; that is, to external factors independent of the striker. It 
follows that the presence of the -requisite- freedom from external coercion becomes doubtful, 
and with it the legitimacy of not having intervened before it was too late for Mbarka. 
 
Before further analysing this idea, other HS cases will be taken into account in the next 
section. 
 
4.8-Additional Hunger Strike Cases  
 
Among the numerous HS recently dealt with by different authorities around the world, three 
cases deserve particular attention in relation to our current investigation. Clearly each of them 
could be the subject of an entire standalone work, but on this occasion they will be discussed 
only schematically so as to provide the essential information specific to each of the cases. 
 
The first case is that of Orlando Zapata Tamayo,159 a Cuban dissident who died on 23 
February 2010 after 85 days of HS. His intention was to protest against prison conditions, but 
-given that his accusations included “scorn of Fidel Castro”- it is not hard to believe that the 
authorities in charge had no intention of preserving his life, so they strategically decided to 
respect his will in the extreme. The similarities with the Mbarka case seem obvious here, and 
acknowledging such a similitude with a non-democratic regime underlines even more 
uncompromisingly the weight of biopolitics in both cases and the rationale for questioning the 
Italian authorities’ approach to the Mbarka HS.  
 
The second case is that of Irom Sharmila Chanu, in Manipur, India.160 She has been on HS -
but it would probably more appropriate to say DF in her case- for over ten years as a form of 
protest against the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). In her case the authorities do 
not want her to die because they would prefer not to see her martyred, and for this reason she 
has been force-fed against her will for almost the entire duration of her HS. The irony is that -
apart from the process of force-feeding itself- Irom has suffered numerous forms of violence, 
including sexual abuse, as part of a campaign of intimidation aimed at persuading her to 
                                                 
159 See, for instance: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/02/23/cuba.dissident/index.html, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8540162.stm [accessed on 12 March 2011] 
160 See, for example: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5348414.stm, 
http://www.dnaindia.com/opinion/comment_irom-sharmila-s-10-year-fast-is-ignored_1323405 [accessed on 
12 March 2011] 
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discontinue her protest. Yet she is not allowed to die. In this instance the authorities in charge 
decided to “hit the enemy” by keeping her alive rather than letting her die. This, as we shall 
see below, is a very common feature of biopolitics. 
 
The third and final case comes back to the European context -the Ukraine, more specifically- 
by examining disputes over the acceptable level to which authorities should adhere when 
choosing to force-feed a prisoner. In the Nevmerzhitsky case,161 in fact, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) affirmed that the regime of force-feeding being 
applied amounted in that context to torture. One interpretation of this might be that the ECHR 
was affirming that there is a limit beyond which the preservation of life cannot be considered 
a sufficient justification for enforcing treatment. Further, this could suggest that even in a 
context where the sanctity of life is the guiding principle, the realisation of the preservation of 
life might represent a greater moral wrong on the part of the authorities than letting the 
prisoner die. This case is interesting because it shows the ambiguity surrounding HS, 
especially in EU contexts. It also shows the practical relevance of Steps 2 and 3 considered in 
section 4.2.  
 
Having expanded on the biopolitical use and misuse of HS around the world, in the next 
section of the chapter we shall return to a more specific focus on the Mbarka case. 
 
4.9-A biopolitical distinction 
 
In Mbarka’s case the biopolitical approach that led to non-intervention was based on three 
factors: Mbarka was a prisoner, a foreigner and also a Muslim. According to a possible 
interpretation of Foucault,162 these factors could function well as sufficient reasons for 
discouraging any active intervention by society, as the authorities in charge had no biopolitical 
intention to preserve his life. On the contrary, Mbarka’s life was a loss that could serve to send 
out three messages deriving from Mbarka’s specific condition: the “retributivist”, the 
“precautionary” and the “religious” messages. Each will now be examined in turn. 
First, let us unpack the “retributivist” message. As seen with the Singleton case, this is the 
                                                 
161 Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine (2005). Available at: 
http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/CaseLaw/hof.nsf/d0cd2c2c444d8d94c12567c2002de990/34464f8568936e2ec1256f
d900316fca?OpenDocument [accessed on 12 March 2011] 
162 Foucault, M., Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France 1974-1975, Navayana Publishing, 2010. 
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most general of the three, working against criminals. If you have committed a crime -or the 
state finds that you did- there will be no exceptions, and you will pay for your crime to the 
fullest. It is in the state’s interest -even if now considered to represent an outdated mode of 
governing- to communicate to the masses of potential criminals the inflexibility and 
incontrovertibility of the law. Aside from this repressive and more visible reason, however, 
there is an additional reading that would see a need on the part of society to deal 
uncompromisingly with the culpability of the criminal in order to be able to counteract it and 
prevent the spread of the “illness of crime”. After all, as Foucault writes: “the criminal […] 
represents a disease of the social body”.163 By ensuring his or her just suffering, society as 
whole can create the necessary antibodies to avoid infection. 
 
Turning to the “precautionary” message, this level of the communication concerns migration 
and foreignness. The proposed biopolitical analysis of the state’s decision not to intervene 
would suggest that the death of Mbarka was used as a way of discouraging other foreigners 
from entering the country if not in the privileged position of having arranged stable 
employment before reaching Italy. This is a very sensitive topic in all Western countries, 
though illegal immigration is a particularly pressing issue in contemporary Italian politics. It 
is possible, then, that the Italian government did not want to lose the opportunity to exploit a 
self-inflicted death as a means of propagating a message of differential treatment for 
foreigners. In contrast with the quotation above, in fact, we should remember that, when 
talking about Marie-Antoinette in France, Foucault underlines that: “she is basically a 
foreigner, that is to say, she is not part of the social body.”164 Here then, there is a swing back 
from the previous position. The authorities are not interested in the therapeutic solution of the 
problem of illegal immigration, for no ready answer is available to what is a global question 
that cannot be tackled by one state alone. The easiest way to deal with it such as not to 
damage the authorities’ reputation before the electorate would be to provide a very strict 
response to the issue. Those who do not hold an Italian passport are not part of the Italian 
social body, and so, as a result of the combination of this notion with the considerations 
above, they are not to be cured within the system but rather prevented from joining it -
especially if carrying the illness of criminality with them. 
 
                                                 
163 Foucault, M., ibid, p.91. 
164 Foucault, M., ibid, p.97. 
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Finally, the “religious” message relates to the strong presence of the Vatican as a recognised 
player in the Italian political arena. This results in the need for political powers to take into 
account the Roman Catholic stance in certain cases in order to avoid undermining consensus 
and losing votes, particularly in relation to bioethical issues. Given that the Vatican decided 
not to intervene in an attempt to save Mbarka’s life -unlike in other recently disputed cases 
centred on the notion of the sanctity of life-165 it is reasonable to sustain that such differential 
treatment of two human beings could be traced back to their religious affiliation.  
 
In relation to these points, it would be interesting to take into account what John Williams 
highlights in his article “Hunger-Strikes: A Prisoner’s Right or a ‘Wicked Folly’?”.166 In the 
delicate discussions that have been taking place on both sides of the Atlantic -to focus on the 
Anglo-American context- it has been concluded in many situations that an explicit 
acknowledgement of the fact that state interests can legitimately counter-balance the 
acceptance of HS.167 This factor underlines that the role of state authorities in this process is 
indeed political. This begs the question as to which variables can impact upon the evaluation 
of a specific change in policy towards a particular HS. Once again, Foucault’s work provides 
valuable insights into this problem: “It seems to me that essentially there have been only two 
major models for the control of individuals in the West: one is the exclusion of the lepers and 
the other is the model of the plague victims.”168 
 
This affirmation allows for an interesting application of its claims to the present investigation, 
especially if combined with a second Foucauldian notion that “society responds to 
pathological criminality in two ways or offers a homogeneous response with two poles: one 
expiatory and the other therapeutic.”169 
 
                                                 
165 The widely publicised case of Eluana Englaro is probably the best example in recent years. See, amongst 
others: Englaro, B. and Nave, E., Eluana - La Libertà e la Vita, Rizzoli, 2008; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7880070.stm [accessed on 18 January 2010]; Bock, M., Ciarrocchi, V., and 
Wiedermann, C., J., “Case involving end-of-life decision issues in Italy”, Intensive Care Med , 33, 2007, 
p.1041-1042; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6186347.stm [accessed on 23 May 2010] 
166 Williams, J., “Hunger-Strikes: A Prisoner’s Right or a ‘Wicked Folly’?”, The Howard Journal of Criminal 
Justice, Volume 40, Issue 3, Aug 2001, p.285-296. 
167 See, amongst other cases: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, Fairview State 
Hospital v Joseph Kallinger (1990) 134 Pa Cmwlth 415, 580 A 2d 887). Despite being recognised to be 
competent -and thus entitled to refuse nutrition- the Court felt that Kallinger was trying to use the system to 
his advantage and therefore the Court opted for enforcing treatment on him for the sake of State interests. 
168 Foucault, M., ibid, p.44. 
169 Foucault, M., ibid, p.34. 
Mirko Daniel Garasic                                                                                                   Chapter 4 
94 
When applied to our analysis thus far, we could say that religion -or at least the political 
bodies that represent the material aspects of a spiritual/religious message- works in the same 
way. From a conservative religious perspective -referring in particular to Roman Catholicism 
in the Italian context- the others (those not following the same credo) are eternally wrong and 
thus, by not converting themselves to message of the only true God, they need to atone for 
their sins in this life. Of course, this attitude has become much milder in recent decades, but 
the argument here emphasises the deep-rooted logic of expiation that was behind the non-
action of not saving a life. One therapy could certainly have been conversion, and, perhaps if 
Mbarka had decided to convert, developments in authorities’ approach to the case would have 
been very different. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the course of this chapter, we have explored one case that might be considered a 
cornerstone of American bioethics, namely that of Dax Cowart. We studied once again 
questions regarding the objective applicability of the notion of autonomy in that context, 
affirming that -even if perhaps the best choice was made- the justification for enforced 
treatment lacked both moral and legal grounds within the current framework that allows a 
competent patient to refuse treatment. In order to stress further the inconsistency, we then 
contrasted the Dax case with the recent fatal HS of Sami Mbarka in Italy. To understand the 
complexity of the issues at stake in HS, a deeper analysis of the principles involved in its 
acceptance and permissibility was carried out, juxtaposing these principles the notion of 
sanctity of life and the moral duty of authorities to preserve it at all costs.  
 
Through the use of different HS cases a broader perspective on the topic has been presented, 
stressing the differential application that the same principles have had in otherwise similar 
circumstances. 
 
The argument of this chapter affirms that the reason for a differential prioritisation of certain 
principles over others in relatively similar contexts stems from the biopolitical value of each 
case. As a result, while the preservation of life would be the main priority of authorities in 
order to avoid the martyrdom of an individual (with all the destabilising implications that such 
an action would produce), in Mbarka’s case the principle of autonomy was given primacy in 
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deciding how to proceed in that context. The unconvincing supremacy of autonomy over 
sanctity of life (a particularly unusual value-hierarchy in Italy) leaves more than a little doubt 
over the authenticity of the authorities’ decision. In addition, the rushed attempt to save 
Mbarka’s life at the last moment, was symptomatic an inconsistent approach towards 
respecting the patient’s desire or lack thereof to be rescued from certain death. 
 
If future cases similar to that of Mbarka or Dax are to escape the biopolitical reading that 
accuses the relevant authorities of discriminatory behaviour, we should aim to arrive once and 
for all at standard positions with respect to HS, DF and forced treatment in general.  
 
Throughout this chapter additional controversies related to the use of the notion of autonomy 
in bioethical and legal contexts have been highlighted. Especially towards the end of the 
chapter, a biopolitical reading of the facts has been foregrounded, affirming that certain 
distinctions in bioethics are in fact functional to their political value. The next chapter of the 
thesis will look to provide a deeper engagement with the biopolitical dimension linking all of 
the cases considered in this work. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
A more consistent notion of Autonomy in relation to refusal of treatment 
 
Introduction 
 
Having analysed different situations in which the notion of autonomy has been evoked as a 
justification for either forcibly treating a person or not depending on the specific 
circumstances, this thesis went on to present a biopolitical reading of such dynamics, 
affirming that the awareness of this uneven approach to such controversial cases should push 
society towards a change in its engagement with them. 
 
In this final chapter, this work will provide a reformulation of autonomy that might function 
as a starting point for future policy, but -beyond that- as a new way of understanding and 
experiencing our interaction with the community around us, be it the impersonal relation with 
the state or -more importantly- the way we deal more directly with our fellow human beings. 
 
To this end, I will first analyse the attitude that Western bioethicists have towards the 
implementation of the notion of autonomy in current debates relating to the cases described 
thus far. It will be shown that, at present, the precondition that allows for disparity of 
treatment is mostly based on the fiction that objectivity is achievable in such delicate cases, 
and that autonomy is its direct interpretation. 
 
In criticising this dogmatic view I will look at Robert Burt’s approach to autonomy: it needs 
to be thusly individual-centred because it is at one and the same time the result and the 
product of a cyclical dynamic present in (and vital to) our society. To escape this recursive 
process I will focus my attention on Onora O’Neill’s work, adapting her concerns over the 
proper societal role of autonomy to cases of enforced treatment. The aim will be to suggest 
that O’Neill’s innovative understanding of Kantian autonomy (principled autonomy) is a 
consistent means of escaping the unsatisfactorily uneven treatment of patients in relatively 
similar bioethical debates, including dramatic examples of overriding refusal of medical 
treatment by enforcement.  
 
Mirko Daniel Garasic                                                                                                   Chapter 5 
97 
5.1- Autonomous action and autonomous person: who decides? 
 
The a priori justification used to legitimise the disparity of treatment in relatively similar 
cases is based on the assumption that authorities are capable of grasping a standard and 
objective version of autonomy and applying it fairly in specific instances.  
 
For example, the distinction between the autonomous action and the autonomous person, as 
explained by Alasdair Maclean in his book Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law, is 
the result of one specific way of understanding autonomy that contrasts the “objective truth” 
of what is autonomous in itself with the subjective capability of potentially -but not 
necessarily- perceiving it. He writes: 
 
“Autonomous persons will not always act autonomously and, where they do not, the act 
may be contrary to their long-term autonomy or other interests. This raises the thorny, 
but crucial, question of whether it is more harmful to interfere with a present non-
autonomous act or to allow that person to harm his or her autonomous life or future 
autonomy. Furthermore, the choice between protecting any decision of an autonomous 
person and only those decisions that are themselves autonomous as implications for the 
law since the latter position would justify a significantly greater degree of 
interference.”
170 
 
There is no doubt that the latter position results in greater interference by the authorities, but 
what is particularly attractive and merit-worthy in this idea is the fact that it manages to 
underline the necessary relevance of the political dimension of what can be permitted to an 
individual. 
 
The contrast between the possibility of respecting an autonomous person’s decisions “no 
matter what” and the scenario in which his or her decisions could not be allowed due to their 
contravention of the law flags up an important incongruity. The definition of an action as 
autonomous does not depend upon the outcomes of the action -as claimed in the second 
sentence of the quotation above- but instead upon the a priori legal permissibility. This way 
of understanding the law is certainly peculiar considering the well-accepted distinction 
                                                 
170 Maclean, A., Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law, CUP, 2009, p.12. 
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between the actus reus and mens rea ordinarily applied in Anglo-American contexts and 
already explained in some depth in Chapter 3. 
 
Moreover, there exists a certain tension between what is affirmed by Maclean in his first 
sentence and what can be deduced from the rest of the quotation. Surely, if a person goes to 
jail because she robbed a bank, this will affect her interests and future autonomy; but, if we 
consider her guilty of that crime and decide to put her in jail, we must accept that -as well as 
the actus reus- the mens rea was also present. Otherwise -as already outlined in previous parts 
of the thesis- we could not judge her to be guilty, at least not entirely. 
 
This is the paradox: in the scheme provided by Maclean, mens rea has the potential always to 
be present, therefore the suggested solution for complicated cases seems to be prevention of 
the actus reus. 
 
However, this way of dealing with the issue appears self-evidently unconvincing. If we stop 
people from acting on the grounds of what they are thinking, and potentially planning to do, 
we would enter a vortex that would quickly lead to the end of democracy and, more 
specifically, the dismantling of current legal systems that depend on the presumption of 
innocence. In fact, were such a power to be established as legitimate, it would be relatively 
easy to affirm that a person was “just about to do something” and preventively incarcerate 
them.  
 
In other words, adapting this consideration to the terminology used in the cases studied in this 
thesis, one might be defined to as an autonomous agent in terms of competence/capacity and 
yet not allowed to choose freely certain options not deemed correct by the authorities. In such 
a situation, however, doubts emerge over who defines the “correct”. 
 
The impossibility of detecting the “real” outcomes of an action for an agent is what 
undermines the second dimension of autonomy described above. Certainly, the dimension 
more directly related to freedom is this one, as it raises more questions regarding the influence 
of politics in establishing the correct way of understanding the specificities of a particular 
person’s case in order to deem him a qualified citizen entitled to be an autonomous person 
capable also of following a prescribed definition of autonomous action. 
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Assessing matters that concern how to live one’s life is a particularly challenging task in a 
society such as our Western one, where respect for individual choice constitutes such a 
fundamental value within our worldview.  
 
In his book Life’s Dominion, Ronald Dworkin stresses the difference between the personal 
value of life and its intrinsic value, with the intention of highlighting that personal value is the 
result not only of the foreseeable success and achievements that an individual can hope to 
experience within his lifetime, but also of its mistakes and sorrows. The natural (or divine) 
and human “investments” of which he talks in order to reconcile conservatives and liberals (at 
least momentarily) represent a scale upon which to measure many kinds of intrinsic 
readjustment that are active in reshaping our autonomy (or, more accurately, competence or 
freedom depending on the context). It follows, thus, that an individual’s understanding and 
affirmation of his autonomy can vary significantly in relation to, say, physical circumstances 
such as a serious sports injury. 
 
In fact, as detailed in Chapter 1, his vision of autonomy is centred on the notion that we 
should evaluate the past actions of an individual, his choices, desires and directives, as these 
could prove helpful in assessing the level of (what he terms) authenticity. 
 
In the same way that a physical accident might result in decisive growth for an individual, so 
might a decisional accident. If we preventively disbar human being from making even wrong 
decisions (within reasonable bounds) for the sake of a pre-established understanding of 
autonomy, we would not only deny her freedom of choice, but also, in utilitarian terms, we 
would also deprive wider humanity of the valuable contributions that each one of us can have 
by “investing” in him- or herself. 
 
In order to escape a direct answer to these important and pressing issues, bioethicists have 
attempted to separate their use of the notion autonomy from its political context. In the next 
section we will look more closely at this crucial step. 
 
5.2-Autonomy in Bioethics 
 
I have considered four cases in the course of this thesis. They are linked by their particular 
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approaches to individual-centred versions of autonomy, but there is another important aspect 
to take into account. This is properly highlighted by Burt in reference to the Dax case:171 it is 
incredibly difficult -or rather impossible- to establish with real certainty where to draw the 
line between our choices as “purely independent” individuals and the level of influence that 
those around us -family, friends, society- have upon our final decisions. It is this truth that 
leaves room for the idea that -in cases of AN and in the Dax case- the best solution would be 
not to proceed with enforced treatment. This common understanding of what is best for the 
sufferer leaves us with doubts about the predominant obsession with ensuring that an 
independent, autonomous individual can control his life, suggesting that this is not always the 
most appropriate, truly free nor morally justifiable type of choice. 
 
Yet, it remains the mainstream approach to most current bioethical controversies, as shown in 
our analysis of the Mbarka and Singleton cases. The ambiguity of the application of the 
notion of autonomy helps the system to adjust its interpretation in accordance to what best 
suits its reinforcement. Regarding this, about the Dax case Burt interestingly writes: “His 
adamant invocation of the legal system was seen by all of them as some considerable threat of 
power potentially at his command.”172  
 
A perfect example of the desired compartmentalisation of autonomy in relation to its intended 
sphere of application is hinted at in the title of a recent work written by James Stacey Taylor, 
Practical Autonomy in Bioethics.173  
 
At first glance, this title pushes the reader to assume that Theoretical Autonomy also exists. 
This presents us with two possibilities: first, there is a Theoretical Autonomy in bioethics; 
second, Theoretical Autonomy is not to be found in the field of bioethics, but its existence is 
surely guaranteed outside of this field. Even though Taylor acknowledged his awareness that 
some kind of theoretical counterpart to practical autonomy is necessary to portray fully the 
notion of autonomy, the ultimate aim of his work was to increase the gap between theory and 
practice. In other words, the intention of Taylor’s book -perfectly in line with the Anglo-
American approach to bioethics- was to reinforce the notion that bioethics concerns itself with 
processes and mechanisms absent from the rest of philosophy. So we can either see the 
                                                 
171 Burt. R., Taking care of strangers, Free Press, 1979. 
172 Burt, Ibid., p.68. 
173 Taylor, J., S.,  Practical Autonomy in Bioethics, Routledge, 2009. 
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dynamics within this discipline as exceptions that prove the rule, or alternatively as a field in 
which different rules altogether apply. 
 
Despite its noble intention -aiming to provide the necessary skills for doctors, nurses and 
health professionals called-upon to make split-second decisions in challenging conditions- 
this case-by-case, problem-solving approach runs the risk of diverting attention away from the 
necessary consideration of a coherent application of the principles applied in the various 
cases. 
 
There is a general consensus in the field of bioethics that sees this discipline -or branch of 
philosophy- as separate from other fields that hold concepts such as freedom or autonomy at 
their centre; namely, political contexts. 
 
In his book the Birth of Bioethics, when trying to establish whether or not bioethics can be 
described as a discipline, Albert Jonsen points out an important aspect peculiar to this field: 
“Only half of bioethics counts as an ordinary academic discipline […] The other half of 
bioethics is the public discourse: people of all sorts and professions talking and arguing about 
bioethical questions.”174 
 
This affirmation, of course, speaks to the intrinsic mission of bioethics, aiming -at least- to 
allow a direct interaction with the non-expert, with normal people, the masses.  
 
If we accept such a mission for bioethics, we must simultaneously become aware of the fact 
that a disappointment in the bioethical sphere can have direct repercussions in the public 
sphere, and it is for this reason that we urgently need to find a way to avoid such 
disappointments. 
 
In line with this “separatist” approach, for example, in Pragmatic Bioethics, Gleen McGee175 
argues that this detachment from its humanist heritage defines the specific character of 
bioethics: an application of theories in specific -in their vast majority medical- cases. He 
views this detachment as a positive development. 
                                                 
174 Jonsen, A., The Birth of Bioethics, OUP, 1998, p.346. 
175 McGee, G., (ed.),Pragmatic Bioethics, MIT press, 2003. This view is emphasised particularly strongly in the 
introduction, but it is present throughout the book.  
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However, I do not share this view, because, although bioethics can be defined as a separate 
discipline with a particular way of dealing with ever-changing practical issues rather than 
more essentially philosophical ones (injustice or causation, for example), its core values are 
strongly intertwined with the surrounding disciplines (law, politics, medicine) and must 
coherently and convincingly apply certain directives to distinct contexts. Otherwise, we risk 
not only a loss of trust in the field of bioethics, but also in its related fields, including politics. 
 
In order to properly understand the unevenness of applications of the notion of autonomy in 
relatively similar cases, I believe -in open contradiction of McGee’s approach- that the answer 
has to be found in the bigger picture rather than through limiting our analysis to a specific set 
of cases. Before proceeding any further, however, one final important aspect highlighted by 
Taylor as an example of the misleading way of understanding autonomy in bioethics. He 
writes: “The feature of practical autonomy that is at issue here is its (supposed) content-
neutrality”176  
 
This distinction is crucial when we make the a priori assumption -as often the case in 
bioethics- that the kind of autonomy to which we refer in bioethical contexts is different from 
that applied to politics. As such, I shall affirm -in line with Taylor- that autonomy is not 
content-free and that content-neutrality does not exist. 
 
As has been described, in more “scientific” contexts autonomy translates into competence or 
capacity where these concepts are considered to be more “objective” ways of assessing the 
capability (capacity/competence) of the individual to perform a certain task or action and, in 
doing so, to show her autonomy. 
 
However, through the use of the various examples put forward in the previous chapters, the 
concepts of competence and capacity are not insulated from “political directives” and are 
hence subjective. It follows that the very interpretation at which we arrive as a society -with 
certain common values, principles and shared dynamics shaping our perception of the 
acceptable- is not content-neutral but, rather, content-biased. In the next section of the chapter 
this concept will be expanded upon by explaining how and why an analysis of autonomy 
                                                 
176 Taylor, J., S., Op. cit., p.64. 
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cannot be convincingly detached from its political context. 
 
5.3-The necessary contextualisation of Autonomy 
 
A valuable contribution to our analysis of the content of autonomy can be achieved by 
reference to Daniel Callahan’s False Hopes,177 which details the undeniable truth that the 
Hippocratic Oath is in fact applied differently in similar cases. As Callahan explains, medicine 
cannot be considered to be value-free: its applications, priorities and taboos are deeply 
embedded in the governing power. We must realise in other words, that the idea of autonomy 
in bioethics can be properly understood only by analysing it in its socio-political context. 
  
Hence we should consider his critique towards Western medicine, which he finds to be too 
aggressive and too dependant upon the demands of a capitalist market that wants to solve its 
problems through the exacerbation of the conflicts of principles that it was responsible for in 
the first instance.178 
 
Capitalism needs autonomous agents to be “free” to make their decisions, particularly 
regarding what to buy and consume. So too do certain medical professionals. In line with the 
idea that the market decides provision, we have ended up with surgeons suggesting morally 
dubious aesthetic operations. However, as long as we can say that the autonomous, competent 
citizen should be allowed to choose freely amongst the available options, little can be done to 
prevent or even to dilute this profit-based understanding of medicine. 
 
In line with what was said in the previous section about the interdependence of bioethics and 
its political context, we must realise that what creates problems with the possibility of 
revising such an attitude is that it constitutes a pillar of most societies that have attained a 
certain level of development; any such internally directed critique could spread to other areas 
of the same system, ultimately threatening to destabilise the very foundations of the 
consumerist society in which we live and in which the cases considered were able to take 
                                                 
177 Callahan, D., False Hopes: why America's quest for perfect health is a recipe for failure, Simon and Schuster, 
1998. 
178 Whether intentionally or not, it seems that a common critique of extreme consumerism is shared by Callahan, 
Foucault and O’Neill. For reason of spaces the present investigation will not develop this connection any 
further, but for the purposes of this work, it will suffice to underline the role that consumerism has in 
medicine in contemporary Western society. 
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place. 
 
The need for autonomy to be so prominent in bioethical contexts results from its political 
value. Once the role of autonomy as the leading principle in bioethics is understood -an 
understanding to which this work aims to contribute- we will be able to embrace a new vision 
of autonomy that will help us to deal with relatively similar cases in the most appropriate 
manner without resorting to a patently biased interpretation of this notion. Callahan suggests 
two steps for achieving a more “sustainable medicine”: 
 
The first condition is to reduce the social problems that can create “medical damage” such as 
when authorities fail to provide sufficient information about a disease, for example. Surely, 
this can also apply to socio-economic injustices: had Singleton not been living in poverty, 
there is far less probability that he would have been involved in the grocery-store robbery 
which resulted in the murder for which he was convicted. In this hypothetical situation, his 
later development of schizophrenia would still have occurred, but the juridical element 
complicating the situation would not have been invoked. 
 
The second improvement that we should ensure is that unhealthy behaviour should be 
denounced, especially at a societal level. In this regard, plenty can be said in relation to AN, 
as many arguments would find Western society at least partially guilty of provoking the 
exponential rise in occurrence of this illness in recent times.  
 
Callahan’s argument reinforces the idea that autonomy is far from being content-free or 
content-neutral. On the contrary, it is strongly intertwined with and directed by the political 
system. In the next section we shall look at this interconnection from a biopolitical 
perspective.  
 
5.4-Conceptualising Autonomy in practice 
 
Achille Mbembe in “Necropolitics” picks up on ideas put forward by Foucault in affirming 
that it is through exercising “control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and 
manifestation of power”179 that sovereignty is ensured.  According to to Foucault, in fact: 
                                                 
179 Mbembe, A., “8ecropolitcs” (trans.) Meintjes, L., Public Culture, 15, no. 1, 2003, p.12. 
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“[Sovereignty] is not the right to put people to death or to grant them life. Nor is it the right to 
allow people to live or to leave them to die. It is the right to take life or let live.”180  
 
Lauren Berlant’s interpretation of Foucault’s position expands on this idea: 
 
“Life is the apriority; sovereign agency signifies the power to permit any given life to 
endure, or not. But biopower, he argues, which does not substitute for but reshapes 
sovereignty, is the power to make something live or to let it die, the power to regularize 
life, the authority to force living not just to happen but to endure and appear in 
particular ways.”
181 
 
The endurance and appearance of living are specific features that fit the consumerist political 
scheme described previously, but for the purposes of the present investigation our 
considerations will be more specifically targeted at the importance of these ideas to the cases 
presented in this work. To this end, let us briefly recap the biopolitical components implied 
(and applied for that matter) in each of the four contexts considered in this thesis. As we said, 
biopolitics deals with the way authority relates to the preservation or interruption of life. 
 
In cases of AN enforced treatment is carried out in order to keep the person alive. The 
acceptance of permitting a competent patient to choose when to interrupt her life-sustaining 
support is absolutely impermissible by society as this would leave an indelible stain on the 
law -as well as on the moral and political arenas- in a way that would hugely affect important 
topics such as abortion and euthanasia. As rightly pointed out by Ronald Dworkin,182 once the 
path of sanctity of life in itself is abandoned, both of the aforementioned issues should cease 
to raise arguments over their permissibility. The state, however, does not favour such a 
scenario because it would strongly undermine its power over its citizens’ lives. 
 
The Dax case was possible because of the same political fears on the part of the system, 
alongside the religious ones of his mother. Those around him did not want him to die, and so 
he was not permitted to. This method of dealing with these delicate situations does not require 
                                                 
180 Foucault, M., “17 March 1976”, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76, 
trans. David Macey, ed. Mauro Bertani et al., New York, 2003, p.240-41. 
181 Berlant, L., “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency)”, Critical Inquiry, 33, Summer 2007, p.756. 
182 Dworkin, R., Op. Cit. The whole book attempts to sustain this view, but Chapter 3 focuses directly on what 
we should consider sacred. 
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“evil individuals” willing to make the person in question suffer pointlessly. It might well be 
the case that the doctors and staff involved in the procedure override the patient’s will with 
the best of intentions. This, however, has little to do with autonomy. 
 
Contrary to the reading just given, in the Singleton and Mbarka cases, priority was instead 
given to the message that the state needed to reinforce in order to preserve order in society: if 
a rule is broken, there will be unavoidable consequences. Specific adherence to this motto 
resulted thus in the deaths of those concerned. 
 
In relation to this biopolitical analysis, Burt presents a fundamental truth that is in line with 
the classic Foucauldian understanding and description of power, but that expands it to include 
a level that is particularly utile to this work: the psychological need of some individuals to 
contingently categorise autonomy/non-autonomy for strictly practical reasons. Individual 
autonomy is a dynamic concept because it depends upon the individual that constantly 
redefines it. The definition of competence or capacity attempts to render such a claim false 
and standardise autonomy once and for all. With the varied examples provided in this thesis, 
we have shown that we are far from having achieved that. 
 
Nonetheless, this awareness seems far from being fully accepted, especially in the world of 
bioethics, where the case-by-case approach is often used. It is this unconvincing way of 
[mis]using autonomy that is most problematic: how can we substantiate in a credible manner 
an approach that considers every single case on its own terms and yet refers to standards of 
autonomy affirmed to be universal?   
 
Foucault provided a justification that has been highlighted already: power wants to preserve 
itself. As a result, it is embedded into every system of power, establishing rules that can be 
adapted and counter-adapted in accordance with the will of the sovereign in question. 
 
Burt’s contribution focuses on the specific agents of the system and their personal ways of 
dealing with the information provided by the sovereign power and their fellow human beings. 
In other words, Burt provides us with an extra layer the needs to be unveiled if we hope to 
arrive at a convincing solution. He points out that: 
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“the vocabulary of the libertarian tradition characterizes social relations as either 
voluntary or coerced and thus offers a false disjunction obscuring the coercions, in that 
vocabulary’s meaning, that frame all relations.”
183 
 
Particularly valuable to this project is the fact that Burt puts forward an explanation-
acceptance of “how things work in this world” that could represent a deeply influential and 
innovative way to allow a more direct interaction between the two major traditions of Western 
philosophy: the analytic tradition of bioethics and the continental-inspired biopolitics. Burt184 
applies a psychoanalytical approach to the two cases that he considers in a fashion that 
stresses the importance of the weight of the individual in enforcing certain given directives. 
 
This multilayer form of abnormality is the most likely driver of disparities of treatment. Such 
a claim is supported by the examples analysed above. In addition to their crimes, Singleton 
was black; Mbarka was both a Muslim and a foreigner; and in the cases of Dax and AN, the 
protagonists needed to be sacrificed so as to avoid undermining the idea of the sanctity of life 
upon which hinge other bioethical debates such as those on abortion, stem cell research, and 
euthanasia. 
 
Burt can be seen as the perfect link between the social and personal levels, as he analyses the 
psychological inputs and dynamics from a personal point of view, as well as from a social 
one. In doing so, he gives us the opportunity to pay the necessary attention to both levels of 
individual autonomy in the process of affirming his “freedom/autonomy”. 
 
The first level is constituted by what an individual can actually do. In this first level, 
                                                 
183 Burt, Op.Cit., p.44. 
184 I have found of particular relevance to the current work the consideration that Burt makes in describing the 
situation of Mrs Lake (his parallel of the Dax case). When Mrs Lake, an aged woman suffering from memory 
loss, is found by the police in a richer area than the one in which she “belongs”, this creates a spontaneous 
reaction of the system that -through its agent- classifies Mrs Lake as “dangerous to herself”. Even though, of 
course, this was only a way of ensuring no further danger for that richer community threatened by an outsider 
not fitting neatly into any of the readily available definitional boxes. The policewoman facing Mrs Lake is 
subconsciously forced to act in an intolerant manner, not because of some evil pre-judged intention to cause 
harm or humiliation to another human being, but simply because she cannot do otherwise. The value system 
in which the agent has been raised cannot conceive of behaviours such as those of Mrs Lake as potentially 
valid ways of interacting with society. This dimension of being “abnormal” in a given situation surely 
combines with a more evident and active prejudice on the part of the policewomen (for example, had Mrs 
Lake been wearing a very expensive dress, it might have been less likely that she would have been stopped in 
the first place as she would have been “entitled” to be in the area). For a more accurate description of the 
case, see in particular:  Burt, R., Op. Cit, p.35-39. 
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competence is involved and it is undeniably relevant. 
 
The second level concerns the level of autonomy bound by the outside world and its 
restrictions on the individual’s practical opportunity to enact his free choice. The reasons 
behind the impossibility of the “outside world” -namely authority- allowing for full freedom 
are twofold: the first reason is conscious and concerns the physiological repellence that 
authority (or power in Foucauldian terms) has towards any form of delegitimisation. After all, 
as Pierpaolo Pasolini said: “nothing is more anarchical than power.”185 
 
The second reason -and this is the dimension most brilliantly highlighted by Burt- focuses on 
the unconscious/subconscious incapability of specific actors within the “system”. This 
analysis reveals why it is necessary to separate his investigation into two distinct levels, as the 
loss of “objective” understanding of the individual position occurs because the representation 
of the state/authority is a person (i.e. another self-reflexive human being).186 
 
Having established and accepted this fact, one can shift the analysis back to how individuals 
came to be living in the situations in which they find themselves. The awareness that such 
dynamics exist in present society, alongside the fact that they are neither openly accepted nor 
addressed, produces a widespread mistrust in authorities, reinforced by the inconsistencies 
evident in bioethics. In the next section, a possible redirection of bioethical debates will be 
brought to the fore.  
 
5.5-Autonomy and Trust 
 
O’Neill attempts to address the limits of our current misinterpretation of autonomy in medico-
ethical contexts by stressing evidence of a parallel loss of public trust in inverse correlation to 
                                                 
185 Pasolini, P., the sentence is taken (and translated) from a RAI interview in which Pasolini affirmed that “nulla 
è più anarchico del potere.” Available at:  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNoIwq_TGFc [accessed on 4 
March 2011] 
186 In analysing the Dax case, Burt makes one particularly relevant statement: it is in the interest of the law to 
stress the importance of the self-determining dimension of the individual rather than the equally valid reality 
of the interconnection with the rest of the community. The latter would mean emphasising that the 
psychological dimension of autonomy cannot extricate itself from its real context. Burt interestingly gives 
relevance to the specific psychological reactions of authorities when faced with unconventional cases. This 
dimension of the analysis does not undermine the “more conscious” political meaning in disparities of 
treatment, but rather it should function as a good way of understanding more completely the complexity of 
dealing with unusual cases. Burt. R., Op. Cit, p.17-19.  
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the rise of the individualistic variant of this concept. Her position aims to underline the 
peculiarity of a situation in which an increase in concern for the rights of the individual has 
been accompanied but a growing “mistrust of various professions, experts and of public 
authorities”.187 Her argument proposes a move away from this variant of autonomy in favour 
of a redirection towards towards a more consistent way of dealing with the notion and its 
applications. 
  
When directly contrasted with trust, the rise in the value of the patient’s autonomy as the 
ultimate yardstick by which to judge fairness of treatment (be it interrupted or enforced) is 
even more likely to engender suspicion, as indeed it already has.188 Clearly, empirical 
evidence of changes to levels of trust in medical professionals varies greatly according to 
period and country, and O’Neill’s analysis -and thus my reference to it- relies on an 
acceptance of cited public opinion polls as valid which will not be disputed in this work. Yet, 
her work raises important questions related to the definition of autonomy: should we choose 
between respect for individual autonomy and relations of trust?189 Do the concept of 
autonomy and respect thereof necessarily undermine the possibility of their coexistence with 
trust? Is the loss of trust the only way to guarantee an increase of autonomy?190 In order to 
respond to these questions she draws a distinction between “individual autonomy” -which we 
might consider to be the mainstream understanding of autonomy- and “principled autonomy”, 
O’Neill’s own improved version, capable of combining autonomy and trust191 rather than 
counterposing them. 
 
According to O’Neill, the limits of the moral validity of individual autonomy lie in the 
implicit acceptance of independence as the key value amongst those necessary to shape an 
autonomous human being. Expressed thus, there would be no good reason for our 
independence to be limited in any way when deciding or acting, as the ultimately decisive 
condition would always be our own judgement, even if this might also result in the presence 
of disconnected individuals functioning in proximity if not connection. As O’Neill says: 
 
                                                 
187 O’Neill, O., Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, Op. Cit., p. 3. Notice the she particularly refers to UK. 
188 See for example: Callahan, D., “When self-determination Runs Amok”, The Hastings Center Report, 1992, 
p.52-55.  
189 O’Neill, Op. Cit, p.4. 
190 Ibid, p.16. 
191 Ibid., p.17: “Autonomy and trust are [...] compatible, and even mutually supporting”. 
Mirko Daniel Garasic                                                                                                   Chapter 5 
110 
“Independent action can be important or trivial, heroic or brutal, helpful or selfish, 
admired or distressing to others. If we view individual autonomy as mere independence, 
its merits will be highly variable”
192 
 
Not wanting to leave O’Neill’s point of view unquestioned, we should briefly mention Gerald 
Dworkin’s consideration of this point. O’Neill’s affirmation seems at first to be impervious, 
he notes, but we should bear in mind that is important to give relevance to the fact that such a 
“despicable” version of autonomy still manages to be consistent with other values such as 
loyalty or love.193 These qualities require an intrinsicly positive attitude towards the 
interaction with other individuals, resulting in a somewhat less ruthless version of autonomy 
than that described by O’Neill.  
 
Having explained the notion of individual autonomy, O’Neill moves on to address her main 
concern in the contemporary, mainstream understanding of autonomy: how does the increase 
of individual autonomy necessarily result in a decrease of trust?  
 
As mentioned above, and as pointed out by Alan Thomas,194 O’Neill highlights a paradox 
present in our society, and, more specifically, in the field of biomedical ethics: despite an 
undeniable increase of the patient’s autonomy in the patient-doctor relationship, the overall 
trust in the healthcare authorities has decreased drastically in recent years.195 If, on the one 
hand, we the patients have increased our power to enforce our autonomous decisions, on the 
other hand, we do not trust as before those individuals charged with putting into practice our 
decisions, namely the doctors. A possible explanation for this apparent contradiction can be 
found in the acknowledgement that the rise of autonomous decisional power in our society 
has affected all its components. As a result, it comprehensibly includes also the doctors 
involved in sensitive issues like abortion or withdrawal of treatment, producing cases where 
the will of the patient to be treated (or not) might clash with the will of the doctor to treat (or 
not). 
                                                 
192 Ibid., p.25.  
193 Dworkin, G., “Can you trust autonomy?”, The Hastings Center Report, 2003, p.42-44. 
194 Thomas, A., “Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics: a review”, Kent University, 2004, available at: 
http://ndpr.nd.edu/ [accessed on 19 December 2008]: “O’8eill’s central concern is the paradox that recent 
bioethics has seen an increase in the safeguarding of individual autonomy and yet increasing public mistrust 
of the professionals and institutions centrally concerned with bioethical issues”. 
195 Clearly, controversial cases like the ones presented in this thesis can hardly work in favour of reducing 
distrust of authorities. 
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A possible solution to this would be, as some feminist positions argue,196 a reevaluation of 
other values within the definition of autonomy. Rationality might well be central to autonomy 
but it is not the only value to consider when establishing whether an individual can be deemed 
autonomous or not. O’Neill aims to make this recognition the starting point for a reanalysis 
not only of the current state of the patient-doctor relationship, but more broadly of Kant’s 
definition of autonomy. Her conception of autonomy sees the principled autonomous agent 
obliged to make her choices within a predefined moral set of normative values, one way of 
overcoming the paternalism-autonomy dualism and allowing for an internal regulative system 
within the concept of autonomy. In other words, we allow an intrinsic form of paternalism in 
principled autonomy, thus overcoming the classical conflict between the two notions. 
Obviously, the conflict between external and internal assessment of what is permissible or not 
represents, in bioethical contexts as well as in more “purely political” ones, a problematic 
issue in itself. In order to synthesise the two levels of the argument, the next section of the 
chapter will provide a more psychological reading of autonomy that will help us understand 
the fundamental change that needs to occur in bioethics as well as in politics. However, there 
are alternative ways of dealing with autonomy that will be considered first. 
 
Robert Zaner’s work complements O’Neill’s idea of trust as a crucial social asset that might 
merit a more central role through its integration with autonomy:  
 
“The dialogical partners who are able to sustain moral dialogue, thus, effectively 
collaborate in each other’s freedom, as Gabriel Marcel long ago emphasized.
197
 
Freedom is not an act of solitary consciousness or pure will; it is rather the mutually 
enabling act which occurs, when and if it does occur, at the heart of moral dialogue.”
198 
 
We must understand that a standalone autonomous being is nothing but a mere cultural 
imposition and a practical impossibility in the vast majority of cases around the globe (with 
some scattered exceptions such as hermits and the like). 
 
                                                 
196 See, amongst others: Clement, G., Care, Autonomy, and Justice: Feminism and the Ethic of Care, Westview 
Press, 1996, Saharso, S., ‘Feminist Ethics, Autonomy and the Politics of Multiculturalism’, Feminist Theory, 
vol. 4, no. 2, Aug 2002, p.199-215, Mackenzie, C., and Stoljar, N., (ed.), Relational Autonomy: Feminist 
Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, OUP, 2000. 
197 As quoted in the book: Marcel, G., Le mystère de l’être, I, Aubier, Paris: Editions Montaigne, 1951, p.144. 
198 Zaner, R., M., Op. Cit., p.57. 
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Kant was aware of the social dimension of autonomy, and for this very reason he stressed the 
importance in refraining from following directives coming from heteronomous inputs.  Yet, he 
also stresses duty as a fundamental feature of autonomy. This is to say duty towards oneself, 
but also duties towards the universe, which obviously includes, in more specific and 
proximate terms, the members of society around us.199  
 
In acknowledging this truth, we must not fear a return to an era of imposition by the family, 
community or state over the single human being, but rather, we should take this opportunity to 
understand in greater depth the fact that it is human nature to be but relatively autonomous 
and independent from those around us. 
 
Clearly, this could sound repressive and limiting to people born and raised in a liberal context 
that exalts the absence of -active or passive- governance by others, but, as O’Neill rightly 
points out, other fields of applied ethics -environmental ethics above all- have already shown 
that the way out of our otherwise doomed future is to embrace a different prospective on the 
one global issue that could focus our communality of intent. Bioethical are no different 
because, as we have shown in this thesis, their supposed objectivity and detachment from a 
contingent political agenda is fictional, a fact that we would do well to remember. 
 
Once we realise that our freedom, our right to exercise our autonomy, depends upon the a 
priori decision that a certain given group of individuals takes over our spectrum of 
possibilities, it appears absurd to deny the necessity of interaction with others as an 
affirmation of one’s autonomy. If this is the case, however, the switch proposed is less drastic 
than it might first appear, as it is not a matter of fully reshaping our system of interaction with 
others as this still remains in place. What needs to be done is to change our modes of 
including others in the decisional processes that lead individuals to make certain choices. 
 
I partially agree with Zaner’s thoughtful claim that “freedom is therefore not a matter of 
                                                 
199 It might be worth considering Kant’s “political layers” of autonomy in Perpetual Peace, with the intention of 
applying this idea to the level of a single human being. “The state of peace among men living side by side is 
not the natural state (status naturalis); the natural state is one of war. This does not always mean open 
hostilities, but at least an unceasing threat of war. A state of peace, therefore, must be established, for in 
order to be secured against hostility it is not sufficient that hostilities simply be not committed; and, unless 
this security is pledged to each by his neighbor (a thing that can occur only in a civil state), each may treat 
his neighbor, from whom he demands this security, as an enemy.” Kant., I., Perpetual Peace, Section II, 
available at: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm#fn3 [accessed on 19 March 2011] 
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autonomy, but rather of mutuality.”200 Despite accepting that mutuality deserves much more 
of a central role than it is normally allowed, I would argue that autonomy should still be 
included but not in the current individual-centred version. 
 
Zaner also rightly points out that -when true dialogue is absent- forms of power take hold and 
decide what is to be done. After all, dialogue too can be a form of enforcing power: far too 
many examples of rhetorical argument would seem to confirm this assertion. Hence, we need 
to ensure a benevolent intention to exchange information and points of view, not only to 
accomplish a bureaucratic task (as the filling in of an informed consent form, for example, can 
be). 
 
We could therefore say that in all the cases considered in this work there was no intention to 
point out the need for a more intense form of dialogue because such an acknowledgement 
would have constituted a limitation -and perhaps a threat- to the [bio]power involved.  
 
We already touched upon the reason why the centrality of the individual is necessary to 
sustain the capitalist market-based approach that medicine has come to adopt, but in the next 
section I will point out medical exceptions (with particular emphasis on mental illness) to the 
Kantian Laws that are applied day to day. 
 
5.6-Political Awareness of the Limits of Autonomy 
 
Although the issue was raised in Chapter 1, it is important here to make some additional 
remarks concerning the political use of the classification of mentally ill patients (those that 
suffer limitations to their freedom due to the functional interpretation of “illness” according to 
a given political agenda). As Christopher Megone reminds us: 
 
“In 1960 Szasz argued that the concept of mental illness lacked literal meaning, that 
there was no such objective entity as mental illness and that the use of the concept (a 
use which could only be seen as metaphorical) had serious bad practical 
consequences.”
201 
                                                 
200 Zaner, Op.Cit., p.58. 
201 Megone, C., “Aristotle’s Function Argument and the Concept of Mental Illness”, Philosophy, Psychiatry, & 
Psychology, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, p. 187. 
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A related, if less controversial approach, could argue that what our contemporary society takes 
to be the standard notion of autonomy is not in fact as well-defined as it is believed to be. In 
other words, the very definition of what is autonomous and what is not has not been 
characterised in a full and satisfactory manner. This lack of clarity leaves space for us to 
ponder: could we not say that in fact the very notion of autonomy does not exist in a form 
sufficiently common to all contrasting positions to allow an acceptance of its literal, and more 
importantly legal, meaning?  
 
This key question brings us back to a historical reanalysis of the autonomy-trust dichotomy. 
The balance between the two has always focused on a use of trust functional to the defence of 
the circumstantial interpretation of autonomy. Hence, it would be worth considering the level 
of acceptance that we currently give, by default, to the role of medicine and to the related 
values that it is commonly held to be defending. In this process, we will quickly discover a 
further inconsistency in the application of principles that we tend to see as guaranteed. 
O’Neill starts her analysis by focusing on the inverse correlation between the rise of 
autonomy with the decrease of trust in biomedical and scientific authorities. One of the 
reasons is to be found in the unsatisfactory behaviour of these very authorities. By claiming to 
defend autonomy in line with its uncompromising Kantian variant (as described by Wolff and 
Feinberg in Chapter 1), the enforcement of treatment on the autonomous patient due to a 
contextual reinterpretation of his autonomy results incongruent and contemptible in the eyes 
of the public; only a shift to a more coherent policy could heal this rift. 
 
In this light, two very interesting interlinked points are raised by O’Neill. First, the 
“discriminatory treatment” that trust is subject to in medical ethics (i.e. when compared with 
environmental ethics) can be justified by the absence in the former context of less certain and 
more contingent outcomes of a given procedure. The second aspect to consider is an evolution 
of this first point: if there is no certainty over the direct damage caused by a given policy, 
what would convince the actors in power to accept a change that would weaken their 
privileged position? The answer to that question remains elusive, allowing for the continued 
strategic misinterpretation of autonomy along political rather than ethical lines. 
 
We have established that medicine is not value free. In line with this reanalysis of our 
assumptions about the prevalent scheme that we are led to believe is “objective”, it is 
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interesting to make an additional consideration that gives a more practical edge to this 
investigation. Mark Mercurio202 flags up the well-accepted practice, during the medical 
training period, of allowing not yet fully competent physicians to operate on patients as part 
of their training. Could we argue that consent is in fact a concept that conflicts with Kantian 
ethics?203 Kant’s universal law clashes with the practical truth that some patients are “forced” 
to accept treatment by doctors less capable than others, or, quite simply, not as well-trained as 
others, accepting thus their own use as means to the end of producing expert doctors.  
 
As Kant famously stated: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a 
means.”204 
 
This idea, widely assumed to underpin the Western tradition of medical practice, merits 
greater attention: we as a society accept a system that, by default, allows its members to be 
used as means to certain ends. However, it seems that we are still incapable of recognising 
such generalised contravention of the Kantian Laws, instead focusing our attention on specific 
cases where the idea of using an individual as a means to an end is deemed unacceptable. This 
inconsistency in analysing different situations reveals the political issues behind current 
debates over autonomy in medical ethics, O’Neill’s work proving particularly helpful in 
detecting these veiled dynamics. The acceptance of such inconsistency in medical practice is 
based on the idea of defending “the patient’s best interest”, but, as affirmed by Mercurio 
himself205, this view is rooted in a utilitarian model rather than on one willing to preserve a 
Kantian notion of autonomy. One possible way out of this deadlock would be to synthesise 
the two suggestions from O’Neill’s work: an “environmental approach” to medicine and the 
need to increase the value of trust in the patient-doctor relationship. 
 
The application of the first point would mean that we, as a society composed of single units, 
should push ourselves to focus more on the global impact of our own approaches to medical 
practice. This somewhat selfless attitude does not necessarily deny autonomy; on the contrary, 
                                                 
202 Mercurio, M., R., “An analysis of candidate ethical justifications for allowing inexperienced physicians-in-
training to perform invasive procedures”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 33, 2008, p.44-57. 
203 Le Marvan, P., and Stock, B., “Medical learning curves and the Kantian ideal”, J Med Ethics, 31, 2005, 
p.514. 
204 Kant., I., Op.Cit., p.36. 
205 Mercurio, M., R., Op. Cit, p.49. 
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one could argue that a broadening of the concern of our actions would enrich our knowledge 
of the facts, raising our level of competence and, as a result, promoting principled 
autonomous judgements. The other -and more important- switch that society would have to 
make relates to a necessary increase of the relevance of trust in biomedical (and political) 
decision-making processes. We shall now go on to discuss possible paths towards this goal. 
 
5.7-Reintroducing dialogue: the way to ensure Principled Autonomy 
 
In our attempt to reconnect the bioethical and the biopolitical spheres, we need to go back to 
the view expressed by one extremely anti-authoritarian Kantian already mentioned in Chapter 
1. In attempting to support his anarchic reading of Kant, Wolff writes: 
 
“As Kant argued, moral autonomy is a submission to laws that one has made for 
oneself. The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of 
another. The autonomous . . . man may do what another tells him, but not because he 
has been told to do it . . . By accepting as final the commands of the others, he forfeits 
his autonomy.”
206 
 
I want to emphasise that he concedes that “[a] man may do what another tells him”. Yet, he 
cannot opt to perform an action because someone pushes him, orders him or simply convinces 
him that he should do so. Rather, he would have to understand the rightness of the action by 
himself and only thus would it become justifiable to act -even if purely coincidentally- in line 
with the commands of others. 
 
As has been reiterated throughout the thesis, the controversial nature of the differential 
application of autonomy by certain authorities can indeed call into question the extent to 
which a person is capable of choosing autonomously. 
 
One of the descriptions given by Burt207 shows the clear need for society to categorise the 
                                                 
206 Wolff, R., P., In Defense of Anarchism, New York, Harper and Row, 1970, p. 14. My emphasis. 
207 See footnote 183 above. 
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“uncategorisable”208 in order -in mere political terms- to protect the status quo; a recognition 
of the irregularity and arbitrariness of such categorisations might well destabilise the system. 
It is for this reason that we have established a pyramidal structure favouring guardians of 
justice (be they policewomen, judges or lawyers) who will always perceive a priori the 
unusual external input as wrong or faulty (i.e. “the strange woman” quickly becoming “the 
crazy woman”) rather than as something with its own valid characteristics, additional and 
potentially positive. The fear of this additional categorisation is essential to the Manichean, 
absolutist view of individuals that the current scheme reinforces. 
 
Taking into account recognition (or knowledge) of the other risks opening us up to questions 
that we do not wish to answer, and thus -resorting to a conservative psychological approach- 
instead of considering something alien to my worldview as potentially enriching, I can more 
easily reject it altogether instead of questioning the extent to which I might actually agree 
with it. 
 
In this respect, Wolff does not depart significantly from the approach to autonomy that he 
criticises as a distortion of Kant. The reason for such an affirmation is that even if he is the 
first to point out that there are many signs in contemporary society that reveal its areas of 
malfunction, he shares O’Neill’s reevaluation of the centrality of trust. 
 
In his full frontal attack on any kind of heteronomous imposition, Wolff argues that even 
through an historical analysis of the media one can discern a societal trend towards the 
devaluation of the state: in the 30s when an FBI agent entered the frame of a film, people 
would have seen him as a positive character; today this would hardly be the case. This 
example, Wolff affirms, shows the increase of distrust that society has developed towards 
authorities, a very similar conclusion to the one reached by O’Neill albeit by a different path. 
The relevance of considering Wolff’s interpretation in this work, then, is to be found in his 
agreement with O’Neill’s conclusion: that the variant of autonomy employed by our system is 
neither satisfactory nor internally consistent.  
 
                                                 
208 It is a basic condition of established power to simplify a problem as much as possible as this makes it much 
easier to deal with. I will not articulate this position further here, but to challenge our own prospective of 
what is objectively “given” in the world out there, and what is filtered (and how) by the institutions of power, 
it is interesting to consider the contribution of Judith Butler’s work on gender. On that topic see: Butler, J., 
Undoing Gender, Routledge, 2004. 
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Even if O’Neill and Wolff share an acknowledgement of the increased loss of trust in 
authorities, the state and fellow human beings more generally, their substantive difference in 
reading Kant reflects their way of highlighting the importance of trust in a non-political sense. 
In fact, despite giving relevance to the value of trust (or more precisely its absence), Wolff 
does not leave much to the role of dialogue. The result is that, while for Wolff pointing out the 
loss of trust serves to de-legitimise political authority, for O’Neill the intention is to use trust 
in a more constructive way. We need to ensure that it enjoys a more central role in the 
decision-making process, be it political or bioethical, of a single individual or of a nation. We 
should consider the ability to trust each other a value and work on ways of encouraging and 
protecting its continued existence. 
 
In order to do so we need to shift our approach to autonomy towards a more principled 
variant. 
 
“Three conceptions of autonomy are commonly invoked and commonly confused in 
writing on bioethics. One of them, the Kantian conception of principled autonomy, can 
be set aside. It is often mentioned with respect, but hardly ever discussed in writing on 
medical and research ethics. Those who invoke Kant’s legacy and authority almost 
invariably overlook the fact that Kant used the term autonomy to refer not to a 
characteristic of the individuals,
209
 but to the formal properties of principles of action 
that can serve for all, and in particular to the combination of law-like form and 
universal form.”
210 
 
This relates also to what O’Neill hoped to underline when mentioning the continuing decline 
of trust, not only towards doctors and caretakers, but more broadly in the sense of actively 
constituting a [global] community. This loss serves a socio-political project that wants each 
individual citizen to be, first and foremost, a consumer, willing to focus -if not exclusively- at 
least primarily, on his or her “free choice”. 
 
However, this way of portraying and understanding autonomy distances itself from the notion 
                                                 
209 As quoted in the book: see Hill, T. Jr., “The Kantian Conception of Autonomy” in his Dignity and Practical 
Reason, Cornell University Press, 1992, p.76-96; O’Neill, O., “Self-Legislation, Autonomy and the Form of 
the Law”, in Recht, Geschichte, Religion: Die Bedeutung Kants für die Gegenwart, in Nagl-Docekal, H., and 
Langthaler ,R., Sonderband der Deutschen Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Akademie Verlag, 2004, p.13-26.  
210 Manson, N., and O’Neill, O., Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, CUP, 2007, p.17. 
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of duty highlighted above and also centrally important to Kant. Burt has very effectively 
shown how the level of heteronomous impact on one’s choices becomes increasingly difficult 
to detect as it improves its symbiosis with the established political system. It is duty that 
determines the distinction between individual autonomy and principled autonomy. 
 
Duty is a term that confines freedom within boundaries of what I ought to do, not only for me 
but also for the rest of the community. Crucially, O’Neill writes: 
 
“The Categorical Imperative, in all its versions, including the Formula of Autonomy, 
articulates this double modal structure of the supreme principle of reason for the 
domain of action: we must act on principles others can follow. So there is no gap 
between reason and principled autonomy, and specifically no gap between practical 
reason and principled autonomy in willing.”
211 
 
Our autonomy, our freedom of choice, our entitlement to give or refuse consent for treatment 
is not as independent from the external world as commonly portrayed in contemporary 
Western society. This does not mean that we need to abandon the undeniable improvements 
that individual autonomy has produced in bioethcial and political contexts. We only need to 
integrate them with principled autonomy. For the sake of stability, we have a duty to seek 
practical answers that can be understood by others. We do not need their approval (this would 
jeopardise our decisional power) but it is important that they can follow our perception and 
evaluation of the circumstances. To implement such a change, it is necessary for Western 
society to restore the relevance of dialogue as a means of upholding reason. 
 
We should use the cases considered to open our eyes to the misuse of autonomy in bioethics 
and to begin to renew the system of interaction between doctors and patients, citizens and 
authorities, where the level of trust between them could return to a level that will allow us to 
make the best possible choices, not based upon the sectoral interests of certain groups, but 
rather on what is right. 
 
 
 
                                                 
211 O’Neill, Op.Cit, p.92. 
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Conclusion 
 
Certainly, the issues highlighted above constitute but part of the reason for which a 
reconfiguration of the concept of autonomy in biomedicine proves so difficult and so 
unappealing to the authorities involved. More generally, such a change would reveal the 
numerous flaws dogging our current system. A partial solution, however, might be the 
reduction of the political power of doctors and -less directly at first- of authorities. The focus 
of my investigation has been the theoretical change that should be implemented a priori when 
considering the impact of autonomy in bioethical contexts. The solution for a more stable way 
of dealing with increasingly controversial cases where the interpretation of autonomy is at 
stake must be found at a more fundamental level than the current case-by-case approach 
allows. In the same way that informed consent gained relevance as a response to the atrocities 
of WWII and allowed humanity to progress, it is now time for autonomy to be reshaped in 
accordance to the evolution of medicine and technology. In conclusion, the consideration of 
O’Neill’s version of Kantian autonomy through the use of arguments both supportive and 
critical of her suggested move towards principled autonomy provides a viable alternative in 
cases where notions of autonomy, consent and freedom are inconsistently adapted and applied 
to sui authorities rather than the best interests of the patient. 
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Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, and in answer to the question raised by the title of this thesis, it appears clear 
that the line between being forced to be medically treated and being allowed to refuse medical 
treatment is indeed very thin. This already minimal distinction becomes even fuzzier when we 
bring into the picture the interdependent terms of freedom, consent and autonomy, themselves 
used interchangeably by various actors in bioethical and political contexts. 
 
Informed consent -a notion introduced to Western bioethics with the successful aim of 
enhancing the rights of the patient vis-à-vis enforced treatment- presupposes a level of 
competence that will allow the individual to process the information provided and 
subsequently to make an autonomous decision regarding her treatment. 
 
Competence (or capacity, technically speaking) is the term used to denote our level of 
autonomy, a concept near-impossible to grasp in a objective, “scientific” way. With the rise of 
this concept, patients were guaranteed more power over decisions concerning their health, and 
thus their freedom. In fact, a person has come to be allowed to exercise her freedom by 
autonomously choosing what to do with her life as long as she is deemed capable of making 
certain decisions, comply with certain tasks, and so forth. However, despite the undeniable 
improvements that this innovation has brought about, this thesis has considered various cases 
where the supposed objectivity that is at play in the evaluation of an individual’s level of 
competence is, in fact, deeply entrenched in politics.  
 
In order to highlight the complexity of such interactions it was necessary to provide an 
analysis of the current role of autonomy in Western bioethics, developed at two parallel 
levels: on the one hand, there existed a need to foreground specific cases (with their unique 
problems) so as to give the critique a more “real-world” edge and to flag up inconsistencies in 
the application of autonomy in various Western contexts (US, UK and Italy), demonstrating 
the urgent need to find a more satisfactory way of dealing with similar cases in the future.   
 
On the other hand, autonomy had to be considered in a broader sense that would not limit its 
analysis to the field of bioethics. Hence, in order to contextualise our critique of the current 
way of inconsistently applying the notion of autonomy, the first step taken by this work was to 
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provide a general understanding of the historical development of autonomy within the 
Western tradition, as well as the standard approaches utilised to define it. 
 
The initial premise of the thesis was that the advent of bioethics created new challenges for 
the way in which we understand and deal with autonomy. Since its incursion into 
philosophical debates, autonomy has needed constant readjustments in line with discussions 
over its appropriate definition and precise meaning, limits and value. In this process, the 
Anglo-American bioethical community has increasingly defined autonomy as a self-standing 
notion insulated from its political context, capable of being applied in different ways to 
relatively similar cases.  
 
This thesis has examined the validity of such an approach by bringing to the fore bioethical 
cases that clearly highlight the fictional status of the Anglo-American notion of autonomy in a 
vacuum. I have argued that we live in an era where everything is fast-paced. Unavoidably, this 
also affects the approach that doctors have towards their patients, and so the room for 
dialogue has often been reduced. Yet, it is important to realise that some medical practices are 
already failing to comply with the current standard Western approach in bioethics that entails 
an unwavering application of the individual-centred notion of autonomy. 
 
Such exceptions prove once more the subjugated status of bioethics in relation to its political 
context. We need to take this opportunity to pause and -using Onora O’Neill’s reading of 
Kantian autonomy- reshape the notion of autonomy in bioethical contexts with the intention 
of producing positive effects also in the political arena.  
 
In order to support this vision, the thesis followed a structure that, having broadly defined 
autonomy in bioethics and politics, began with the controversial adaptation of this concept to 
a specific case of refusal of life-saving medical treatment, before gradually expanding on 
doubts over the legitimacy of its [mis]use. 
 
Hence, in Chapter 1, we described how autonomy is currently defined in Western bioethics by 
reference to the two mainstream authors central to discussions of autonomy: Kant and Mill. 
Subsequently, autonomy was considered through the eyes of more recent and contemporary 
positions so as to prepare the ground for a debate over the validity of certain interpretations in 
Mirko Daniel Garasic                                                                                                 Conclusion 
123 
counter-position to others, and, most importantly of all, to analyse what might incline us to 
accept (if at all) its differential application in different contexts.  
 
After this introduction to general understandings and applications of autonomy in political 
and bioethical contexts, in Chapter 2 the reader’s attention was directed towards practical 
cases where controversy over how autonomy should be -and indeed is- applied to real life 
instances is most tangible. The focus on cases of refusal of naso-gastric treatment by patients 
suffering from Anorexia Nervosa constituted the first of these examples because it forces us to 
question the objective validity of certain presumptions that Western society tends to have 
regarding issues of this kind. Beginning with these controversial cases also helped us point 
out a very important aspect that needs to be considered if a convincing assessment of the 
definition of competence is to be achieved. 
 
The standard argument against compliance with the refusal of naso-gastric treatment is based 
on the idea that the autonomy of an individual should always be preserved and respected as 
long as it is possible to affirm that the individual is sufficiently competent to be deemed 
autonomous. The validity of this tautological approach, criticised thoroughly by the work of 
Giordano, was called into question, pointing out that we cannot categorically deny that, even 
if incompetent in relation to food, anorexics can still be considered competent enough to make 
decisions regarding their quality of life. Taking this position as reasonable, the justification for 
not accepting a refusal of treatment on the grounds of respecting an individual’s autonomy 
becomes rather weak. Indeed, it becomes weaker still if this hesitancy on the part of 
authorities involved in the decision turns out to be related to a well-defined political message 
concerning the necessary preservation of life itself. 
 
To establish the veracity of such a critical reading of cases of Anorexia Nervosa, in Chapter 3 
I introduced an additional case where enforced treatment was instead carried out in order to 
allow a killing to take place. The Singleton case extended the reach of discussions relating to 
the distinction between the theoretical realm and the practical question of what society should 
do in order to preserve and encourage respect for the autonomy of the individual, including in 
its practical implementation in current law. The biased application of categorisations of 
mental illness raised further questions over the function of defining certain individuals as 
competent or not in relation to how this limits their potential for action within a given system.  
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In stark contrast with the previously explored cases of Anorexia Nervosa, in fact, Singleton 
was forcibly treated against his will in order to enable his execution. 
 
The “preservation of life at all costs” attitude applied in cases of Anorexia Nervosa (based on 
the dominant view in Western bioethics that the sanctity of life must be defended where 
possible), seemed to have dissipated so as to make room for the conflicting societal desire to 
ensure that the necessary continuity of retributivism would not be jeopardised by one 
exceptionally complicated case. In further analysing this disparity, it was suggested that the 
enforced treatment suffered by Singleton could not be -and should not have been- justified 
even in conventional medical terms, as it appears obvious that curing someone only to kill 
him can hardly be described as “acting in his best interest” -the standard Hippocratic approach 
in Western medicine. 
 
Having explored the above situations as examples of a strategic use of autonomy in relation to 
cases involving mental illness, I then went on to consider other cases where the incompetence 
of the patients was not inherently implied in the condition of the person in question. In 
Chapter 4, the Dax case and the Mbarka case brought to the fore some additional doubts over 
the real nature of uneven treatment on the part of the authorities in relatively similar bioethical 
cases. These doubts compounded concerns over the relationship between the misuse of 
autonomy in bioethical cases and their political dimensions. 
 
Through an analysis of the unconvincing justification of enforced treatment (for Dax) and of 
its more or less complete absence (in the Mbarka case), Chapter 4 underlined more 
vehemently the need to understand these cases not as standalone exceptions to a well-
functioning rule, but rather as signs of reinforcement of a certain biopolitical agenda. 
 
Once again the crucial distinction between the two cases was related to the contrast between 
the disparity of application of the same notion: while for Dax the assessment of temporary 
incompetence led to a prolonged forced treatment, Mbarka’s enforced treatment was 
deliberately delayed on the grounds that respect for his autonomy had to be ensured, despite 
the fact that Hunger Strikes have been proved to produce temporary incompetence towards 
their final stages. I argued that, contrary to what in fact occurred, this awareness should have 
prompted authorities to apply the same care for Mbarka as they did in other circumstances 
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(including Dax’s), a change in approach which did not occur because of the political salience 
of the case.  
 
In comparing the two cases towards the end of the chapter, I utilised the work of Foucault to 
provide a biopolitical reading of the distinctions made in the two instances, affirming once 
again that it is impossible to ignore the political weight that each of the cases had in its 
specific context.    
   
In this respect it should be clear to the reader that -as explained in the introduction- owing to 
the conscious choice of this work to utilise a number sources to support the critical reading of 
autonomy that it hopes to have achieved, it has been necessary to limit the depth with which 
these various positions have been explored. 
 
The Foucauldian analysis employed here proceeded along the same lines. To be fair towards 
both his work and mine, it is important to understand that although my application of his 
theory refers to the discussion over autonomy with the intention of destabilising one of its 
interpretations in favour of another, I am aware that a more complete coverage of Foucault’s 
point of view would have required discussion of power relations even in the new scenario. 
 
In other words, differently from this thesis’s objective, Foucault’s critical analysis cannot be 
satisfied by the idea of principled autonomy as a concept free of power schemes and 
dynamics. I do not wish to contest the validity of such a view here, but it is important to 
acknowledge that I am aware of its existence and relevance. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 5 the biopolitical critique was expanded through the complementary 
application of Robert Burt’s work, underlining that the independent description of autonomy 
commonly recognised as an objective truth, is in fact fictional. This inaccurate definition of 
the way human beings interact with each other serves the specific political systems 
characteristic of Western society, requiring individuals independent in their choices to decide 
autonomously to consume whatever the market provides.  
 
As reiterated throughout this work, the definition of autonomy within the current individual-
centred system cannot provide reasonable grounds upon which to override refusal of 
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treatment in cases of Anorexia Nervosa (as preferable to the political and medical authorities), 
instead favouring enforced treatment in other contexts where the ultimate aim is to not 
preserve a life, such as the Singleton case. 
 
This acknowledgement should not prevent us from seeking more consistent alternative 
applications of the notion of autonomy. On the contrary, it is through this increased 
understanding that we should realise that autonomy could be used in a more consistent way if 
we were to apply the non-individualistic variant of it suggested by Onora O’Neill, which 
incorporates notions of duty and obligation towards the community. This may represent the 
best way of redefining the current Western approach to autonomy without falling into an 
inconsistent application of it: we are free to choose individualistically as long as our choice 
does not significantly affect society (be it the family, the state or the community).  Where it 
does affect society, authority comes into play and reaffirms what can and cannot be tolerated. 
 
Obviously, this restriction of one’s freedom in favour of authority is already present in the 
biopolitical dimension criticised throughout this work. My proposal for reducing the misuse 
of power is to enlarge the gamut of actors involved in decision-making so to ensure a more 
valuable form of dialogue, genuinely driven by the intention to serve the best interests of the 
person rather than a potentially malicious biopolitical agenda.  
 
A practical outcome of this reform might be the rethinking of the role of authorities in relation 
to individual autonomy. The increase in respect for the patient’s informed choice has 
undeniably been a positive achievement for the whole society, but it is perhaps time for us to 
state more clearly our need to reemphasise responsibility as suggested by O’Neill. The upshot 
of this would be the difficult acceptance of the legal implications of such an innovation in 
bioethics, which would in themselves mark the first reduction of the autonomy of the 
individual in the past twenty years. In fact, in relation to this point, we should not forget that 
Kant’s and Mill’s standard interpretations of autonomy would not leave much room for the 
permissibility of enforced treatment on a competent adult. As such, the person in question 
should be entitled to choose freely how to pursue her own understanding of happiness, which 
for anorexic patients might mean the end of the repetitive, demoralising procedure that naso-
gastric treatment represents. The only way that a possible justification could be found -and 
this is indeed the method used in the current legislation to prevent the interruption of 
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treatment- has to focus on Kant. That being the case, some of the less considered aspects of 
his view should be given greater relevance in order to rebalance the current bioethical crisis 
that we are faced with. Within the wide range of possible ways of reading Kant, the 
application of O’Neill’s approach to cases of refusal of treatment in Anorexia Nervosa may be 
the only way that will finally allow us to escape the unsatisfactory application of Categorical 
Imperatives currently favoured by our society. If bioethics is willing to keep on using the term 
“autonomy” without inconsistency, substantial changes will have to be made to its 
interpretation. 
 
Having acknowledged this link, I then suggested that O’Neill’s approach to autonomy also 
reduces the “inconsistency-gap”, such a remedy to current disparities of treatment could 
function as an inspiration to other fields as well.  
 
To conclude, and even if unable to substantiate the practical outcomes of such a suggestion in 
this instance, I believe that, in more practical terms, that Italy could represent an ideal state in 
which to implement this new less exclusively individual-centred version of autonomy. 
 
If we consider the fact that the Italian context (unlike the Anglo-American tradition) has never 
made such a neat switch towards that unquestioned prioritisation of the individual-centred 
variant of autonomy described in this thesis, we could hardly disagree that this aspect 
(presupposing agreement on the validity and necessity of a change in approach regarding 
autonomy) has created the perfect conditions for Italy to represent an example of how Western 
bioethical debates could be reshaped. 
 
Going back to the critique considered in Chapter 1, where Bruce Jennings argued against 
O’Neill’s suggestion that a detachment from the individual-centred form of autonomy is 
deeply unrealistic given its deep embeddedness in American society, we could affirm that by 
the same logic Italian society represents a far more conducive context in which to put into 
practice the concept of principled autonomy. Given that Italy is a liberal country that has 
never quite embraced the variant of autonomy criticised in this thesis, it remains in the 
advantageous position of not being destined to follow the same path towards the structural 
injustices manifest in other contexts, injustices bound to degenerate if not properly tackled, as 
evidenced by the unacceptable, politically driven resolution of the Mbarka case. 
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